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Introduct ion
We are in the midst of an information revolution, and we are only be-
ginning to understand its implications. The past few decades have
witnessed a dramatic transformation in the way we shop, bank, and
go about our daily business—changes that have resulted in an un-
precedented proliferation of records and data. Small details that were
once captured in dim memories or fading scraps of paper are now
preserved forever in the digital minds of computers, in vast databases
with fertile fields of personal data. Our wallets are stuffed with ATM
cards, calling cards, frequent shopper cards, and credit cards—all of
which can be used to record where we are and what we do. Every day,
rivulets of information stream into electric brains to be sifted, sorted,
rearranged, and combined in hundreds of different ways. Digital
technology enables the preservation of the minutia of our everyday
comings and goings, of our likes and dislikes, of who we are and what
we own. It is ever more possible to create an electronic collage that
covers much of a person’s life—a life captured in records, a digital
person composed in the collective computer networks of the world.
We are currently confronting the rise of what I refer to as “digital
dossiers.” A dossier is a collection of detailed data about an individ-
ual. Dossiers are used in European courts to assemble information
1
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about a person in order to reach a judgment. Today, through the use
of computers, dossiers are being constructed about all of us. Data is
digitized into binary numerical form, which enables computers to
store and manipulate it with unprecedented efficiency. There are
hundreds of companies that are constructing gigantic databases of
psychological profiles, amassing data about an individual’s race, gen-
der, income, hobbies, and purchases. Shards of data from our daily
existence are now being assembled and analyzed—to investigate
backgrounds, check credit, market products, and make a wide variety
of decisions affecting our lives.
This book is about how we should understand and protect privacy
in light of these profound technological developments. Our old con-
ceptions of privacy are not up to the task. Much of the law pertaining
to privacy is based on these conceptions, and as a result, it has failed
to resolve the emerging privacy problems created by digital dossiers.
This book aims to rethink longstanding notions of privacy to grapple
with the consequences of living in an Information Age.
The Problems of Digital Dossiers
New Technologies and New Problems. In earlier times, communities were
small and intimate. Personal information was preserved in the mem-
ories of friends, family, and neighbors, and it was spread by gossip
and storytelling. Today, the predominant mode of spreading informa-
tion is not through the flutter of gossiping tongues but through the
language of electricity, where information pulses between massive
record systems and databases. On the upside, this development
means that individuals can more readily escape from the curious eyes
of the community, freeing themselves from stifling social norms in-
hibiting individuality and creativity. On the downside, an ever-grow-
ing series of records is created about almost every facet of a person’s
life. As businesses and the government increasingly share personal
information, digital dossiers about nearly every individual are being
assembled. This raises serious concerns. The information gathered
about us has become quite extensive, and it is being used in ways that
profoundly affect our lives. Yet, we know little about how our personal
information is being used, and we lack the power to do much about it.
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Digital dossiers are constructed and used through three types of
“information flow.”1 Information flow is a way of describing the
movement of data. Like water in an elaborate system of plumbing,
data flows through information pipelines linking various businesses,
organizations, and government entities. First, information often flows
between large computer databases of private-sector companies. Sec-
ond, data flows from government public record systems to a variety of
businesses in the private sector. Indeed, many companies construct
their databases by culling personal data from public records. Third,
information flows from the private sector to government agencies
and law enforcement officials. The increase in digital dossiers has
thus resulted in an elaborate lattice of information networking, where
information is being stored, analyzed, and used in ways that have
profound implications for society.
Even if we’re not aware of it, the use of digital dossiers is shaping
our lives. Companies use digital dossiers to determine how they do
business with us; financial institutions use them to determine
whether to give us credit; employers turn to them to examine our
backgrounds when hiring; law enforcement officials draw on them to
investigate us; and identity thieves tap into them to commit fraud.
Computer Databases. Computers and cyberspace have vastly in-
creased our ability to collect, store, and analyze information. Today, it
seems as if everyone is collecting information—the media, employ-
ers, businesses, and government. Countless companies maintain
computerized records of their customers’ preferences, purchases,
and activities. There are hundreds of records detailing an individual’s
consumption. Credit card companies maintain information about
one’s credit card purchases. Video stores keep records about one’s
video rentals. Online retailers, such as Amazon.com, preserve records
of all the books and other items a person buys. And there are hun-
dreds of companies people aren’t even aware of that maintain their
personal information. For example, Wiland Services maintains a
database of about , different points of information on over 
million individuals.2 Acxiom.com collects and sells data on con-
sumers to marketers. In its InfoBase, it provides “[o]ver  demo-
graphic variables . . . including age, income, real property data,
3i n t r o d u c t i o n
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children’s data, and others.” It also contains data on education levels,
occupation, height, weight, political affiliation, ethnicity, race, hob-
bies, and net worth.3
Computers enable marketers to collect detailed dossiers of per-
sonal information and to analyze it to predict the consumer’s behav-
ior. Through various analytic techniques, marketers construct models
of what products particular customers will desire and how to encour-
age customers to consume. Companies know how we spend our
money, what we do for a living, how much we earn, and where we live.
They know about our ethnic backgrounds, religion, political views,
and health problems. Not only do companies know what we have al-
ready purchased, but they also have a good idea about what books we
will soon buy or what movies we will want to see.
Public Records. Imagine that the government had the power to compel
individuals to reveal a vast amount of personal information about
themselves—where they live; their phone numbers; their physical de-
scription; their photograph; their age; their medical problems; all of
their legal transgressions throughout their lifetimes; the names of
their parents, children, and spouses; their political party affiliations;
where they work and what they do; the property that they own and its
value; and sometimes even their psychotherapists’ notes, doctors’
records, and financial information.
Then imagine that the government routinely poured this informa-
tion into the public domain—by posting it on the Internet where it
could be accessed from all over the world, by giving it away to any in-
dividual or company that asked for it, or even by providing entire
databases of personal information upon request. Think about how
this information would be available to those who make important de-
cisions about an individual’s life and career—such as whether the in-
dividual will get a loan or a job. Also consider that, in many cases, the
individual would not even know that the information is being used to
make these decisions.
Imagine as well that this information would be traded among hun-
dreds of private-sector companies that would combine it with a host
of other information such as one’s hobbies, purchases, magazines, or-
ganizations, credit history, and so on. This expanded profile would
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then be sold back to the government in order to investigate and mon-
itor individuals more efficiently.
Stop imagining. What I described is a growing reality in the United
States, and the threat posed to privacy is rapidly becoming worse.
Federal, state, and local governments maintain public records span-
ning an individual’s life from birth to death. These records contain a
myriad of personal details. Until recently, public records were difficult
to access—finding information about a person often involved a scav-
enger hunt through local offices to dig up records. But with the Inter-
net, public records are increasingly being posted online, where
anybody anywhere can easily obtain and search them.
Government Access. The data in digital dossiers increasingly flows
from the private sector to the government, particularly for law en-
forcement use. Law enforcement agencies have long sought personal
information about individuals from various companies and financial
institutions to investigate fraud, white-collar crime, drug trafficking,
computer crime, child pornography, and other types of criminal ac-
tivity. In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September , ,
the impetus for the government to gather personal information has
greatly increased, since this data can be useful to track down terror-
ists and to profile airline passengers for more thorough searches. De-
tailed records of an individual’s reading materials, purchases,
diseases, and website activity enable the government to assemble a
profile of an individual’s finances, health, psychology, beliefs, politics,
interests, and lifestyle. Many people communicate over the Internet
using a screen name or pseudonym; the data in digital dossiers can
unveil their identities as well as expose all of the people with whom
they associate and do business.
The government has recently been exploring ways to develop tech-
nology to detect patterns of behavior based on our dossiers. In ,
it was revealed that the Department of Defense was developing a pro-
gram called Total Information Awareness (since renamed Terrorism
Information Awareness). The program begins with the government
amassing personal information from private-sector sources into a
massive database of dossiers on individuals. Profiling technology is
then used to detect those who are likely to be engaged in criminal
5i n t r o d u c t i o n
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activity. When Congress learned of Total Information Awareness, it
halted the program because of its threat to privacy. However, the
same type of collection and use of data envisioned by those who
dreamed up Total Information Awareness is already being carried out
by the government. The digital dossiers that continue to grow in the
private sector and in public records are now becoming a tool for the
government to monitor and investigate people.
What Is the Problem? The growing collection and use of personal infor-
mation in digital form has long been viewed as problematic—a fear
typically raised under the banner of “privacy.” The use of personal in-
formation certainly presents privacy problems, but what exactly is
the nature of these problems? Although the problems of personal in-
formation are understood as concerns over privacy, beyond this, they
are often not well defined. How much weight should our vague appre-
hensions be given, especially considering the tremendous utility,
profit, and efficiency of using personal information?
The answer to this question depends upon how these privacy
problems are conceptualized. Unfortunately, so far, the problems
have not been adequately articulated. Many discussions of privacy
merely scratch the surface by simply pointing out a series of techno-
logical developments with the assumption that people will react with
anxiety. Rarely do discussions about privacy delve deeper. We need a
better understanding of the problems; we must learn how they devel-
oped, how they are connected, what precisely they threaten, and how
they can be solved.
This book aims to reconceptualize privacy in today’s world of rap-
idly changing technology. The task of conceptualizing the privacy
problems digital dossiers create is of the utmost importance. As John
Dewey aptly wrote, “a problem well put is half-solved.”4 We can’t really
solve a problem until we know the harm that it causes. A good diag-
nosis of a problem goes a long way toward finding solutions to it.
The goal of this book extends beyond articulating a new under-
standing of contemporary privacy problems; the book also aims to
demonstrate the ways that the problems can be solved. In particular,
this is a book about the law. A relatively robust amount of law has de-
veloped to protect privacy, but it has often failed to be effective when
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confronted by the problems of the Information Age. This book dis-
cusses why this has happened and what can be done about it.
Traditional Conceptions of Privacy
Traditionally, privacy violations have been understood in a particular
manner. In this book, I contend that these ways of understanding pri-
vacy must be rethought in order to fully comprehend the problems
with digital dossiers. This doesn’t mean that these understandings are
incorrect. They arose with earlier privacy problems and can certainly
be of help in understanding digital dossiers. But these more tradi-
tional ways of understanding privacy don’t account for key aspects of
the unique problems the digital age has introduced.
Orwell’s Big Brother. The dominant metaphor for modern invasions of
privacy is Big Brother, the ruthless totalitarian government in George
Orwell’s novel 1984. Big Brother oppresses its citizens, purges dis-
senters, and spies on everyone in their homes. The result is a cold,
drab, grey world with hardly any space for love, joy, original thinking,
spontaneity, or creativity. It is a society under total control. Although
the metaphor has proven quite useful for a number of privacy prob-
lems, it only partially captures the problems of digital dossiers. Big
Brother envisions a centralized authoritarian power that aims for ab-
solute control, but the digital dossiers constructed by businesses
aren’t controlled by a central power, and their goal is not to oppress us
but to get us to buy new products and services. Even our government
is a far cry from Big Brother, for most government officials don’t act
out of malicious intent or a desire for domination. Moreover, Big
Brother achieves its control by brutally punishing people for disobe-
dience and making people fear they are constantly being watched.
But businesses don’t punish us so long as we keep on buying, and
they don’t make us feel as though we are being watched. To the con-
trary, they try to gather information as inconspicuously as possible.
Making us feel threatened would undermine rather than advance the
goal of unencumbered information collection. Finally, while Big
Brother aims to control the most intimate details of a citizen’s life,
much of the information in digital dossiers is not intimate or unusual.
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The Secrecy Paradigm. In another traditional way of understanding pri-
vacy that I refer to as the “secrecy paradigm,” privacy is invaded by
uncovering one’s hidden world, by surveillance, and by the disclosure
of concealed information. The harm such invasions cause consists of
inhibition, self-censorship, embarrassment, and damage to one’s rep-
utation. The law is heavily influenced by this paradigm. As a result, if
the information isn’t secret, then courts often conclude that the infor-
mation can’t be private. However, this conception of privacy is not re-
sponsive to life in the modern Information Age, where most personal
information exists in the record systems of hundreds of entities. Life
today is fueled by information, and it is virtually impossible to live as
an Information Age ghost, leaving no trail or residue.
The Invasion Conception. Under the traditional view, privacy is violated
by the invasive actions of particular wrongdoers who cause direct in-
jury to victims. Victims experience embarrassment, mental distress,
or harm to their reputations. The law responds when a person’s deep-
est secrets are exposed, reputation is tarnished, or home is invaded.
This view, which I call the “invasion conception,” understands pri-
vacy to be a kind of invasion, in which somebody invades and some-
body is invaded. However, digital dossiers often do not result in any
overt invasion. People frequently don’t experience any direct injury
when data about them is aggregated or transferred from one com-
pany to another. Moreover, many of the problems of digital dossiers
emerge from the collaboration of a multitude of different actors with
different purposes. Each step along the way is relatively small and in-
nocuous, failing to cause harm that the invasion conception would
recognize as substantial.
Rethinking Privacy
Digital dossiers pose significant problems, and for a more complete
understanding of these issues, I turn to another metaphor—Franz
Kafka’s depiction of bureaucracy in The Trial. Kafka’s novel chronicles
the surreal nightmare of a person who is unexpectedly informed that
he is under arrest but given no reason why. A bureaucratic court
maintains a dossier about him, but he has no access to this informa-
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tion. Throughout the rest of the novel, the protagonist desperately at-
tempts to find out why the Court is interested in his life, but his quest
is hopeless—the Court is too clandestine and labyrinthine to be fully
understood.
The Trial captures an individual’s sense of helplessness, frustra-
tion, and vulnerability when a large bureaucratic organization has
control over a vast dossier of details about one’s life. Bureaucracy of-
ten results in a routinized and sometimes careless way of handling in-
formation—with little to no accountability. This makes people
vulnerable to identity theft, stalking, and other harms. The problem is
not simply a loss of control over personal information, nor is there a
diabolical motive or plan for domination as with Big Brother. The
problem is a bureaucratic process that is uncontrolled. These bureau-
cratic ways of using our information have palpable effects on our
lives because people use our dossiers to make important decisions
about us to which we are not always privy.
Thus far, the existing law protecting information privacy has not
adequately responded to the emergence of digital dossiers. We need
to better articulate what the problems are, what is at stake, and what
precisely the law must do to solve the problems. We must rethink pri-
vacy for the Information Age.
A Roadmap for This Book
In part I, I explore the digital dossiers about individuals that are being
assembled through computer databases and the Internet. I focus pri-
marily on the activities of businesses. Chapter  traces the history of
the developing privacy problems precipitated by computer databases
and cyberspace. In chapter , I examine the prevailing ways that these
privacy problems have been conceptualized. I discuss the predomi-
nance of the Orwell metaphor and why it must be supplemented with
the Kafka metaphor. Chapter  discusses why the law of information
privacy has failed to grapple adequately with the problem of digital
dossiers. Chapter  responds to those who argue that the market
(alone or with some minor tinkering) can appropriately deal with the
problem. In chapter , I argue that beyond a set of individual rights,
protecting privacy requires an architecture that regulates the way
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information may be collected and used. Consequently, protecting
privacy must focus not merely on remedies and penalties for ag-
grieved individuals but on shaping an architecture to govern the ever-
increasing data flows of the Information Age.
Part II turns to the way in which public records contribute to the
problems of digital dossiers. Chapter  describes the increasing accu-
mulation of personal information in public record systems and the
emerging threats to privacy posed by the increased accessibility of
this information as records are made available on the Internet. In
chapter , I argue that the regulation of public records in the United
States must be rethought in light of the new technologies in the Infor-
mation Age, and I advance a theory about how to reconcile the ten-
sion between transparency and privacy. I also explore why regulating
the access and use of public records will not infringe upon First
Amendment rights.
Part III examines the problems created by the increasing govern-
ment access to digital dossiers. In chapter , I explore in detail the nu-
merous ways that the government is accessing personal information
held by private-sector businesses and why this is problematic. Chap-
ter  discusses how the Supreme Court has improperly interpreted
the Fourth Amendment so that it doesn’t apply to records maintained
by third parties, a result that virtually prevents the Fourth Amend-
ment from dealing with the problem of government access to digital
dossiers. In the void left by the inapplicability of the Fourth Amend-
ment, Congress has enacted a series of statutes to address the prob-
lem. As I explain, however, the statutes create a regulatory regime that
is uneven, overly complex, and filled with gaps and loopholes. In
chapter , I explore how the law should appropriately regulate gov-
ernment access to personal information maintained by the private
sector.
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The Rise of  
the Dig ita l  Doss ier
We currently live in a world where extensive dossiers exist about each
one of us. These dossiers are in digital format, stored in massive com-
puter databases by a host of government agencies and private-sector
companies. The problems caused by these developments are pro-
found. But to understand the problems, we must first understand
how they arose.
A History of Public-Sector Databases
Although personal records have been kept for centuries,1 only in con-
temporary times has the practice become a serious concern. Prior to
the nineteenth century, few public records were collected, and most
of them were kept at a very local level, often by institutions associated
with churches.2 The federal government’s early endeavors at collect-
ing data consisted mainly in conducting the census. The first census
in  asked only four questions.3 With each proceeding census, the
government gathered more personal information. By ,  ques-
tions were asked.4 When the  census included questions about
diseases, disabilities, and finances, it sparked a public outcry, ulti-
mately leading to the passage in the early twentieth century of stricter
laws protecting the confidentiality of census data.5
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Government information collection flourished during the middle
of the twentieth century. The creation and growth of government bu-
reaucracy—spawning well over  federal agencies within the past
century—led to an insatiable thirst for information about individuals.
One such agency was the Social Security Administration, created in
, which assigned nine-digit numbers to each citizen and required
extensive record-keeping of people’s earnings.
Technology was a primary factor in the rise of information collec-
tion. The  census required almost , clerks to tally information
tediously by hand—and it took seven years to complete.6 At the rapid
rate of population growth, if a faster way could not be found to tabu-
late the information, the  census wouldn’t be completed before
the  census began. Fortunately, just in time for the  census, a
census official named Herman Hollerith developed an innovative
tabulating device—a machine that read holes punched in cards.7 Hol-
lerith’s new machine helped tabulate the  census in under three
years.8 Hollerith left the Census Bureau and founded a small firm that
produced punch card machines—a firm that through a series of
mergers eventually formed the company that became IBM.9
IBM’s subsequent rise to prosperity was due, in significant part, to
the government’s increasing need for data. The Social Security System
and other New Deal programs required a vast increase in records that
had to be kept about individuals. As a result, the government became
one of the largest purchasers of IBM’s punch card machines.10 The So-
cial Security Administration kept most of its records on punch cards,
and by  it had more than  million cards in storage.11
The advent of the mainframe computer in  revolutionized in-
formation collection. The computer and magnetic tape enabled the
systematic storage of data. As processing speeds accelerated and as
memory ballooned, computers provided a vastly increased ability to
collect, search, analyze, and transfer records.
Federal and state agencies began to computerize their records. The
Census Bureau was one of the earliest purchasers of commercially
available computers.12 Social Security numbers (SSNs)—originally not
to be used as identifiers beyond the Social Security System—became
immensely useful for computer databases.13 This is because SSNs en-
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able data to be easily linked to particular individuals. In the s,
federal, state, and local governments—as well as the private sector—
increasingly began to use them for identification.14
Beginning in the s, the growing computerization of records
generated a substantial buzz about privacy. Privacy captured the at-
tention of the public, and a number of philosophers, legal scholars,
and other commentators turned their attention to the threats to pri-
vacy caused by the rise of the computer.15 Congress began to debate
how to respond to these emerging developments.16 In , the U.S.
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) issued a report
entitled Records, Computers, and the Rights of Citizens, which tren-
chantly articulated the growing concerns over computerized record
systems:
There was a time when information about an individual tended
to be elicited in face-to-face contacts involving personal trust
and a certain symmetry, or balance, between giver and receiver.
Nowadays, an individual must increasingly give information
about himself to large and relatively faceless institutions, for
handling and use by strangers—unknown, unseen, and, all too
frequently, unresponsive. Sometimes the individual does not
even know that an organization maintains a record about him.
Often he may not see it, much less contest its accuracy, control
its dissemination, or challenge its use by others.17
These problems continued to escalate throughout the ensuing
decades. Computers grew vastly more powerful, and computerized
records became ubiquitous. The rise of the Internet in the s
added new dimensions to these problems, sparking a revolution in
the collection, accessibility, and communication of personal data.
Today, federal agencies and departments maintain almost ,
databases,18 including records pertaining to immigration, bankruptcy,
licensing, welfare, and countless other matters. In a recent effort to
track down parents who fail to pay child support, the federal govern-
ment has created a vast database consisting of information about all
people who obtain a new job anywhere in the nation. The database
contains their SSNs, addresses, and wages.19
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States maintain public records of arrests, births, criminal proceed-
ings, marriages, divorces, property ownership, voter registration,
workers’ compensation, and scores of other types of records. State li-
censing regimes mandate that records be kept on numerous profes-
sionals such as doctors, lawyers, engineers, insurance agents, nurses,
police, accountants, and teachers.
A History of Private-Sector Databases
Although the government played an integral role in the development
of massive dossiers of personal information, especially early on, busi-
nesses soon began to play an even greater role. While the public-sector
story concerns the quest for regulatory efficiency, the private-sector
story involves money and marketing.
Long before the rise of nationwide advertising campaigns there
was a personal relationship between merchant and customer. Local
merchants lived next door to their customers and learned about their
lives from their existence together in the community. To a large ex-
tent, marketing was done locally—by the peddler on the street or the
shopkeeper on the corner. Mass marketing, which began in the nine-
teenth century and flourished in the twentieth century, transformed
the nature of selling from personal one-to-one persuasion to large-
scale advertising campaigns designed for the nameless, faceless
American consumer.
Mass marketing consumed vast fortunes, and only a small fraction
of the millions of people exposed to the ads would buy the products
or services. Soon marketers discovered the power of a new form of
marketing—targeted marketing. The idea was to figure out which
people were most likely to consume a product and focus the advertis-
ing on them.
In the s, the sales department of General Motors Corporation
began an early experiment with targeted marketing. GM discovered
that owners of Ford vehicles frequently didn’t purchase a Ford as their
next vehicle—so it targeted owners of two-year-old Fords and sent
them a brochure on GM vehicles.20 GM then began to send out ques-
tionnaires asking for consumer input into their products. GM be-
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lieved that this would be a good marketing device, presenting the im-
age of a big corporation that cared enough to listen to the opinions of
everyday people. GM cast itself as a democratic institution, its sur-
veys stating that it was “OF the people, FOR the people, BY the
people.” One GM print advertisement depicted a delighted child
holding up the survey letter exclaiming: “Look dad, a letter from Gen-
eral Motors!” The campaign was quite successful—ironically not be-
cause of the data collected but because of GM’s image of appearing to
be interested in the consumer’s ideas.21
Today, corporations are desperate for whatever consumer infor-
mation they can glean, and their quest for information is hardly per-
ceived as democratic. The data collected extends beyond information
about consumers’ views of the product to information about the con-
sumers themselves, often including lifestyle details and even a full-
scale psychological profile.
The turn to targeting was spurred by the proliferation and special-
ization of mass media throughout the century, enabling marketers to
tap into groups of consumers with similar interests and tastes. The
most basic form of targeting involved selecting particular television
programs, radio shows, or magazines in which to place advertise-
ments. This technique, however, merely amounted to mass marketing
on a slightly smaller scale.
The most revolutionary developments in targeted marketing oc-
curred in the direct marketing industry. The practice of sending mail
order catalogs directly to consumers began in the late nineteenth
century when railroads extended the reach of the mail system.22 The
industry also reached out to people by way of door-to-door salesper-
sons. In the s, marketers began calling people directly on the tele-
phone, and “telemarketing” was born.
Direct marketing remained a fledgling practice for most of the
twentieth century. Direct marketers had long accepted the “ per-
cent” rule—only  percent of those contacted would respond.23 With
such a staggering failure rate, direct marketing achieved its successes
at great cost. To increase the low response rate, marketers sought to
sharpen their targeting techniques, which required more consumer
research and an effective way to collect, store, and analyze information
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about consumers. The advent of the computer database gave mar-
keters this long sought-after ability—and it launched a revolution in
targeting technology.
Databases provided an efficient way to store and search for data.
Organized into fields of information, the database enabled marketers
to sort by various types of information and to rank or select various
groups of individuals from its master list of customers—a practice
called “modeling.” Through this process, fewer mailings or calls
needed to be made, resulting in a higher response rate and lower
costs. In addition to isolating a company’s most profitable customers,
marketers studied them, profiled them, and then used that profile to
find similar customers.24 This, of course, required not only informa-
tion about existing customers, but the collection of data about
prospective customers as well.
Originally, marketers sought to locate the best customers by identi-
fying those customers who purchased items most recently and fre-
quently and who spent the most money.25 In the s, marketers
turned to demographic information.26 Demographics included basic
information such as age, income level, race, ethnicity, gender, and ge-
ographical location. Marketers could target certain demographic seg-
ments of the nation, a practice called “cluster marketing.” This
approach worked because people with similar incomes and races
generally lived together in clusters.
The private sector obtained this demographic information from
the federal government. In the s, the United States began selling
its census data on magnetic tapes. To protect privacy, the Census Bu-
reau sold the information in clusters of , households, supplying
only addresses—not names. But clever marketing companies such as
Donnelley, Metromail, and R. L. Polk reattached the names by match-
ing the addresses with information in telephone books and voter reg-
istration lists. Within five years of purchasing the census data, these
companies had constructed demographically segmented databases
of over half of the households in the nation.27
In the s, marketers looked to supplement their data about con-
sumers by compiling “psychographic” information—data about psy-
chological characteristics such as opinions, attitudes, beliefs, and
lifestyles.28 For example, one company established an elaborate tax-
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onomy of people, with category names such as “Blue Blood Estates,”
“Bohemian Mix,” “Young Literati,” “Shotguns and Pickups,” and “His-
panic Mix.”29 Each cluster had a description of the type of person,
their likes, incomes, race and ethnicity, attitudes, and hobbies.30
These innovations made targeted marketing—or “database mar-
keting” as it is often referred to today—the hottest form of marketing,
growing at twice the rate of America’s gross national product.31 In ,
direct marketing resulted in almost $ trillion in sales.32 On average,
over  pieces of unsolicited advertisements, catalogs, and market-
ing mailings arrive every year at each household.33 Due to targeting,
direct mail yields $ in sales for every $ in cost—a ratio double that
for a television advertisement—and forecasters predict catalog sales
will grow faster than retail sales.34 Telemarketing is a $ billion a year
industry.35 In a  Gallup poll,  percent of U.S. companies used
some form of direct mail, targeted email, or telemarketing.36
The effectiveness of targeted marketing depends upon data, and
the challenge is to obtain as much of it as possible. Marketers discov-
ered that they didn’t have to research and collect all the information
from scratch, for data is the perspiration of the Information Age. Bil-
lions of bytes are released each second as we click, charge, and call. A
treasure trove of information already lay untapped within existing
databases, retail records, mailing lists, and government records. All
that marketers had to do was plunder it as efficiently as possible.
The increasing thirst for personal information spawned the cre-
ation of a new industry: the database industry, an Information Age
bazaar where personal data collections are bartered and sold. Mar-
keters “rent” lists of names and personal information from database
companies, which charge a few cents to a dollar for each name.37 Over
 companies compose the personal information industry, with an-
nual revenues in the billions of dollars.38 The sale of mailing lists alone
(not including the sales generated by the use of the lists) generates $
billion a year.39 The average consumer is on around  mailing lists
and is included in at least  databases.40
An increasing number of companies with databases—magazines,
credit card companies, stores, mail order catalog firms, and even tele-
phone companies—are realizing that their databases are becoming
one of their most valuable assets and are beginning to sell their data.
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A new breed of company is emerging that devotes its primary
business to the collection of personal information. Based in
Florida, Catalina Marketing Corporation maintains supermarket
buying history databases on  million households from more than
, stores.41 This data contains a complete inventory of one’s gro-
ceries, over-the-counter medications, hygiene supplies, and contra-
ceptive devices, among others. Aristotle, Inc. markets a database of
 million registered voters. Aristotle’s database records voters’
names, addresses, phone numbers, party affiliation, and voting fre-
quency. Aristotle combines this data with about  other categories
of information, such as one’s race, income, and employer—even the
make and model of one’s car. It markets a list of wealthy campaign
donors called “Fat Cat.” Aristotle boasts: “Hit your opponent in the
Wallet! Using Fat Cats, you can ferret out your adversary’s contribu-
tors and slam them with a mail piece explaining why they shouldn’t
donate money to the other side.”42 Another company manufactures
software called GeoVoter, which combines about , categories
of information about a voter to calculate how that individual will
vote.43
The most powerful database builders construct information em-
pires, sometimes with information on more than half of the American
population. For example, Donnelley Marketing Information Services
of New Jersey keeps track of  million people. Wiland Services has
constructed a database containing over , elements, from demo-
graphic information to behavioral data, on over  million people.
There are around five database compilers that have data on almost all
households in the United States.44
Beyond marketers, hundreds of companies keep data about us in
their record systems. The complete benefits of the Information Age
do not simply come to us—we must “plug in” to join in. In other
words, we must establish relationships with Internet Service
Providers, cable companies, phone companies, insurance compa-
nies, and so on. All of these companies maintain records about us.
The Medical Information Bureau, a nonprofit institution, maintains a
database of medical information on  million individuals, which is
available to over  insurance companies.45 Credit card companies
have also developed extensive personal information databases. Un-
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like cash, which often does not involve the creation of personally
identifiable records, credit cards result in detailed electronic docu-
mentation of our purchases.46
Increasingly, we rely on various records and documents to assess
financial reputation.47 According to sociologist Steven Nock, this en-
ables reputations to become portable.48 In earlier times, a person’s
financial condition was generally known throughout the community.
In modern society, however, people are highly mobile and creditors
often lack first-hand experience of the financial condition and trust-
worthiness of individuals. Therefore, creditors rely upon credit re-
porting agencies to obtain information about a person’s credit
history. Credit reports reveal a person’s consistency in paying back
debts as well as the person’s loan defaulting risk. People are assigned
a credit score, which impacts whether they will be extended credit,
and, if so, what rate of interest will be charged. Credit reports con-
tain a detailed financial history, financial account information, out-
standing debts, bankruptcy filings, judgments, liens, and mortgage
foreclosures. Today, there are three major credit reporting agencies—
Equifax, Experian, and Trans Union. Each agency has compiled ex-
tensive dossiers about almost every adult U.S. citizen.49 Credit reports
have become essential to securing a loan, obtaining a job, purchasing
a home or a car, applying for a license, or even renting an apartment.
Credit reporting agencies also prepare investigative consumer re-
ports, which supplement the credit report with information about an
individual’s character and lifestyle.50
Launched in , Regulatory DataCorp (RDC) has created a mas-
sive database to investigate people opening new bank accounts. RDC
was created by many of the world’s largest financial companies. Its
database, named the Global Regulatory Information Database
(GRID), gathers information from over , different sources
around the world.51 RDC’s purpose is to help financial companies
conduct background checks of potential customers for fraud, money
laundering, terrorism, and other criminal activity. Although some
people’s information in the database may be incorrect, they lack the
ability to correct the errors. RDC’s CEO and president responds:
“There are no guarantees. Is the public information wrong? We don’t
have enough information to say it’s wrong.”52
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Cyberspace and Personal Information
Cyberspace is the new frontier for gathering personal information,
and its power has only begun to be exploited. The Internet is rapidly
becoming the hub of the personal information market, for it has
made the peddling and purchasing of data much easier. Focus USA’s
website boasts that it has detailed information on  million peo-
ple.53 Among its over  targeted mailing lists are lists of “Affluent
Hispanics,” “Big-Spending Parents,” “First Time Credit Card Holders,”
“Grown But Still At Home,” “Hi-Tech Seniors,” “New Homeowners,”
“Status Spenders,” “Big Spending Vitamin Shoppers,” and “Waist
Watchers.”54 For example, Focus USA states for its list of “New
Movers”:
As much as % of the population moves every year. . . . New
movers have a lot of needs in their first few months. . . . During
this lifestyle change period, new movers tend to be more recep-
tive to direct mail and telemarketing offers for a wide variety of
products.
The database contains data about age, gender, income, children, In-
ternet connections, and more. There is a list devoted exclusively to
“New Movers With Children,” which includes data on the ages of the
children. A list called “Savvy Single Women” states that “[s]ingle
women represent a prime market for travel/vacation, frequent flyer
clubs, credit cards, investing, dining out, entertainment, insurance,
catalog shopping, and much more.”
There’s also a list of “Mr. Twenty Somethings” that contains mostly
college-educated men who Focus USA believes are eager to spend
money on electronic equipment. And there are lists of pet lovers, fit-
ness-conscious people, cat and dog owners, motorcycle enthusiasts,
casino gamblers, opportunity seekers, and sub-prime prospects.55
Dunhill International also markets a variety of lists, including “Amer-
ica’s Wealthiest Families,” which includes . million records “ap-
pended with demographic and psychographic data.”56 There are also
databases of disabled people, consumers who recently applied for a
credit card, cruise ship passengers, teachers, and couples who just
had a baby. Hippo Direct markets lists of people suffering from “med-
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ical maladies” such as constipation, cancer, diabetes, heart disease,
impotence, migraines, enlarged prostate, and more.57 Another com-
pany markets a list of  million elderly incontinent women.58 In addi-
tion to serving as a marketplace for personal information, cyberspace
has provided a revolution for the targeted marketing industry be-
cause web pages are not static—they are generated every time the
user clicks. Each page contains spaces reserved for advertisements,
and specific advertisements are downloaded into those spots. The dy-
namic nature of web pages makes it possible for a page to download
different advertisements for different users.
Targeting is very important for web advertising because a web page
is cluttered with information and images all vying for the users’ atten-
tion. Similar to the response rates of earlier efforts at direct market-
ing, only a small percentage of viewers (about  percent) click the
advertisements they view.59 The Internet’s greater targeting potential
and the fierce competition for the consumer’s attention have given
companies an unquenchable thirst for information about web users.
This information is useful in developing more targeted advertising as
well as in enabling companies to better assess the performance and
popularity of various parts of their websites.
Currently, there are two basic ways that websites collect personal
information. First, many websites directly solicit data from their
users. Numerous websites require users to register and log in, and
registration often involves answering a questionnaire. Online mer-
chants amass data from their business transactions with consumers.
For example, I shop on Amazon.com, which keeps track of my pur-
chases in books, videos, music, and other items. I can view its records
of every item I’ve ever ordered, and this goes back well over six years.
When I click on this option, I get an alphabetized list of everything I
bought and the date I bought it. Amazon.com uses its extensive
records to recommend new books and videos. With a click, I can see
dozens of books that Amazon.com thinks I’ll be interested in. It is
eerily good, and it can pick out books for me better than my relatives
can. It has me pegged.
Websites can also secretly track a customer’s websurfing. When a
person explores a website, the website can record data about her ISP,
computer hardware and software, the website she linked from, and
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exactly what parts of the website she explored and for how long. This
information is referred to as “clickstream data” because it is a trail of
how a user navigates throughout the web by clicking on various links.
It enables the website to calculate how many times it has been visited
and what parts are most popular. With a way to connect this informa-
tion to particular web users, marketers can open a window into peo-
ple’s minds. This is a unique vision, for while marketers can measure
the size of audiences for other media such as television, radio, books,
and magazines, they have little ability to measure attention span. Due
to the interactive nature of the Internet, marketers can learn how we
respond to what we hear and see. A website collects information
about the way a user interacts with the site and stores the information
in its database. This information will enable the website to learn
about the interests of a user so it can better target advertisements to
the user. For example, Amazon.com can keep track of every book or
item that a customer browses but does not purchase.
To connect this information with particular users, a company can
either require a user to log in or it can secretly tag a user to recognize
her when she returns. This latter form of identification occurs
through what is called a “cookie.” A cookie is a small text file of codes
that is deployed into the user’s computer when she downloads a web
page.60 Websites place a unique identification code into the cookie,
and the cookie is saved on the user’s hard drive. When the user visits
the site again, the site looks for its cookie, recognizes the user, and lo-
cates the information it collected about the user’s previous surfing ac-
tivity in its database. Basically, a cookie works as a form of high-tech
cattle-branding.
Cookies have certain limits. First, they often are not tagged to par-
ticular individuals—just to particular computers. However, if the
website requires a user to log in or asks for a name, then the cookies
will often contain data identifying the individual. Second, typically,
websites can only decipher the cookies that they placed on a user’s
computer; they cannot use cookies stored by a different website.
To get around these limitations, companies have devised strategies
of information sharing with other websites. One of the most popular
information sharing techniques is performed by a firm called Dou-
bleClick. When a person visits a website, it often takes a quick detour
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to DoubleClick. DoubleClick accesses its cookie on the person’s com-
puter and looks up its profile about the person. Based on the profile,
DoubleClick determines what advertisements that person will be
most responsive to, and these ads are then downloaded with the web-
site the person is accessing. All this occurs in milliseconds, without
the user’s knowledge. Numerous websites subscribe to DoubleClick.
This means that if I click on the same website as you at the very same
time, we will receive different advertisements calculated by Dou-
bleClick to match our interests. People may not know it, but Dou-
bleClick cookies probably reside on their computer. As of the end of
, DoubleClick had amassed  million customer profiles.61
Another information collection device, known as a “web bug,” is
embedded into a web page or even an email message. The web bug is
a hidden snippet of code that can gather data about a person.62 For
example, a company can send a spam email with a web bug that will
report back when the message is opened. The bug can also record
when the message is forwarded to others. Web bugs also can collect
information about people as they explore a website. Some of the nas-
tier versions of web bugs can even access a person’s computer files.63
Companies also use what has become known as “spyware,” which
is software that is often deceptively and secretly installed into peo-
ple’s computers. Spyware can gather information about every move
one makes when surfing the Internet. This data is then used by spy-
ware companies to target pop-up ads and other forms of
advertising.64
Legal scholar Julie Cohen has noted another growing threat to pri-
vacy—technologies of digital rights management (DRM), which are
used by copyright holders to prevent piracy. Some DRM technologies
gather information about individuals as they listen to music, watch
videos, or read e-books. DRM technologies thus “create records of
intellectual exploration, one of the most personal and private of ac-
tivities.”65
Copyright holders are also using computer programs called “bots”
(shorthand for “robots”). Also known as “crawlers” or “spiders,” bots
can automatically prowl around the Internet looking for information.
Industry trade groups, such as the Recording Industry Association of
America (RIAA) and the Motion Picture Association of America
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(MPAA), have unleashed tens of thousands of bots to identify poten-
tial illegal users of copyrighted materials.66 Spammers—the senders of
junk email—also employ a legion of bots to copy down email ad-
dresses that appear on the web in order to add them to spam lists.
Bots also patrol Internet chat rooms, hunting for data.67
As we stand at the threshold of an age structured around informa-
tion, we are only beginning to realize the extent to which our lives can
be encompassed within its architecture. “The time will come,” pre-
dicts one marketer, “when we are well known for our inclinations, our
predilections, our proclivities, and our wants. We will be classified,
profiled, categorized, and our every click will be watched.”68 As we live
more of our lives on the Internet, we are creating a permanent record
of unparalleled pervasiveness and depth. Indeed, almost everything
on the Internet is being archived. One company has even been sys-
tematically sweeping up all the data from the Internet and storing it
in a vast electronic warehouse.69 Our online personas—captured, for
instance, in our web pages and online postings—are swept up as well.
We are accustomed to information on the web quickly flickering in
and out of existence, presenting the illusion that it is ephemeral. But
little on the Internet disappears or is forgotten, even when we delete
or change the information. The amount of personal information
archived will only escalate as our lives are increasingly digitized into
the electric world of cyberspace.
These developments certainly suggest a threat to privacy, but what
specifically is the problem? The way this question is answered has
profound implications for the way the law will grapple with the prob-
lem in the future.
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Kafka and Orwel l
Reconceptua l iz ing  
In format ion Pr ivacy
The most widely discussed metaphor in the discourse of information
privacy is George Orwell’s depiction of Big Brother in 1984. The use of
the Big Brother metaphor to understand the database privacy prob-
lem is hardly surprising. Big Brother has long been the metaphor of
choice to characterize privacy problems, and it has frequently been
invoked when discussing police search tactics,1 wiretapping and
video surveillance,2 and drug testing.3 It is no surprise, then, that the
burgeoning discourse on information privacy has seized upon this
metaphor.
With regard to computer databases, however, Big Brother is incom-
plete as a way to understand the problem. Although the Big Brother
metaphor certainly describes particular facets of the problem, it neg-
lects many crucial dimensions. This oversight is far from inconse-
quential, for the way we conceptualize a problem has important
ramifications for law and policy.
The Importance of Metaphor
A metaphor, as legal scholar Steven Winter aptly defines it, “is the
imaginative capacity by which we relate one thing to another.”4 In
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their groundbreaking analysis, linguistics professor George Lakoff
and philosopher Mark Johnson observe that metaphors are not mere
linguistic embellishments or decorative overlays on experience; they
are part of our conceptual systems and affect the way we interpret our
experiences.5 Metaphor is not simply an act of description; it is a way
of conceptualization. “The essence of metaphor,” write Lakoff and
Johnson, “is understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in
terms of another.”6
Much of our thinking about a problem involves the metaphors we
use. According to legal philosopher Jack Balkin, “metaphoric models
selectively describe a situation, and in so doing help to suppress al-
ternative conceptions.” Metaphors do not just distort reality but com-
pose it; the “power [of metaphors] stems precisely from their ability to
empower understanding by shaping and hence limiting it.”7
Winter, as well as Lakoff and Johnson, focus on metaphors embod-
ied in our thought processes, pervading the type of language we use.8
The metaphors I speak of are not as deeply ingrained. Metaphors are
tools of shared cultural understanding.9 Privacy involves the type of
society we are creating, and we often use metaphors to envision diff-
erent possible worlds, ones that we want to live in and ones that we
don’t. Orwell’s Big Brother is an example of this type of metaphor; it is
a shared cultural narrative, one that people can readily comprehend
and react to.
Ascribing metaphors is not only a descriptive endeavor but also an
act of political theorizing with profound normative implications.10 Ac-
cording to Judge Richard Posner, however, “it is a mistake to try to
mine works of literature for political or economic significance” be-
cause works of literature are better treated as aesthetic works rather
than “as works of moral or political philosophy.”11 To the contrary, lit-
erature supplies the metaphors by which we conceptualize certain
problems, and Posner fails to acknowledge the role that metaphor
plays in shaping our collective understanding. Metaphors function
not to render a precise descriptive representation of the problem;
rather, they capture our concerns over privacy in a way that is palpa-
ble, potent, and compelling. Metaphors are instructive not for their
realism but for the way they direct our focus to certain social and po-
litical phenomena.
28 k a f k a  a n d  o r w e l l▲
George Orwell’s Big Brother
Orwell’s Totalitarian World. Journalists, politicians, and jurists often
describe the problem created by databases with the metaphor of Big
Brother—the harrowing totalitarian government portrayed in George
Orwell’s 1984.12 Big Brother is an all-knowing, constantly vigilant gov-
ernment that regulates every aspect of one’s existence. In every cor-
ner are posters of an enormous face, with “eyes [that] follow you
about when you move” and the caption “big brother is watching
you.”13
Big Brother demands complete obedience from its citizens and
controls all aspects of their lives. It constructs the language, rewrites
the history, purges its critics, indoctrinates the population, burns
books, and obliterates all disagreeable relics from the past. Big
Brother’s goal is uniformity and complete discipline, and it attempts
to police people to an unrelenting degree—even their innermost
thoughts. Any trace of individualism is quickly suffocated.
This terrifying totalitarian state achieves its control by targeting
the private life, employing various techniques of power to eliminate
any sense of privacy. Big Brother views solitude as dangerous. Its
techniques of power are predominantly methods of surveillance. Big
Brother is constantly monitoring and spying; uniformed patrols
linger on street corners; helicopters hover in the skies, poised to peer
into windows. The primary surveillance tool is a device called a “tele-
screen” which is installed into each house and apartment. The tele-
screen is a bilateral television—individuals can watch it, but it also
enables Big Brother to watch them:
There was of course no way of knowing whether you were being
watched at any given moment. How often, or on what system,
the Thought Police plugged in on any individual wire was guess-
work. It was even conceivable that they watched everybody all
the time. . . . You had to live—did live, from habit that became in-
stinct—in the assumption that every sound you made was over-
heard, and, except in darkness, every movement scrutinized.14
In 1984, citizens have no way of discovering if and when they
are being watched. This surveillance, both real and threatened, is
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combined with swift and terrifying force: “People simply disap-
peared, always during the night. Your name was removed from the
registers, every record of everything you had ever done was wiped
out, your one-time existence was denied and then forgotten.”15
Orwell’s narrative brilliantly captures the horror of the world it de-
picts, and its images continue to be invoked in the legal discourse of
privacy and information. “The ultimate horror in Orwell’s imagined
anti-utopia,” observes sociologist Dennis Wrong, “is that men are de-
prived of the very capacity for cherishing private thoughts and feel-
ings opposed to the regime, let alone acting on them.”16
Panoptic Power. The telescreen functions similarly to the Panopticon,
an architectural design for a prison, originally conceived by Jeremy
Bentham in .17 In Discipline and Punish, Michel Foucault provides
a compelling description of this artifice of power:
[A]t the periphery, an annular building; at the centre, a tower;
this tower is pierced with wide windows that open onto the inner
side of the ring; the peripheric building is divided into cells, each
of which extends the whole width of the building. . . . All that is
needed, then, is to place a supervisor in a central tower and to
shut up in each cell a madman, a patient, a condemned man, a
worker or a schoolboy. By the effect of backlighting, one can ob-
serve from the tower, standing out precisely against the light, the
small captive shadows in the cells of the periphery. They are like
so many cages, so many small theatres, in which each actor is
alone, perfectly individualized and constantly visible.18
The Panopticon is a device of discipline; its goal is to ensure order,
to prevent plots and riots, to mandate total obedience. The Panopti-
con achieves its power through an ingenious technique of surveil-
lance, one that is ruthlessly efficient. By setting up a central
observation tower from which all prisoners can be observed and by
concealing from them any indication of whether they are being
watched at any given time, “surveillance is permanent in its effects,
even if it is discontinuous in its action.”19 Instead of having hundreds
of patrols and watchpersons, only a few people need to be in the
tower. Those in the tower can watch any inmate but they cannot be
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seen. By always being visible, by constantly living under the reality
that one could be observed at any time, people assimilate the effects
of surveillance into themselves. They obey not because they are mon-
itored but because of their fear that they could be watched. This fear
alone is sufficient to achieve control. The Panopticon is so efficient
that nobody needs to be in the tower at all.
As Foucault observed, the Panopticon is not merely limited to the
prison or to a specific architectural structure—it is a technology of
power that can be used in many contexts and in a multitude of ways.
In 1984, the telescreen works in a similar way to the Panopticon, serv-
ing as a form of one-way surveillance that structures the behavior of
those who are observed. The collection of information in cyberspace
can be readily analogized to the telescreen. As we surf the Internet,
information about us is being collected; we are being watched, but we
do not know when or to what extent.
The metaphor of Big Brother understands privacy in terms of
power, and it views privacy as an essential dimension of the political
structure of society. Big Brother attempts to dominate the private life
because it is the key to controlling an individual’s entire existence: her
thoughts, ideas, and actions.
The Ubiquity of the Metaphor. Big Brother dominates the discourse of
information privacy. In , when the use of computer databases was
in its infancy, U.S. Supreme Court Justice William Douglas observed
that we live in an Orwellian age in which the computer has become
“the heart of a surveillance system that will turn society into a trans-
parent world.”20 One state supreme court justice observed that the
“acres of files” being assembled about us are leading to an “Orwellian
society.”21
Academics similarly characterize the problem.22 In The Culture of
Surveillance, sociologist William Staples observes that we have inter-
nalized Big Brother—we have created a Big Brother culture, where we
all act as agents of surveillance and voyeurism.23 “The specter of Big
Brother has haunted computerization from the beginning,” computer
science professor Abbe Mowshowitz observes. “Computerized per-
sonal record-keeping systems, in the hands of police and intelligence
agencies, clearly extend the surveillance capabilities of the state.”24
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Commentators have adapted the Big Brother metaphor to describe
the threat to privacy caused by private-sector databases, often refer-
ring to businesses as “Little Brothers.”25 As sociologist David Lyon
puts it: “Orwell’s dystopic vision was dominated by the central state.
He never guessed just how significant a decentralized consumerism
might become for social control.”26 Legal scholar Katrin Byford writes:
“Life in cyberspace, if left unregulated, thus promises to have distinct
Orwellian overtones—with the notable difference that the primary
threat to privacy comes not from government, but rather from the
corporate world.”27 In The End of Privacy, political scientist Reg
Whitaker also revises the Big Brother narrative into one of a multitude
of Little Brothers.28
Internet “surveillance” can be readily compared to Orwell’s tele-
screen. While people surf the web, companies are gathering informa-
tion about them. As Paul Schwartz, a leading expert on privacy law,
observes, the “Internet creates digital surveillance with nearly limit-
less data storage possibilities and efficient search possibilities.” In-
stead of one Big Brother, today there are a “myriad” of “Big and Little
Brothers” collecting personal data.29
Even when not directly invoking the metaphor, commentators fre-
quently speak in its language, evoke its images and symbols, and
define privacy problems in similar conceptual terms. Commentators
view databases as having many of the same purposes (social control,
suppression of individuality) and employing many of the same tech-
niques (surveillance and monitoring) as Big Brother. David Flaherty,
who served as the first Information and Privacy Commissioner for
British Columbia, explains that the “storage of personal data can be
used to limit opportunity and to encourage conformity.” Dossiers of
personal information “can have a limiting effect on behavior.”30 Oscar
Gandy, a noted professor of communications and media studies,
writes that “panopticism serves as a powerful metaphorical resource
for representing the contemporary technology of segmentation and
targeting.”31 As legal scholar Jerry Kang observes:
[D]ata collection in cyberspace produces data that are detailed,
computer-processable, indexed to the individual, and perma-
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nent. Combine this with the fact that cyberspace makes data col-
lection and analysis exponentially cheaper than in real space,
and we have what Roger Clarke has identified as the genuine
threat of “dataveillance.”32
Dataveillance, as information technology expert Roger Clarke defines
it, refers to the “systematic use of personal data systems in the investi-
gation or monitoring of the actions or communications of one or
more persons.”33 According to political scientist Colin Bennet, “[t]he
term dataveillance has been coined to describe the surveillance prac-
tices that the massive collection and storage of vast quantities of per-
sonal data have facilitated.”34 Dataveillance is thus a new form of
surveillance, a method of watching not through the eye or the cam-
era, but by collecting facts and data. Kang argues that surveillance is
an attack on human dignity, interfering with free choice because it
“leads to self-censorship.”35 Likewise, Paul Schwartz claims that data
collection “creates a potential for suppressing a capacity for free
choice: the more that is known about an individual, the easier it is to
force his obedience.”36 According to this view, the problem with data-
bases is that they are a form of surveillance that curtails individual
freedom.
The Limits of the Metaphor. Despite the fact that the discourse appro-
priately conceptualizes privacy through metaphor and that the Big
Brother metaphor has proven quite useful for a number of privacy
problems, the metaphor has significant limitations for the database
privacy problem. As illustrated by the history of record-keeping and
databases in chapter , developments in record-keeping were not or-
chestrated according to a grand scheme but were largely ad hoc, aris-
ing as technology interacted with the demands of the growing public
and private bureaucracies. Additionally, the goals of data collection
have often been rather benign—or at least far less malignant than the
aims of Big Brother. In fact, personal information has been collected
and recorded for a panoply of purposes. The story of record-keeping
and database production is, in the end, not a story about the progres-
sion toward a world ruled by Big Brother or a multitude of Little
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Brothers. Instead, it is a story about a group of different actors with
different purposes attempting to thrive in an increasingly informa-
tion-based society.
The most significant shortcoming of the Big Brother metaphor is
that it fails to focus on the appropriate form of power. The metaphor
depicts a particular technique of power—surveillance. Certainly,
monitoring is an aspect of information collection, and databases may
eventually be used in ways that resemble the disciplinary regime of
Big Brother. However, most of the existing practices associated with
databases are quite different in character. Direct marketers wish to
observe behavior so they can tailor goods and advertisements to indi-
vidual differences. True, they desire consumers to act in a certain way
(to purchase their product), but their limited attempts at control are
far from the repressive regime of total control exercised by Big
Brother. The goal of much data collection by marketers aims not at
suppressing individuality but at studying it and exploiting it.
The most insidious aspect of the surveillance of Big Brother is
missing in the context of databases: human judgment about the ac-
tivities being observed (or the fear of that judgment). Surveillance
leads to conformity, inhibition, and self-censorship in situations
where it is likely to involve human judgment. Being observed by an
insect on the wall is not invasive of privacy; rather, privacy is threat-
ened by being subject to human observation, which involves judg-
ments that can affect one’s life and reputation. Since marketers
generally are interested in aggregate data, they do not care about
snooping into particular people’s private lives. Much personal infor-
mation is amassed and processed by computers; we are being
watched not by other humans, but by machines, which gather in-
formation, compute profiles, and generate lists for mailing, email-
ing, or calling. This impersonality makes the surveillance less
invasive.
While having one’s actions monitored by computers does not in-
volve immediate perception by a human consciousness, it still ex-
poses people to the possibility of future review and disclosure. In the
context of databases, however, this possibility is remote. Even when
such data is used for marketing, marketers merely want to make a
profit, not uproot a life or soil a reputation.
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I do not, however, want to discount the dangerous effects of sur-
veillance through the use of databases. Although the purposes of the
users of personal data are generally not malignant, databases can still
result in unintended harmful social effects. The mere knowledge that
one’s behavior is being monitored and recorded certainly can lead to
self-censorship and inhibition. Foucault’s analysis of surveillance
points to a more subtle yet more pervasive effect: surveillance
changes the entire landscape in which people act, leading toward an
internalization of social norms that soon is not even perceived as re-
pressive.37 This view of the effects of surveillance raises important
questions regarding the amount of normalization that is desirable in
society. While our instincts may be to view all normalization as an in-
sidious force, most theories of the good depend upon a significant
degree of normalization to hold society together.
Although the effects of surveillance are certainly a part of the data-
base problem, the heavy focus on surveillance miscomprehends the
most central and pernicious effects of databases. Understanding the
problem as surveillance fails to account for the majority of our activi-
ties in the world and web. A large portion of our personal information
involves facts that we are not embarrassed about: our financial infor-
mation, race, marital status, hobbies, occupation, and the like. Most
people surf the web without wandering into its dark corners. The vast
majority of the information collected about us concerns relatively in-
nocuous details. The surveillance model does not explain why the
recording of this non-taboo information poses a problem. The focus
of the surveillance model is on the fringes—and often involves things
we may indeed want to inhibit such as cult activity, terrorism, and
child pornography.
Digital dossiers do cause a serious problem that is overlooked by
the Big Brother metaphor, one that poses a threat not just to our free-
dom to explore the taboo, but to freedom in general. It is a problem
that implicates the type of society we are becoming, the way we think,
our place in the larger social order, and our ability to exercise mean-
ingful control over our lives.
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Franz Kafka’s Trial
Kafka’s Distopic Vision. Although we cannot arbitrarily adopt new
metaphors, we certainly can exercise control over the metaphors we
use. Since understanding our current society is an ongoing process,
not a once-and-done activity, we are constantly in search of new
metaphors to better comprehend our situation.
Franz Kafka’s harrowing depiction of bureaucracy in The Trial cap-
tures dimensions of the digital dossier problem that the Big Brother
metaphor does not.38 The Trial opens with the protagonist, Joseph K.,
awakening one morning to find a group of officials in his apartment,
who inform him that he is under arrest. K. is bewildered at why he has
been placed under arrest: “I cannot recall the slightest offense that
might be charged against me. But even that is of minor importance,
the real question is, who accuses me? What authority is conducting
these proceedings?” When he asks why the officials have come to ar-
rest him, an official replies: “You are under arrest, certainly, more than
that I do not know.”39 Instead of taking him away to a police station,
the officials mysteriously leave.
Throughout the rest of the novel, Joseph K. begins a frustrating
quest to discover why he has been arrested and how his case will be
resolved. A vast bureaucratic court has apparently scrutinized his life
and assembled a dossier on him. The Court is clandestine and myste-
rious, and court records are “inaccessible to the accused.”40 In an
effort to learn about this Court and the proceedings against him,
Joseph K. scuttles throughout the city, encountering a maze of
lawyers, priests, and others, each revealing small scraps of knowledge
about the workings of the Court. In a pivotal scene, Joseph K. meets a
painter who gleaned much knowledge of the obscure workings of the
Court while painting judicial portraits. The painter explains to K.:
“The whole dossier continues to circulate, as the regular official
routine demands, passing on to the highest Courts, being re-
ferred to the lower ones again, and then swinging backwards and
forwards with greater or smaller oscillations, longer or shorter
delays. . . . No document is ever lost, the Court never forgets any-
thing. One day—quite unexpectedly—some Judge will take up
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the documents and look at them attentively. . . .” “And the case
begins all over again?” asked K. almost incredulously. “Certainly”
said the painter.41
Ironically, after the initial arrest, it is Joseph K. who takes the initia-
tive in seeking out the Court. He is informed of an interrogation on
Sunday, but only if he has no objection to it: “Nevertheless he was
hurrying fast, so as if possible to arrive by nine o’clock, although he
had not even been required to appear at any specific time.”42 Al-
though the Court has barely imposed any authority, not even specify-
ing when Joseph K. should arrive for his interrogation, he acts as if
this Court operates with strict rules and makes every attempt to obey.
After the interrogation, the Court seems to lose interest in him.
Joseph K., however, becomes obsessed with his case. He wants to be
recognized by the Court and to resolve his case; in fact, being ignored
by the Court becomes a worse torment than being arrested.
As K. continues his search, he becomes increasingly perplexed by
this unusual Court. The higher officials keep themselves hidden; the
lawyers claim they have connections to Court officials but never offer
any proof or results. Hardly anyone seems to have direct contact with
the Court. In addition, its “proceedings were not only kept secret from
the general public, but from the accused as well.” Yet K. continues to
seek an acquittal from a crime he hasn’t been informed of and from
an authority he cannot seem to find. As Joseph K. scurries through the
bureaucratic labyrinth of the law, he can never make any progress to-
ward his acquittal: “Progress had always been made, but the nature of
the progress could never be divulged. The Advocate was always work-
ing away at the first plea, but it had never reached a conclusion.”43 In
the end, Joseph K. is seized by two officials in the middle of the night
and executed.
Kafka’s The Trial best captures the scope, nature, and effects of the
type of power relationship created by databases. My point is not that
The Trial presents a more realistic descriptive account of the database
problem than Big Brother. Like 1984, The Trial presents a fictional por-
trait of a harrowing world, often exaggerating certain elements of so-
ciety in a way that makes them humorous and absurd. Certainly, in
the United States most people are not told that they are inexplicably
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under arrest, and they do not expect to be executed unexpectedly one
evening. The Trial is in part a satire, and what is important for the
purposes of my argument are the insights the novel provides about
society through its exaggerations. In the context of computer data-
bases, Kafka’s The Trial is the better focal point for the discourse than
Big Brother. Kafka depicts an indifferent bureaucracy, where individ-
uals are pawns, not knowing what is happening, having no say or
ability to exercise meaningful control over the process. This lack of
control allows the trial to completely take over Joseph K.’s life. The
Trial captures the sense of helplessness, frustration, and vulnerability
one experiences when a large bureaucratic organization has control
over a vast dossier of details about one’s life. At any time, something
could happen to Joseph K.; decisions are made based on his data, and
Joseph K. has no say, no knowledge, and no ability to fight back. He is
completely at the mercy of the bureaucratic process.
As understood in light of the Kafka metaphor, the primary problem
with databases stems from the way the bureaucratic process treats in-
dividuals and their information.
Bureaucracy. Generally, the term “bureaucracy” refers to large public
and private organizations with hierarchical structures and a set of
elaborate rules, routines, and processes.44 I will use the term to refer
not to specific institutions but to a particular set of practices—
specifically, how bureaucratic processes affect and influence individ-
uals subjected to them. Bureaucratic organization, sociologist Max
Weber asserts, consists of a hierarchical chain-of-command, special-
ized offices to carry out particular functions, and a system of general
rules to manage the organization.45 Bureaucracy is not limited to gov-
ernment administration; it is also a feature of business management.
The modern world requires the efficient flow of information in order
to communicate, to deliver goods and services, to regulate, and to
carry out basic functions. According to Weber, bureaucracy is “capa-
ble of attaining the highest degree of efficiency and is in this sense
formally the most rational known means of exercising authority over
human beings.”46 Bureaucratic processes are highly routinized, striv-
ing for increased efficiency, standardization of decisions, and the cul-
tivation of specialization and expertise. As Paul Schwartz notes,
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bureaucracy depends upon “vast quantities of information” that “re-
lates to identifiable individuals.”47 Much of this information is impor-
tant and necessary to the smooth functioning of bureaucracies.
Although bureaucratic organization is an essential and beneficial
feature of modern society, bureaucracy also presents numerous prob-
lems. Weber observes that bureaucracy can become “dehumanized”
by striving to eliminate “love, hatred, and all purely personal, irra-
tional, and emotional elements which escape calculation.”48 Bureau-
cracy often cannot adequately attend to the needs of particular
individuals—not because bureaucrats are malicious, but because
they must act within strict time constraints, have limited training,
and are frequently not able to respond to unusual situations in
unique or creative ways. Schwartz contends that because bureau-
cracy does not adequately protect the dignity of the people it deals
with, it can “weaken an individual’s capacity for critical reflection and
participation in society.”49 Additionally, decisions within public and
private bureaucratic organizations are often hidden from public view,
decreasing accountability. As Weber notes, “[b]ureaucratic adminis-
tration always tends to exclude the public, to hide its knowledge and
action from criticism as well as it can.”50 Bureaucratic organizations
often have hidden pockets of discretion. At lower levels, discretion
can enable abuses. Frequently, bureaucracies fail to train employees
adequately and may employ subpar security measures over personal
data. Bureaucracies are often careless in their uses and handling of
personal information.
The problem with databases emerges from subjecting personal in-
formation to the bureaucratic process with little intelligent control or
limitation, which results in our not having meaningful participation
in decisions about our information. Bureaucratic decision-making
processes are being exercised ever more frequently over a greater
sphere of our lives, and we have little power or say within such a sys-
tem, which tends to structure our participation along standardized
ways that fail to enable us to achieve our goals, wants, and needs.
Bureaucracy and Power. The power effects of this relationship to bu-
reaucracy are profound; however, they cannot adequately be ex-
plained by resorting only to the understanding of power in Orwell’s
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1984. Big Brother employs a coercive power that is designed to domi-
nate and oppress. Power, however, is not merely prohibitive; as illus-
trated by Aldous Huxley in Brave New World, it composes our very
lives and culture. Huxley describes a different form of totalitarian so-
ciety—one controlled not by force, but by entertainment and pleas-
ure. The population is addicted to a drug called Soma, which is
administered by the government as a political tool to sedate the peo-
ple. Huxley presents a narrative about a society controlled not by a
despotic coercive government like Big Brother, but by manipulation
and consumption, where people participate in their own enslave-
ment. The government achieves obedience through social condition-
ing, propaganda, and other forms of indoctrination.51 It does not use
the crude coercive techniques of violence and force, but instead em-
ploys a more subtle scientific method of control—through genetic en-
gineering, psychology, and drugs. Power works internally—the
government actively molds the private life of its citizens, transform-
ing it into a world of vapid pleasure, mindlessness, and numbness.
Despite the differences, power for both Orwell and Huxley oper-
ates as an insidious force employed for a particular design. The Trial
depicts a different form of power. The power employed in The Trial
has no apparent goal; any purpose remains shrouded in mystery. Nor
is the power as direct and manipulative in design as that depicted by
Orwell and Huxley. The Court system barely even cares about Joseph
K. The Trial depicts a world that differs significantly from our tradi-
tional notions of a totalitarian state. Joseph K. was not arrested for his
political views; nor did the Court manifest any plan to control people.
Indeed, Joseph K. was searching for some reason why he was ar-
rested, a reason that he never discovered. One frightening implication
is that there was no reason, or if there were, it was absurd or arbitrary.
Joseph K. was subjected to a more purposeless process than a trial.
Indeed, the Court does not try to exercise much power over Joseph K.
His arrest does not even involve his being taken into custody—merely
a notification that he is under arrest—and after an initial proceeding,
the Court makes no further effort even to contact Joseph K.
What is more discernible than any motive on the part of the Court
or any overt exercise of power are the social effects of the power rela-
tionship between the bureaucracy and Joseph K. The power depicted
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in The Trial is not so much a force as it is an element of relationships
between individuals and society and government. These relation-
ships have balances of power. What The Trial illustrates is that power
is not merely exercised in totalitarian forms, and that relationships to
bureaucracies which are unbalanced in power can have debilitating
effects upon individuals—regardless of the bureaucracies’ purposes
(which may, in fact, turn out to be quite benign).
Under this view, the problem with databases and the practices cur-
rently associated with them is that they disempower people. They
make people vulnerable by stripping them of control over their per-
sonal information. There is no diabolical motive or secret plan for
domination; rather, there is a web of thoughtless decisions made by
low-level bureaucrats, standardized policies, rigid routines, and a way
of relating to individuals and their information that often becomes
indifferent to their welfare.
The Interplay of the Metaphors. The Kafka and Orwell metaphors are
not mutually exclusive. As I will discuss in more depth in part III of
this book, the interplay of the metaphors captures the problems with
government access to digital dossiers. In particular, the government is
increasingly mining data from private-sector sources to profile indi-
viduals. Information about people is observed or recorded and then
fed into computer programs that analyze the data looking for certain
behavior patterns common to criminal or terrorist activity. This
method of investigation and analysis employs secret algorithms to
process information and calculate how “dangerous” or “criminal” a
person might be. The results of these secret computations have pal-
pable effects on people’s lives. People can be denied the right to fly on
an airplane without a reason or a hearing; or they can be detained in-
definitely without the right to an attorney and without being told the
reasons why.
In another example, political scientist John Gilliom’s study of the
surveillance of welfare recipients chronicles a world of constant ob-
servation coupled by an almost pathological bureaucracy.52 Recipi-
ents must fill out mountains of paperwork, answer endless questions,
and be routinely monitored. Often, they receive so little financial as-
sistance that they resort to odd jobs to obtain more income, which, if
41k a f k a  a n d  o r w e l l
▲
discovered, could make them ineligible for benefits. The system cre-
ates a strong incentive for transgression, severe penalties for any
breach, and elaborate data systems that attempt to detect any
malfeasance through automated investigations. The system com-
bines pervasive surveillance with a bureaucratic process that has little
compassion or flexibility.
A quote by noted playwright and author Friedrich Dürrenmatt best
captures how surveillance and bureaucracy interrelate in the Infor-
mation Age:
[W]hat was even worse was the nature of those who observed
and made a fool of him, namely a system of computers, for what
he was observing was two cameras connected to two computers
observed by two further computers and fed into computers con-
nected to those computers in order to be scanned, converted, re-
converted, and, after further processing by laboratory
computers, developed, enlarged, viewed, and interpreted, by
whom and where and whether at any point by human beings he
couldn’t tell.53
Surveillance generates information, which is often stored in record
systems and used for new purposes. Being watched and inhibited in
one’s behavior is only one part of the problem; the other dimension is
that the data is warehoused for unknown future uses. This is where
Orwell meets Kafka.
Beyond the Secrecy Paradigm
Understanding the database privacy problem in terms of the Kafka
metaphor illustrates that the problem with databases concerns the
use of information, not merely keeping it secret. Traditionally, privacy
problems have been understood as invasions into one’s hidden
world. Privacy is about concealment, and it is invaded by watching
and by public disclosure of confidential information. I refer to this
understanding of privacy as the “secrecy paradigm.” This paradigm is
so embedded in our privacy discourse that privacy is often repre-
sented visually by a roving eye, an open keyhole, or a person peeking
through Venetian blinds.
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Information about an individual, however, is often not secret, but
is diffused in the minds of a multitude of people and scattered in var-
ious documents and computer files across the country. Few would be
embarrassed by the disclosure of much of the material they read, the
food they eat, or the products they purchase. Few would view their
race, ethnicity, marital status, or religion as confidential. Of course,
databases may contain the residue of scandals and skeletons—illicit
websites, racy books, stigmatizing diseases—but since information in
databases is rarely publicized, few reputations are tarnished. For the
most part, the data is processed impersonally by computers without
ever being viewed by the human eye. The secrecy paradigm focuses
on breached confidentiality, harmed reputation, and unwanted pub-
licity. But since these harms are not really the central problems of
databases, privacy law often concludes that the information in data-
bases is not private and is thus not entitled to protection. Indeed, one
commentator defended DoubleClick’s tracking of web browsing
habits by stating:
Over time, people will realize it’s not Big Brother who’s going to
show up [at] your door in a black ski mask and take your kids
away or dig deep into your medical history. This is a situation
where you are essentially dropped into a bucket with  million
people who look and feel a lot like you do to the advertising com-
pany.54
This commentator, viewing privacy with the Big Brother metaphor,
focuses on the wrong types of harms and implicitly views only secret
information as private.
The problem with databases pertains to the uses and practices as-
sociated with our information, not merely whether that information
remains completely secret. Although disclosure can be a violation of
privacy, this does not mean that avoiding disclosure is the sum and
substance of our interest in privacy. What people want when they de-
mand privacy with regard to their personal information is the ability
to ensure that the information about them will be used only for the
purposes they desire. Even regarding the confidentiality of informa-
tion, the understanding of privacy as secrecy fails to recognize that
individuals want to keep things private from some people but not
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others. The fact that an employee criticizes her boss to a co-worker
does not mean that she wants her boss to know what she said.
Helen Nissenbaum, a professor of information technology, is quite
right to argue that we often expect privacy even when in public.55 Not
all activities are purely private in the sense that they occur in isolation
and in hidden corners. When we talk in a restaurant, we do not expect
to be listened to. A person may buy condoms or hemorrhoid medica-
tion in a store open to the public, but certainly expects these pur-
chases to be private activities. Contrary to the notion that any
information in public records cannot be private, there is a consider-
able loss of privacy by plucking inaccessible facts buried in some ob-
scure document and broadcasting them to the world on the evening
news. Privacy can be infringed even if no secrets are revealed and
even if nobody is watching us.
The Aggregation Effect
The digital revolution has enabled information to be easily amassed
and combined. Even information that is superficial or incomplete can
be quite useful in obtaining more data about individuals. Information
breeds information. For example, although one’s SSN does not in and
of itself reveal much about an individual, it provides access to one’s
financial information, educational records, medical records, and a
whole host of other information. As law professor Julie Cohen notes,
“[a] comprehensive collection of data about an individual is vastly
more than the sum of its parts.”56 I refer to this phenomenon as the
“aggregation effect.” Similar to a Seurat painting, where a multitude
of dots juxtaposed together form a picture, bits of information when
aggregated paint a portrait of a person.
In the Information Age, personal data is being combined to create
a digital biography about us. Information that appears innocuous can
sometimes be the missing link, the critical detail in one’s digital biog-
raphy, or the key necessary to unlock other stores of personal infor-
mation. But why should we be concerned about a biography that
includes details about what type of soap a person buys, whether she
prefers Pepsi to Coca-Cola, or whether she likes to shop at Macy’s
rather than Kmart? As legal scholar Stan Karas points out, the prod-
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ucts we consume are expressive of our identities.57 We have many
choices in the products we buy, and even particular brands symbolize
certain personality traits and personal characteristics. Karas notes
that Pepsi has marketed itself to a younger, more rebellious consumer
than Coca-Cola, which emphasizes old-fashioned and traditional im-
ages in its advertisements.58 Whether punk, yuppie, or hippie, people
often follow a particular consumption pattern that reflects the sub-
culture with which they identify.59
Of course, the products we buy are not wholly reflective of our
identities. A scene from Henry James’s Portrait of a Lady best captures
the complexities of the situation. Madame Merle, wise in the ways of
the world yet jaded and selfish, is speaking to Isabel Archer, a young
American lady in Europe full of great aspirations of living a bold and
exceptional life, far beyond convention. Merle declares: “What shall
we call our ‘self’? Where does it begin? Where does it end? It overflows
into everything that belongs to us—and then it flows back again. I
know a large part of myself is the clothes I choose to wear. I’ve a great
respect for things!” Isabel disagrees: “nothing that belongs to me is
any measure of me.” “My clothes only express the dressmaker,” Isabel
says, “but they don’t express me. To begin with, it is not my own
choice that I wear them; they’ve been imposed upon me by society.”60
Merle is obsessed by things, and she views herself as deeply inter-
twined with her possessions. The objects she owns and purchases are
deeply constitutive of her personality. Isabel, in her proud individual-
ism, claims that she is vastly distinct from what she owns and wears.
Indeed, for her, things are a tool for conformity; they do not express
anything authentic about herself.
Yet Madame Merle has a point—the information is indeed expres-
sive. But Isabel is right, too—this information is somewhat superfi-
cial, and it only partially captures who we are. Although the digital
biography contains a host of details about a person, it captures a dis-
torted persona, one who is constructed by a variety of external de-
tails.61 Although the information marketers glean about us can be
quite revealing, it still cannot penetrate into our thoughts and often
only partially captures who we are.62 Information about our property,
our professions, our purchases, our finances, and our medical history
does not tell the whole story. We are more than the bits of data we give
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off as we go about our lives. Our digital biography is revealing of our-
selves but in a rather standardized way. It consists of bits of informa-
tion pre-defined based on the judgment of some entity about what
categories of information are relevant or important. We are partially
captured by details such as our age, race, gender, net worth, property
owned, and so on, but only in a manner that standardizes us into
types or categories. Indeed, database marketers frequently classify
consumers into certain categories based on stereotypes about their
values, lifestyle, and purchasing habits. As Julie Cohen observes, peo-
ple are not simply “reducible to the sum of their transactions, genetic
markers, and other measurable attributes.”63
Our digital biography is thus an unauthorized one, only partially
true and very reductive. We must all live with these unauthorized bi-
ographies about us, the complete contents of which we often do not
get to see. Although a more extensive dossier might be less reductive
in capturing our personalities, it would have greater controlling
effects on an individual’s life.
Not only are our digital biographies reductive, but they are often
inaccurate. In today’s bureaucratized world, one of the growing
threats is that we will be subject to the inadvertence, carelessness,
and mindlessness of bureaucracy. A scene from the darkly humorous
movie Brazil illustrates this problem.64 The movie opens with an ex-
hausted bureaucrat swatting a fly, which inconspicuously drops into
a typewriter, causes a jam, and results in him mistyping a letter in a
person’s name on a form. The form authorizes the arrest and interro-
gation of suspected rebels. In the next scene, an innocent man peace-
fully sits in his home with his family when suddenly scores of
armor-clad police storm inside and haul him away.
These dangers are not merely the imaginary stuff of movies. The
burgeoning use of databases of public record information by the pri-
vate sector in screening job applicants and investigating existing em-
ployees demonstrates how errors can potentially destroy a person’s
career. For example, a Maryland woman wrongly arrested for a bur-
glary was not cleared from the state’s criminal databases. Her name
and SSN also migrated to a Baltimore County database relating to
child protective services cases. She was fired from her job as a substi-
tute teacher, and only after she could establish that the information
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was in error was she rehired. When she later left that job to run a day
care center for the U.S. military, she was subjected to questioning
about the erroneous arrest. Later on, when employed at as a child
care director at a YMCA, she was terminated when her arrest record
surfaced in a background clearance check. Since she could not have
the error expunged in sufficient time, the job was given to another
person. Only after several years was the error finally cleared from the
public records.65 As our digital biographies are increasingly relied
upon to make important decisions, the problems that errors can
cause will only escalate in frequency and magnitude.
To the extent that the digital biography is accurate, our lives are not
only revealed and recorded, but also can be analyzed and investi-
gated. Our digital biographies are being assembled by companies
which are amassing personal information in public records along
with other data. Collectively, millions of biographies can be searched,
sorted, and analyzed in a matter of seconds. This enables automated
investigations of individuals on a nationwide scale by both the gov-
ernment and the private sector. Increasingly, companies are conduct-
ing investigations which can have profound consequences on
people’s lives—such as their employment and financial condition.
Employers are resorting to information brokers of public record infor-
mation to assist in screening job applicants and existing employees.
For example, the firm HireCheck serves over , employers to con-
duct background checks for new hires or current employees.66 It con-
ducts a national search of outstanding arrest warrants; a SSN search
to locate the person’s age, past and current employers, and former ad-
dresses; a driver record search; a search of worker’s compensation
claims “to avoid habitual claimants or to properly channel assign-
ments”; a check of civil lawsuit records; and searches for many other
types of information.67 These investigations occur without any exter-
nal oversight, and individuals often do not have an opportunity to
challenge the results.
Forms of Dehumanization: Databases and the Kafka Metaphor
Expounding on the Kafka metaphor, certain uses of databases foster a
state of powerlessness and vulnerability created by people’s lack of
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any meaningful form of participation in the collection and use of
their personal information. Bureaucracy and power is certainly not a
new problem. Databases do not cause the disempowering effects of
bureaucracy; they exacerbate them—not merely by magnifying exist-
ing power imbalances but by transforming these relationships in pro-
found ways that implicate our freedom. The problem is thus old and
new, and its additional dimensions within the Information Age re-
quire extensive explication.
Impoverished Judgments. One of the great dangers of using information
that we generally regard as private is that we often make judgments
based on this private information about the person. As legal scholar
Kenneth Karst warned in the s, one danger of “a centralized, stan-
dardized data processing system” is that the facts stored about an in-
dividual “will become the only significant facts about the subject of
the inquiry.”68 Legal scholar Jeffrey Rosen aptly observes, “Privacy
protects us from being misdefined and judged out of context in a
world of short attention spans, a world in which information can eas-
ily be confused with knowledge. True knowledge of another person is
the culmination of a slow process of mutual revelation.”69
Increased reliance upon the easily quantifiable and classifiable in-
formation available from databases is having profound social effects.
The nature and volume of information affects the way people ana-
lyze, use, and react to information. Currently, we rely quite heavily on
quantifiable data: statistics, polls, numbers, and figures. In the law
alone, there is a trend to rank schools; to measure the influence of fa-
mous jurists by counting citations to their judicial opinions;70 to as-
sess the importance of law review articles by tabulating citations to
them;71 to rank law journals with an elaborate system of establishing
point values for authors of articles;72 and to determine the influence
of academic movements by checking citations.73 The goal of this use
of empirical data is to eliminate the ambiguity and incommensura-
bility of many aspects of life and try to categorize them into neat, tidy
categories. The computer has exacerbated this tendency, for the in-
crease in information and the way computers operate furthers this
type of categorization and lack of judgment.74 Indeed, in legal schol-
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arship, much of this tendency is due to the advent of computer re-
search databases, which can easily check for citations and specific
terms.
In our increasingly bureaucratic and impersonal world, we are re-
lying more heavily on records and profiles to assess reputation. As H.
Jeff Smith, a professor of management and information technology,
contends:
[D]ecisions that were formerly based on judgment and human
factors are instead decided according to prescribed formulas. In
today’s world, this response is often characterized by reliance on
a rigid, unyielding process in which computerized information is
given great weight. Facts that actually require substantial evalua-
tion could instead be reduced to discrete entries in preassigned
categories.75
Certainly, quantifiable information can be accurate and serve as
the best way for making particular decisions. Even when quantifiable
information is not exact, it is useful for making decisions because of
administrative feasibility. Considering all the variables and a multi-
tude of incommensurate factors might simply be impossible or too
costly.
Nevertheless, the information in databases often fails to capture
the texture of our lives. Rather than provide a nuanced portrait of our
personalities, compilations of data capture the brute facts of what we
do without the reasons. For example, a record of an arrest without the
story or reason is misleading. The arrest could have been for civil dis-
obedience in the s—but it is still recorded as an arrest with some
vague label, such as “disorderly conduct.” It appears no differently
from the arrest of a vandal. In short, we are reconstituted in databases
as a digital person composed of data. The privacy problem stems par-
adoxically from the pervasiveness of this data—the fact that it en-
compasses much of our lives—as well as from its limitations—how it
fails to capture us, how it distorts who we are.
Powerlessness and Lack of Participation. Privacy concerns an individual’s
power in the elaborate web of social relationships that encompasses
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her life. Today, a significant number of these relationships involve in-
teraction with public and private institutions. In addition to the myr-
iad of public agencies that regulate the products we purchase, the
environment, and the like, we depend upon private institutions such
as telephone companies, utility companies, Internet service
providers, cable service providers, and health insurance companies.
We also depend upon companies that provide the products we be-
lieve are essential to our daily lives: hygiene, transportation, enter-
tainment, news, and so on. Our lives are ensconced in these
institutions, which have power over our day-to-day activities
(through what we consume, read, and watch), our culture, politics,
education, and economic well-being. We are engaged in relationships
with these institutions, even if on the surface our interactions with
them are as rudimentary and distant as signing up for services, pay-
ing bills, and requesting repairs. With many firms—such as credit re-
porting agencies—we do not even take affirmative steps to establish a
relationship.
Companies are beginning to use personal information to identify
what business experts call “angel” and “demon” customers.76 Cer-
tain customers—the angels—are very profitable, but others—the
demons—are not. Angel customers account for a large amount of a
company’s business whereas demon customers purchase only a small
amount of goods and services and are likely to cost the company
money. For example, a demon customer is one who uses up a com-
pany’s resources by frequently calling customer service. Some busi-
ness experts thus recommend that companies identify these types of
customers through the use of personal information and treat them
differently. For example, businesses might serve the angels first and
leave the demons waiting; or they might offer the angels cheaper
prices; or perhaps, they might even try to turn the demons away en-
tirely.77 The result of companies moving in this direction is that people
will be treated differently and may never know why. Even before the
concept of angel and demon customers was articulated, one bank
routinely denied credit card applications from college students ma-
joring in literature, history, and art, based on the assumption that
they would not be able to repay their debts. The bank’s practice re-
mained a secret until the media ran a story about it.78
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We are increasingly not being treated as equals in our relationships
with many private-sector institutions. Things are done to us; deci-
sions are made about us; and we are often completely excluded from
the process. With considerably greater frequency, we are ending up
frustrated with the outcome. For example, complaints about credit
reporting agencies to the Federal Trade Commission have been rap-
idly escalating, with , in  and over , in .79
Privacy involves the ability to avoid the powerlessness of having
others control information that can affect whether an individual gets
a job, becomes licensed to practice in a profession, or obtains a criti-
cal loan. It involves the ability to avoid the collection and circulation
of such powerful information in one’s life without having any say in
the process, without knowing who has what information, what pur-
poses or motives those entities have, or what will be done with that
information in the future. Privacy involves the power to refuse to be
treated with bureaucratic indifference when one complains about er-
rors or when one wants certain data expunged. It is not merely the
collection of data that is the problem—it is our complete lack of con-
trol over the ways it is used or may be used in the future.
Problematic Information Gathering Techniques. This powerlessness is
compounded by the fact that the process of information collection in
America is clandestine, duplicitous, and unfair. The choices given to
people over their information are hardly choices at all. People must
relinquish personal data to gain employment, procure insurance, ob-
tain a credit card, or otherwise participate like a normal citizen in to-
day’s economy. Consent is virtually meaningless in many contexts.
When people give consent, they must often consent to a total surren-
der of control over their information.
Collection of information is often done by misleading the con-
sumer. General Electric sent a supposedly anonymous survey to
shareholders asking them to rate various aspects of the company. Un-
beknownst to those surveyed, the survey’s return envelope was coded
so that the responses could be matched to names in the company’s
shareholder database.80
Some information is directly solicited via registration question-
naires or other means such as competitions and sweepstakes. The
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warranty registration cards of many products—which ask a host of
lifestyle questions—are often sent not to the company that makes the
product but to National Demographics and Lifestyles Company at a
Denver post office box. This company has compiled information on
over  million people and markets it to other companies.81 Often,
there is an implicit misleading notion that consumers must fill out a
registration questionnaire in order to be covered by the warranty.
Frequent shopper programs and discount cards—which involve
filling out a questionnaire and then carrying a special card that pro-
vides discounts—enable the scanner data to be matched to data
about individual consumers.82 This technique involves offering sav-
ings in return for personal information and the ability to track a per-
son’s grocery purchases.83 However, there are scant disclosures that
such an exchange is taking place, and there are virtually no limits on
the use of the data.
Conde Nast Publications Inc. (which publishes the New Yorker,
Vanity Fair, Vogue, and other magazines) recently sent out a booklet
of  questions asking detailed information about an individual’s
hobbies, shopping preferences, health (including medications used,
acne problems, and vaginal/yeast infections), and much more. Al-
most , people responded. In return for the data, the survey
said: “Just answer the questions below to start the conversation and
become part of this select group of subscribers to whom marketers
listen first.” Conde Nast maintains a database of information on 
million people. Stephen Jacoby, the vice president for marketing and
databases, said: “What we’re trying to do is enhance the relationship
between the subscriber and their magazine. In a sense, it’s a benefit to
the subscriber.”84
There is no “conversation” created by supplying the data. Conde
Nast does not indicate how the information will be used. It basically
tries to entice people to give information for a vague promise of little
or no value. While the company insists that it will not share informa-
tion with “outsiders,” it does not explain who constitutes an “out-
sider.” The information remains in the control of the company, with
no limitations on use. Merely informing the consumer that data may
be sold to others is an inadequate form of disclosure. The consumer
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does not know how many times the data will be resold, to whom it
will be sold, or for what purposes it will be used.
Irresponsibility and Carelessness. A person’s lack of control is exacer-
bated by the often thoughtless and irresponsible ways that bureau-
cracies use personal information and their lack of accountability in
using and protecting the data. In other words, the problem is not sim-
ply a lack of individual control over information, but a situation
where nobody is exercising meaningful control over the information.
In bureaucratic settings, privacy policy tends to fall into drift and be
reactionary. In a detailed study of organizations such as banks, insur-
ance companies, and credit reporting agencies, H. Jeff Smith con-
cluded that all of the organizations “exhibited a remarkably similar
approach: the policy-making process, which occurred over time, was
a wandering and reactive one.” According to a senior executive at a
health insurance company, “We’ve been lazy on the privacy [issues]
for several years now, because we haven’t had anybody beating us over
the head about them.” According to Smith, most executives in the sur-
vey were followers rather than leaders: “[M]ost executives wait until
an external threat forces them to consider their privacy policies.”85
Furthermore, there have been several highly publicized instances
where companies violated their own privacy policies. Although prom-
ising its users that their information would remain confidential, the
website GeoCities collected and sold information about children who
played games on the site.86 RealNetworks, Inc. secretly collected per-
sonal information about its users in direct violation of its privacy pol-
icy. And a website for young investors promised that the data it
collected about people’s finances would remain anonymous, but in-
stead it was kept in identifiable form.87
More insidious than drifting and reactionary privacy policies are
irresponsible and careless uses of personal information. For example,
Metromail Corporation, a seller of direct marketing information,
hired inmates to enter the information into databases. This came to
light when an inmate began sending harassing letters that were sexu-
ally explicit and filled with intimate details of people’s lives.88 A televi-
sion reporter once paid $ to obtain from Metromail a list of over
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, children living in Pasadena, California. The reporter gave the
name of a well-known child molester and murderer as the buyer.89
These cases illustrate the lack of care and accountability by the cor-
porations collecting the data.
McVeigh v. Cohen90 best illustrates this problem. A highly decorated
-year veteran of the Navy sought to enjoin the Navy from discharg-
ing him under the statutory policy known as “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,
Don’t Pursue.”91 When responding to a toy drive for the crew of his
ship, Tim McVeigh (no relation to the Oklahoma City bomber) acci-
dentally used the wrong email account, sending a message under the
alias “boysrch.” He signed the email “Tim” but included no other in-
formation. The person conducting the toy drive searched through the
member profile directory of America Online (AOL), where she learned
that “boysrch” was an AOL subscriber named Tim who lived in Hawaii
and worked in the military. Under marital status, he had identified
himself as “gay.” The ship’s legal adviser began to investigate, suspect-
ing that “Tim” was McVeigh. Before speaking to McVeigh, and without
a warrant, the legal adviser had a paralegal contact AOL for more in-
formation. The paralegal called AOL’s toll-free customer service num-
ber and, without identifying himself as a Navy serviceman, concocted
a story that he had received a fax from an AOL customer and wanted
to confirm who it belonged to. Despite a policy of not giving out per-
sonal information, the AOL representative told him that the customer
was McVeigh. As a result, the Navy sought to discharge McVeigh.
In Remsburg v. Docusearch, Inc.,92 a man named Liam Youens be-
gan purchasing information about Amy Lynn Boyer from a company
called Docusearch. He requested Boyer’s SSN, and Docusearch ob-
tained it from a credit reporting agency and provided it to him.
Youens then requested Boyer’s employment address, so Docusearch
hired a subcontractor, who obtained it by making a “pretext” phone
call to Boyer. By lying about her identity and the reason for the call,
the subcontractor obtained the address from Boyer. Docusearch then
gave the address to Youens, who went to Boyer’s workplace and shot
and killed her. Docusearch supplied the information without ever
asking who Youens was or why he was seeking the information.
Within the past few years, explicit details of  psychotherapy pa-
tients’ sex lives, as well as their names, addresses, telephone num-
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bers, and credit card numbers, were inadvertently posted on the In-
ternet.93 A banker in Maryland who sat on a state’s public health com-
mission checked his list of bank loans with records of people with
cancer in order to cancel the loans of the cancer sufferers.94 A hacker
illegally downloaded thousands of patients’ medical files along with
their SSNs from a university medical center.95 Due to a mix-up, a re-
tirement plan mailed financial statements to the wrong people at the
same firm.96 Extensive psychological records describing the condi-
tions of over  children were inadvertently posted on the University
of Montana’s website.97 An employee of a company obtained ,
credit reports from a credit reporting agency and peddled them to
others for use in fraud and identity theft.98 Health information and
SSNs of military personnel and their families were stolen from a mili-
tary contractor’s database.99
In sum, the privacy problem created by the use of databases stems
from an often careless and unconcerned bureaucratic process—one
that has little judgment or accountability—and is driven by ends
other than the protection of people’s dignity. We are not just heading
toward a world of Big Brother or one composed of Little Brothers, but
also toward a more mindless process—of bureaucratic indifference,
arbitrary errors, and dehumanization—a world that is beginning to
resemble Kafka’s vision in The Trial.
55k a f k a  a n d  o r w e l l
▲
The Problems of
Information Pr ivacy Law
A distinctive domain of law relating to information privacy has been
developing throughout the twentieth century. Although the law has
made great strides in dealing with privacy problems, the law of infor-
mation privacy has been severely hampered by the difficulties in for-
mulating a compelling theory of privacy. The story of privacy law is a
tale of changing technology and the law’s struggle to respond in effec-
tive ways.
Information privacy law consists of a mosaic of various types of
law: tort law, constitutional law, federal and state statutory law, evi-
dentiary privileges, property law, and contract law. Much of privacy
law is interrelated, and as legal scholar Ken Gormley observes, “vari-
ous offshoots of privacy are deeply intertwined at the roots, owing
their origins to the same soil.”1
Information privacy law has made great strides toward protecting
privacy. Nevertheless, there are systematic deficiencies across the
spectrum of privacy law in addressing the special nature of the prob-
lem of digital dossiers.
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The Privacy Torts
Warren and Brandeis. Privacy law owes its greatest debt to Samuel War-
ren and Louis Brandeis. Warren and Brandeis practiced law together
in a Boston law firm. Brandeis later went on to become a Supreme
Court justice.2 In , they wrote their profoundly influential article,
The Right to Privacy,3 considered by many to be one of the primary
foundations of privacy law in the United States.4 In the article, Warren
and Brandeis raised alarm at the intersection of yellow journalism,5
with its increasing hunger for sensational human interest stories, and
the development of new technologies in photography. During the lat-
ter half of the nineteenth century, newspapers were the most rapidly
growing form of media, with circulation increasing about , per-
cent from  to . In , there were approximately  newspa-
pers with , readers. By , there were  papers with over 
million readers. This massive growth was due, in part, to yellow jour-
nalism, a form of sensationalistic reporting that focused on scandals
and petty crimes. Reaping the successes of yellow journalism, Joseph
Pulitzer and William Randolph Hearst became the barons of the
newspaper business. According to Warren and Brandeis: “The press is
overstepping in every direction the obvious bounds of propriety and
decency. Gossip is no longer the resource of the idle and of the vi-
cious, but has become a trade, which is pursued with industry as well
as effrontery.”6
Warren and Brandeis also expressed concern over what they called
“instantaneous” photography. Although photography had been
around before , recent developments made photography much
cheaper and easier. Cameras had been large, expensive, and not read-
ily portable. In , the Eastman Kodak Company came out with the
“snap camera,” a hand-held camera for the general public. For the
first time, people could take candid photographs. Warren and Bran-
deis feared the intersection of this new photographic technology with
the gossip-hungry press: “Instantaneous photographs and newspa-
per enterprise have invaded the sacred precincts of private and do-
mestic life; and numerous mechanical devices threaten to make good
the prediction that ‘what is whispered in the closet shall be pro-
claimed from the house-tops.’”7
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On the surface, observed Warren and Brandeis, the existing com-
mon law failed to afford a remedy for privacy invasions. But it con-
tained the seeds to develop the proper protection of privacy. The
authors looked to existing legal rights and concluded that they were
manifestations of a deeper principle lodged in the common law—
“the more general right of the individual to be let alone.”8 From this
principle, new remedies to protect privacy could be derived. Warren
and Brandeis suggested that the primary way to safeguard privacy
was through tort actions to allow people to sue others for privacy in-
vasions.
What Warren and Brandeis achieved was nothing short of magnifi-
cent. By pulling together various isolated strands of the common law,
the authors demonstrated that creating remedies for privacy inva-
sions wouldn’t radically change the law but would merely be an ex-
pansion of what was already germinating.
As early as , courts and legislatures responded to the Warren
and Brandeis article by creating a number of privacy torts to redress
the harms that Warren and Brandeis had noted.9 These torts permit
people to sue others for privacy violations. In , William Prosser,
one of the most renowned experts on tort law, surveyed over  pri-
vacy cases in the  years since the publication of the Warren and
Brandeis article.10 He concluded that the cases could be classified as
involving four distinct torts.11 These torts are: () intrusion upon seclu-
sion; () public disclosure of private facts; () false light; and () ap-
propriation. Today, whether by statute or common law, most states
recognize some or all of the privacy torts.12
The privacy torts emerged in response to the privacy problems
raised by Warren and Brandeis—namely, the incursions into privacy
by the burgeoning print media. Today, we are experiencing the rapid
rise of a new form of media—the Internet. Although the press still
poses a threat to privacy, and photography has become an indispen-
sable tool of journalism (as Warren and Brandeis accurately pre-
dicted), there are now many additional threats to privacy other than
the press. The privacy torts are capable of redressing specific harms
done to individuals—such as when the press discloses a deeply em-
barrassing secret about a private figure—but are not well adapted to
58 t h e  p r o b l e m s  o f  i n f o r m a t i o n  p r i v a c y  l a w▲
regulating the flow of personal information in computer databases
and cyberspace.
Intrusion upon Seclusion. The tort of intrusion upon seclusion protects
against the intentional intrusion into one’s “solitude or seclusion” or
“private affairs or concerns” that “would be highly offensive to a rea-
sonable person.”13 Although this tort could be applied to the informa-
tion collection techniques of databases, most of the information
collection is not “highly offensive to a reasonable person.” Each par-
ticular instance of collection is often small and innocuous; the danger
is created by the aggregation of information, a state of affairs typically
created by hundreds of actors over a long period of time. Indeed,
courts have thrown out cases for intrusion involving the type of infor-
mation that would likely be collected in databases. For example,
courts have rejected intrusion actions based on obtaining a person’s
unlisted phone number, selling the names of magazine subscribers to
direct mail companies, and collecting and disclosing an individual’s
past insurance history.14 Further, intrusion must involve an invasion
of “seclusion,” and courts have dismissed intrusion suits when plain-
tiffs have been in public places. With regard to databases, much infor-
mation collection and use occurs in public, and indeed, many parts
of cyberspace may well be considered public places. Therefore, the
tort of intrusion cannot provide an adequate safeguard against the
gathering of personal information for databases.
Public Disclosure of Private Facts. The tort of public disclosure of private
facts creates a cause of action when one makes public “a matter con-
cerning the private life of another” in a way that “(a) would be highly
offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) is not of legitimate concern
to the public.”15 Courts have sustained public disclosure suits for
printing a photograph of a woman whose dress was blown up invol-
untarily by air jets; for publishing an article describing an individual’s
unusual disease; and for posting a large sign in a window stating that
a person owed a debt.16
Although this tort could conceivably be applied to certain uses of
databases, such as the sale of personal information by the database
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industry, the tort of private facts appears to be designed to redress ex-
cesses of the press, and is accordingly focused on the widespread dis-
semination of personal information in ways that become known to
the plaintiff. In contrast, databases of personal information are often
transferred between specific companies, not broadcast on the
evening news. Even if marketers disclosed information widely to the
public, the tort is limited to “highly offensive” facts, and most facts in
databases would not be highly offensive if made public. Moreover,
some marketing data may already be in a public record, or by furnish-
ing data in the first place, an individual may be deemed to have as-
sented to its dissemination.
Additionally, the disclosure of personal information through the
use and sale of databases is often done in secret. The trade in infor-
mation is done behind closed doors in a kind of underworld that
most people know little about. This secret trading of data is often
completely legal. Thus, it would be difficult for a plaintiff to discover
that such sales or disclosures have been made. Even if people are gen-
erally aware that their data is being transferred, they will often not be
able to find out the specifics—what companies are receiving it and
what these companies plan to do with it. As a result, the public disclo-
sure tort is not well-adapted to combating the flow of personal infor-
mation between various companies.
False Light. The tort of false light is primarily a variation on the
defamation torts of libel and slander, protecting against the giving of
“publicity to a matter concerning another that places the other before
the public in a false light” that is “highly offensive to a reasonable per-
son.”17 Like defamation, this tort has limited applicability to the types
of privacy harms created by the collection and use of personal infor-
mation by way of computer databases. Both defamation and false
light protect one’s reputation, but the type of information collected in
databases often is not harmful to one’s reputation.
Appropriation. The tort of appropriation occurs when one “appropri-
ates to his own use or benefit the name or likeness of another.”18 In
the courts, this tort has developed into a form of intellectual property
right in aspects of one’s personhood. The interest protected is the in-
60 t h e  p r o b l e m s  o f  i n f o r m a t i o n  p r i v a c y  l a w▲
dividual’s right to “the exclusive use of his own identity, in so far as it
is represented by his name or likeness.”19 For example, people can sue
under this tort when their names or images are used to promote a
product without their consent.20
Appropriation could be applied to database marketing, which can
be viewed as the use of personal information for profit. However, the
tort’s focus on protecting the commercial value of personal informa-
tion has often prevented it from being an effective tool in grappling
with the database privacy problem. In Dwyer v. American Express Co.,
a court held there was no appropriation when American Express sold
its cardholders’ names to merchants because “an individual name has
value only when it is associated with one of defendants’ lists. Defen-
dants create value by categorizing and aggregating these names. Fur-
thermore, defendants’ practices do not deprive any of the
cardholders of any value their individual names may possess.”21 In
Shibley v. Time, Inc., a court held that there was no action for appro-
priation when magazines sold subscription lists to direct mail com-
panies because the plaintiff was not being used to endorse any
product.22 The appropriation tort often aims at protecting one’s eco-
nomic interest in a form of property, and it is most effective at pro-
tecting celebrities who have created value in their personalities. This
is not the same interest involved with privacy, which can be impli-
cated regardless of the economic value accorded to one’s name or
likeness.
An Overarching Problem. Even if it were possible to eliminate the above
difficulties with some minor adjustments to the privacy torts, the pri-
vacy problem with databases transcends the specific injuries and
harms that the privacy torts are designed to redress. By its nature, tort
law looks to isolated acts, to particular infringements and wrongs.
The problem with databases does not stem from any specific act, but
is a systemic issue of power caused by the combination of relatively
small actions, each of which when viewed in isolation would appear
quite innocuous. Many modern privacy problems are the product of
information flows, which occur between a variety of different entities.
There is often no single wrongdoer; responsibility is spread among a
multitude of actors, with a vast array of motives and aims, each doing
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different things at different times. For example, when a person un-
wittingly finds herself embroiled in a public news story, the invasive-
ness of the media is often not the product of one particular reporter.
Rather, the collective actions of numerous reporters camping outside
a person’s home and following her wherever she goes severely dis-
rupt her life. The difficulty in obtaining a legal remedy for this dis-
ruption is that no one reporter’s actions may be all that invasive or
objectionable. The harm is created by the totality of privacy inva-
sions, but the tort of intrusion upon seclusion only focuses on each
particular actor.23
In sum, tort law often views privacy invasions separately and indi-
vidually; but the problems of digital dossiers emerge from the collec-
tive effects of information transactions, combinations, lapses in
security, disclosures, and abusive uses. Therefore, solutions involving
the retooling of tort law will be severely limited in redressing the
problem.
Constitutional Law
The U.S. Constitution protects privacy in a number of ways even
though the word “privacy” does not appear in the document. Al-
though the Constitution does not explicitly provide for a right to pri-
vacy, a number of its provisions protect certain dimensions of privacy,
and the Supreme Court has sculpted a right to privacy by molding to-
gether a variety of constitutional protections. Beyond the U.S. Consti-
tution, many states protect privacy in their own constitutions—some
with an explicit right to privacy.24
The U.S. Constitution only protects against state action, and many
databases belong to the private sector. However, since the govern-
ment is often a supplier of information to the private sector and is a
major source of databases, constitutional protection could serve as a
good potential tool for grappling with the problem.
The First Amendment. In addition to protecting free speech, the First
Amendment safeguards the right of people to associate with one an-
other. Freedom of association restricts the government’s ability to de-
mand organizations to disclose the names and addresses of their
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members or to compel people to list the organizations to which they
belong.25 As the Supreme Court reasoned, privacy is essential to the
freedom to associate, for it enables people to join together without
having to fear loss of employment, community shunning, and other
social reprisals.26 However, privacy of associations is becoming more
difficult in a world where online postings are archived, where a list of
the people a person contacts can easily be generated from telephone
and email records, and where records reveal where a person travels,
what websites she visits, and so on. The Supreme Court has repeatedly
held that the First Amendment protects anonymous speech, and it
can restrict the government from requiring the disclosure of informa-
tion that reveals a speaker’s identity.27 However, the First Amendment
only applies when the government plays a role in the compulsion of
the information,28 and most of the gathering of personal information
by companies isn’t done under the pressure of any law.
The Fourth and Fifth Amendments. The Fourth Amendment restricts the
government from conducting “unreasonable searches and seizures.”29
It typically requires that government officials first obtain judicial au-
thorization before conducting a search. According to the Supreme
Court, “[t]he overriding function of the Fourth Amendment is to pro-
tect personal privacy and dignity against unwarranted intrusion by
the State.”30 The Fifth Amendment provides for a privilege against
self-incrimination.31 The government cannot compel individuals to
disclose incriminating information about themselves. In , the
Court articulated how the Fourth and Fifth Amendments worked in
tandem to protect privacy. The case was Boyd v. United States.32 The
government sought to compel a merchant to produce documents for
use in a civil forfeiture proceeding. The Court held that the govern-
ment could not require the disclosure of the documents because “any
forcible and compulsory extortion of a man’s own testimony or of his
private papers to be used as evidence to convict him of crime or to
forfeit his goods” is an “invasion of his indefeasible right to personal
security, personal liberty and private property.”33
As the administrative state blossomed throughout the twentieth
century, the Court sidestepped the broad implications of Boyd.
The administrative state spawned hundreds of agencies and a vast
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bureaucracy that maintained records of personal information. As
William Stuntz notes, “[g]overnment regulation required lots of infor-
mation, and Boyd came dangerously close to giving regulated actors a
blanket entitlement to nondisclosure. It is hard to see how modern
health, safety, environmental, or economic regulation would be pos-
sible in such a regime.”34 Therefore, the Court abandoned Boyd, and it
increasingly curtailed the Fourth and Fifth Amendments from regu-
lating the burgeoning government record systems.35
The Fourth and Fifth Amendments protect only against govern-
ment infringements, and do nothing to control the collection and use
of information by private bureaucracies. Although it does not apply to
the private sector, the Fourth Amendment does have the potential to
protect against one problem with digital dossiers. The rise of digital
dossiers in the private sector is becoming of increasing interest to law
enforcement officials. I will discuss this issue in great depth in part III
of this book. As I will demonstrate, the secrecy paradigm has made
the Fourth Amendment practically inapplicable when the govern-
ment seeks to tap into private-sector dossiers. In Smith v. Maryland,36
the Court held that there was no reasonable expectation of privacy in
the phone numbers one dials. The Court reasoned that such phone
numbers were not secret because they were turned over to third par-
ties (phone companies).37 Similarly, in United States v. Miller, the
Court held that financial records possessed by third parties are not
private under the Fourth Amendment.38 The Court’s focus—which
stems from the paradigm that privacy is about protecting one’s hid-
den world—leads it to the view that when a third party has access to
one’s personal information, there can be no expectation of privacy in
that information.
The Right to Privacy. Beyond specific constitutional provisions, the
Supreme Court has held that the Constitution implicitly protects
privacy. In , in Griswold v. Connecticut, the Court held that a
state could not ban the use of or counseling about contraceptives
because it invaded the “zone of privacy” protected by the Constitu-
tion.39 Although there is no part of the Bill of Rights that directly es-
tablishes a right to privacy, such a right is created by the
“penumbras” of many of the  amendments that form the Bill of
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Rights. In Roe v. Wade, the Court held that the right to privacy “is
broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to
terminate her pregnancy.”40
In the  decision, Whalen v. Roe, the Supreme Court extended
substantive due process privacy protection to information privacy.
New York passed a law requiring that records be kept of people who
obtained prescriptions for certain addictive medications. Plaintiffs
argued that the statute infringed upon their right to privacy. The
Court held that the constitutionally protected “zone of privacy” ex-
tends to two distinct types of interests: () “independence in making
certain kinds of important decisions”; and () the “individual interest
in avoiding disclosure of personal matters.”41 The former interest re-
ferred to the line of cases beginning with Griswold which protected
people’s right to make decisions about their health, bodies, and pro-
creation. The latter interest, however, was one that the Court had not
previously defined.
The plaintiffs argued that they feared the greater accessibility of
their personal information and the potential for its disclosure. As a re-
sult of this fear, they argued, many patients did not get the prescrip-
tions they needed and this interfered with their independence in
making decisions with regard to their health. The Court, however,
held that the constitutional right to information privacy required only
a duty to avoid unreasonable disclosure, and that the state had taken
adequate security measures.42
The plaintiffs’ argument, however, was not that disclosure was the
real privacy problem. Rather, the plaintiffs were concerned that the
collection of and greater access to their information made them lose
control over their information. A part of themselves—a very impor-
tant part of their lives—was placed in the distant hands of the state
and completely outside their control. This is similar to the notion of a
chilling effect on free speech, which is not caused by the actual en-
forcement of a particular law but by the fear created by the very exis-
tence of the law. The Court acknowledged that the court record
supported the plaintiffs’ contention that some people were so dis-
traught over the law that they were not getting the drugs they needed.
However, the Court rejected this argument by noting that because
over , prescriptions had been filled before the law had been
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enjoined, the public was not denied access to the drugs.43 The prob-
lem with the Court’s response is that the Court failed to indicate how
many prescriptions had been filled before the law had been passed.
Without this data, there is no way to measure the extent of the deter-
rence. And even if there were only a few who were deterred, the anxi-
ety caused by living under such a regime must also be taken into
account.
The famous case of Doe v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transporta-
tion Authority (SEPTA) best illustrates how the constitutional right to
information privacy fails to comprehend the privacy problem of data-
bases.44 The plaintiff Doe was HIV positive and told two doctors (Dr.
Press and Dr. Van de Beek) at his work about his condition but no-
body else. He strove to keep it a secret. His employer, SEPTA, a self-in-
sured government agency, maintained a prescription drug program
with Rite-Aid as the drug supplier. SEPTA monitored the costs of its
program. Doe was taking a drug used exclusively in the treatment of
HIV, and he asked Dr. Press whether the SEPTA officials who reviewed
the records would see the names for the various prescriptions. Dr.
Press said no, and Doe had his prescription filled under the plan. Un-
fortunately, even though SEPTA never asked for the names, Rite-Aid
mistakenly supplied the names corresponding to prescriptions when
it sent SEPTA the reports. Pierce, the SEPTA official reviewing the
records, became interested in Doe’s use of the drug and began to in-
vestigate. She asked Dr. Van de Beek about the drug, and he told her
what the drug was used for but would not answer any questions
about the person using the drugs. Pierce also asked questions of Dr.
Press, who informed Doe of Pierce’s inquiry.
This devastated Doe. Doe began to fear that other people at work
had found out. He began to perceive that people were treating him
differently. However, he was not fired, and in fact, he was given a pro-
motion. The court of appeals held that the constitutional right to in-
formation privacy had not been violated because there had not been
any disclosure of confidential information.45 Pierce had merely in-
formed doctors who knew already. Doe offered no proof that anybody
else knew, and accordingly, the court weighed his privacy invasion as
minimal.
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However, this missed the crux of Doe’s complaint. Regardless of
whether he was imagining how his co-workers were treating him, he
was indeed suffering a real, palpable fear. His injury was the power-
lessness of having no idea who else knew he had HIV, what his em-
ployer thought of him, or how the information could be used against
him. This feeling of unease changed the way he perceived everything
at his place of employment. The privacy problem wasn’t merely the
fact that Pierce divulged his secret or that Doe himself had lost con-
trol over his information, but rather that the information appeared to
be entirely out of anyone’s control. Doe was in a situation similar to
that of Kafka’s Joseph K.—waiting endlessly for the final verdict. He
was informed that information about him had been collected; he
knew that his employer had been investigating; but the process
seemed to be taking place out of his sight. To some extent, he experi-
enced the desperation that Joseph K. experienced—he knew that in-
formation about him was out there in the hands of others and that
these people were in fact doing something with that information, but
he had no participation in the process.
Statutory Law
Since the early s, Congress has passed over  laws pertaining to
privacy. Unlike the European Union, which adopted a general direc-
tive providing for comprehensive privacy protection,46 the United
States has not enacted measures of similar scope. Instead, Congress
has passed a series of statutes narrowly tailored to specific privacy
problems.
The Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) of , which regulates
credit reporting agencies, fails to adequately restrict secondary uses
and disclosures of that information.47 Although inspired by allega-
tions of abuse and lack of responsiveness of credit agencies, the FCRA
was severely weakened due to the effective lobbying of the credit re-
porting industry.48 The Act permits credit reporting companies to sell
the “credit header” portion of credit histories (which contains names,
addresses, former addresses, telephone number, SSN, employment
information, and birthdate) to marketers.49 The FCRA does little to
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equalize the unbalanced power relationship between individuals and
credit reporting companies.
Congress’s most significant piece of privacy legislation in the
s—the Privacy Act of —regulates the collection and use of
records by federal agencies, giving individuals the right to access and
correct information in these records.50 The Privacy Act is a good be-
ginning, but it remains incomplete. In particular, it applies only to
agencies of the federal government, and has no applicability to the
use of databases by businesses and marketers.
The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of  (FERPA),
also known as the Buckley Amendment, regulates the accessibility of
student records. The FERPA remains quite narrow, only applying to a
subset of records in one limited context (education). Excluded are
campus security records and health and psychological records.51
The Cable Communications Policy Act (CCPA) of  requires ca-
ble operators to inform subscribers about the nature and uses of per-
sonal information collected.52 The law prohibits any disclosure that
reveals the subscriber’s viewing habits, and it is enforced with a pri-
vate cause of action. The statute, however, applies only to cable oper-
ators and it has a broad exception where personal data can be
disclosed for a “legitimate business activity.” Nevertheless, the CCPA
is an important first step in giving consumers control over their cable
records.
In , Congress modernized electronic surveillance laws when it
passed the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA).53 The
ECPA extends the protections of the federal wiretap law of  to new
forms of voice, data, and video communications, including cellular
phones and email. The ECPA restricts the interception of transmitted
communications and the searching of stored communications. The
focus of the law is on regulating surveillance. The difficulties of the
ECPA in responding to the challenges of computer databases is illus-
trated by the case In re DoubleClick, Inc. Privacy Litigation.54 A group
of plaintiffs profiled by DoubleClick contended that DoubleClick’s
placing and accessing cookies on their hard drives constituted unau-
thorized access in violation of ECPA. The court concluded that the
ECPA didn’t apply to DoubleClick because its cookies were perma-
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nent and ECPA restricted unauthorized access only to communica-
tions in “temporary, intermediate storage.” Additionally, DoubleClick
didn’t illegally intercept a communication in violation of the ECPA
because DoubleClick was authorized to access the cookies by the
websites that people visited. The DoubleClick case illustrates that the
ECPA is not well-tailored to addressing a large portion of private-sec-
tor information gathering in cyberspace.
After reporters obtained Supreme Court Justice nominee Robert
Bork’s videocassette rental data, Congress passed the Video Privacy
Protection Act (VPPA) of ,55 which has become known as the Bork
Bill. The VPPA prohibits videotape service providers from disclosing
the titles of the videos a person rents or buys. People are authorized
to sue if the statute is violated.56 However, the Act only applies to
video stores, and no similar restrictions are placed on bookstores,
record stores, or any other type of retailer, magazine producer, or cat-
alog company.
The Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) of  permits in-
dividuals to sue a telemarketer for damages up to $ for each call
received after requesting not to be called again.57 If the telemarketer
knowingly breaks the law, then the penalty is trebled. The TCPA, how-
ever, aims at redressing the aggravation of disruptive phone calls, and
it does not govern the collection, use, or sale of personal data.
In , Congress finally addressed the longstanding practice of
many states of selling personal information in their motor vehicle
records to marketers. The Driver’s Privacy Protection Act of 
(DPPA) limits this practice, forcing states to acquire a driver’s consent
before disclosing personal information to marketers.58 Although the
DPPA is an important step in controlling government disclosures of
personal information to the private sector, it applies only in the con-
text of motor vehicle records. States are not limited in disclosing in-
formation contained in the numerous other forms of records they
maintain.
In , Congress passed the Health Insurance Portability and Ac-
countability Act (HIPAA) to help standardize medical information so
it could be transferred more easily between different databases.59
Since this raised privacy concerns, Congress ordered the Department
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of Health and Human Services (HHS) to regulate the privacy of med-
ical records. HHS’s regulations, among other things, require authori-
zation for all uses and disclosures beyond those for treatment,
payment, or health care operation (such as for marketing purposes).60
The HIPAA regulations have apparently pleased nobody. Doctors and
hospitals complain that the regulations are too complicated, cumber-
some, and expensive to follow. Advocates for privacy find the regula-
tions weak and ineffective.
The first federal law directly addressing privacy in cyberspace, the
Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA) of , regulates
the collection of children’s personal information on the Internet.61
Websites targeted at children must post privacy policies and must ob-
tain parental consent in order to use children’s personal information.
But the law’s reach is limited. It applies only to children’s websites or
when the website operator “has actual knowledge that it is collecting
personal information from a child.”62 Only children under age  are
covered. Additionally, as privacy law expert Anita Allen argues, the
law forces parents to become involved in their children’s Internet ac-
tivities when some parents “may want their children to have free ac-
cess to the Internet for moral or political reasons.” Allen concludes
that “COPPA is among the most paternalistic and authoritarian of the
federal privacy statutes thus far.”63
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley (GLB) Act of  permits any financial
institution to share “nonpublic personal information” with affiliated
companies.64 However, people can opt-out when a company discloses
personal information to third parties.65 In practice, the GLB Act
greatly facilitates the disclosure of people’s information. Given the
large conglomerates of today’s corporate world, affiliate sharing is
significant. For example, Experian, one of the three largest credit re-
porting agencies, was purchased by Great Universal Stores, a British
retail corporation, which also acquired Metromail, Inc., a direct-mar-
keting company.66 The Act applies only to “nonpublic” information,
and much of the information aggregated in databases (such as one’s
name, address, and the like) is often considered to be public. Addi-
tionally, the Act’s opt-out right is ineffective. As legal scholars Ted
Janger and Paul Schwartz argue, the financial institution has “supe-
rior knowledge” and the GLB “leaves the burden of bargaining on the
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less informed party, the individual consumer.”67 They conclude that
“[a]n opt-out default creates incentives for privacy notices that lead
to inaction by the consumer.”68
In sum, the federal laws are a start, but they often give people only
a very limited form of control over only some of their information and
frequently impose no system of default control on other holders of
such information.69 Although the statutes help in containing the
spread of information, they often fail to adequately address the un-
derlying power relationships and contain broad exceptions and loop-
holes that limit their effectiveness.
Furthermore, the federal statutes cover only a small geography of
the database problem. As privacy law expert Joel Reidenberg has
pointed out, the laws are “sectoral” in nature, dealing with privacy in
certain contexts but leaving gaping holes in others.70 “This mosaic ap-
proach,” he observes, “derives from the traditional American fear of
government intervention in private activities and the reluctance to
broadly regulate industry. The result of the mosaic is a rather haphaz-
ard and unsatisfactory response to each of the privacy concerns.”71
Thus, the federal privacy statutes form a complicated patchwork of
regulation with significant gaps and omissions. For example, federal
regulation covers federal agency records, educational records, cable
television records, video rental records, and state motor vehicle
records, but it does not cover most records maintained by state and
local officials, as well as a host of other records held by libraries, char-
ities, and merchants (i.e., supermarkets, department stores, mail or-
der catalogs, bookstores, and the like). The COPPA protects the
privacy of children under  on the Internet, but there is no protection
for adults. As political scientist Colin Bennett observes, “[t]he ap-
proach to making privacy policy in the United States is reactive rather
than anticipatory, incremental rather than comprehensive, and frag-
mented rather than coherent. There may be a lot of laws, but there is
not much protection.”72
Second, many of Congress’s privacy statutes are hard to enforce. It
is often difficult, if not impossible, for an individual to find out if in-
formation has been disclosed. A person who begins receiving unso-
licited marketing mail and email may have a clue that some entity has
disclosed her personal information, but that person often will not be
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able to discover which entity was the culprit. Indeed, the trade in per-
sonal information is a clandestine underworld, one that is not ex-
posed sufficiently by federal privacy regulation to enable effective
enforcement.
The Kafka metaphor illustrates that the problem with digital
dossiers involves the fact that our personal information is not only
out of our control but also is often placed within a bureaucratic
process that lacks control and discipline in handling and using such
information. The federal statutes have certainly made advances in
protecting against this problem, and they demonstrate that Con-
gress’s resolve to protect privacy has remained strong for over 
years. But much more work remains to be done.
The FTC and Unfair and Deceptive Practices
Since , the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has been bringing
actions against companies that violate their own privacy policies. The
FTC has interpreted the FTC Act, which prohibits “unfair or deceptive
acts or practices in or affecting commerce,”73 to be infringed when a
company breaks a promise it made in its privacy policy. The FTC can
bring civil actions and seek injunctive remedies. Since it began en-
forcing the Act in this manner, the FTC has brought several high-
profile cases, almost all of which have resulted in settlements.74
Yet, the FTC has been rather weak and reactive in its enforcement
of privacy policies.75 In a number of cases involving companies engag-
ing in blatant breaches of their own privacy policies, the FTC has set-
tled, simply requiring companies to sin no more.76 A recent case
involving Microsoft, however, suggests that the FTC might become
more proactive. Microsoft’s Passport maintains the personal informa-
tion of Internet users to allow them to use a single username and
password to access many different websites without having to sign on
to each separately. Although Microsoft promised in its privacy policy
that it protected Passport information with “powerful online security
technology,” the FTC concluded that Microsoft did not provide ade-
quate security. Microsoft and the FTC agreed on a settlement where
Microsoft must create a better system of security.77 Unlike most cases
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before the FTC, the security problems of Microsoft’s Passport had not
yet resulted in a major security breach.
In the end, however, the FTC is limited in its reach. It only ensures
that companies keep their promises. As Paul Schwartz notes, if a web-
site doesn’t make a promise about privacy, then it will “fall outside of
the FTC’s jurisdiction.”78 Unfortunately, the FTC has only limited time
and resources, and its “privacy protection activities already are
dwarfed by its more aggressive investigations of fraud and deceptive
marketing practices on the Internet.”79
A World of Radical Transparency: Freedom of Information Law
Some commentators suggest that there is little the law can do to pro-
tect privacy in the Information Age. In The Transparent Society, tech-
nology commentator David Brin argues that privacy is dead:
[I]t is already far too late to prevent the invasion of cameras and
databases. The djinn cannot be crammed back into its bottle. No
matter how many laws are passed, it will prove quite impossible
to legislate away the new surveillance tools and databases. They
are here to stay. Light is going to shine into every corner of our
lives.80
Brin suggests that we abandon privacy in favor of a transparent soci-
ety, one where everything is out in the open, where we watch the
watchers, where we have the ability to monitor the elites—the politi-
cians and the corporate leaders—just as much as they have the ability
to monitor us. “[W]e may not be able to eliminate the intrusive glare
shining on citizens of the [twenty-first century],” Brin observes, “but
the glare just might be rendered harmless through the application of
more light aimed in the other direction.”81 We should thus regulate in
favor of mandating free access to information. According to Brin, a
truly transparent society would hold accountable those who would
violate our privacy.82
Brin fails to realize that affording mutuality of access to informa-
tion will do little to empower ordinary individuals. The reason is that
information is much more of an effective tool in the hands of a large
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bureaucracy. Information is not the key to power in the Information
Age—knowledge is. Information consists of raw facts. Knowledge is
information that has been sifted, sorted, and analyzed. The mere pos-
session of information does not give one power; it is the ability to
process that information and the capability to use the data that mat-
ter. In order to solve the problem, a transparent society would have to
make each individual as competent as bureaucratic organizations in
processing information into knowledge.
The Law of Information Privacy and Its Shortcomings
As this chapter has demonstrated, the law of information privacy is
quite extensive. It developed in response to certain vexing privacy
problems, often created by new technologies. The Warren and Bran-
deis privacy torts were inspired by new photographic technology and
a rapidly growing media that was becoming very sensationalistic. The
types of injuries Warren and Brandeis had in mind were those caused
by intrusive newsgathering techniques and by publishing private in-
formation in the newspapers. In the mid-twentieth century, during
the Cold War, the law focused heavily on surveillance, which had be-
come one the central threats to privacy. These times witnessed the
growth of electronic communication along with new means of elec-
tronic espionage such as wiretapping, bugging devices, and video
cameras. Americans feared the terrible totalitarian regimes of Nazi
Germany, the Soviet Union, and Eastern Europe, all of which em-
ployed extensive monitoring of their citizens’ private lives as well as
secret police and spies to maintain strict control. Law enforcement
officials in the United States also increasingly resorted to the use of
surveillance, with the rapidly growing FBI leading the way. It is there-
fore certainly not surprising that the privacy law forged during these
times was devoted to ameliorating the kinds of harms so perfectly
captured in Orwell’s 1984.
However, the advent of the computer, the proliferation of data-
bases, and the birth of the Internet have created a new breed of pri-
vacy problems. The Orwellian dangers have certainly not
disappeared; nor have the harms created by the sensationalistic me-
dia. But the rise of digital dossiers has created new and different
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problems. New privacy laws have been created in response. The con-
stitutional right to information privacy has emerged in the courts as a
spinoff of the regular constitutional right to privacy. Congress and the
states have passed numerous statutes to regulate the collection and
use of personal information. The FTC has started to bring enforce-
ment actions against companies that fail to live up to their privacy
promises. All of these developments have been promising, but as I
have shown throughout this chapter, the law of privacy has not dealt
effectively with the new problems created by digital dossiers. The rea-
son is that the law still harbors conceptions of privacy that are not re-
sponsive to the realities of the Information Age. These new privacy
problems are not isolated infringements, but are systematic and di-
ffuse. They are often not created by a single perpetrator, but by a com-
bination of actors often without sinister purposes. The problems
caused by digital dossiers are quite broad, and they apply to the entire
information economy, making the narrow federal statutes inapplica-
ble to a large portion of the flow of personal information. Enforcing
rights and remedies against the collection and use of personal infor-
mation is very difficult since much information flow occurs without
people even knowing about it.
So what can be done? I have demonstrated some of the law’s short-
comings. Can the law adequately respond to these problems? This
question will be the focus of the next chapter and beyond.
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The Limits  of  
Market-Based Solut ions
Many solutions to the problems of privacy and information are mar-
ket-based, relying on property rights or contractual default rules to
regulate the flow of information. Does the market already adequately
protect privacy? Or can the market, with minor tinkering, develop
effective privacy protection? Or must a more radical reconstruction of
the market be undertaken?
Market-Based Solutions
Property Rights and Contract. The notion of “control of personal infor-
mation” is one of the most dominant conceptions of privacy. As pri-
vacy expert Alan Westin declares: “Privacy is the claim of individuals,
groups, or institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to
what extent information about them is communicated to others.”1
Numerous other scholars embrace this definition.2
Theorists who view privacy as control over information frequently
understand it within the framework of property and contract con-
cepts. This is not the only way control can be understood, but the
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leading commentators often define it in terms of ownership—as a
property right in information.3 Understood in such terms, control
over something entails a bundle of legal rights of ownership, such as
rights of possession, alienability, exclusion of others, commercial ex-
ploitation, and so on.4 This is what leads Westin to conclude: “[P]er-
sonal information, thought of as the right of decision over one’s
private personality, should be defined as a property right.”5 The mar-
ket discourse focuses the debate around who should own certain
kinds of information as well as what the appropriate contractual rules
should be for trading personal information.
Therefore, in addition to property rights, contract law plays an
important role in regulating privacy. Parties can make contractual
agreements about privacy at the outset of forming a relationship. In
certain instances, courts have held that even though the contract
did not specifically mention privacy, it is an implied term in the con-
tract. The common law tort of breach of confidentiality embodies
this view. It enables people to sue for damages when a party
breaches a contractual obligation (often implied rather than ex-
press) to maintain confidentiality. This tort primarily protects the
privacy of the patient-physician relationship.6 The tort also has been
used to protect against banks breaching the confidences of their
customers.7
Implied contractual terms are a form of default rule in the con-
tract. Contractual default rules are the initial set of rules that regulate
market transactions. These rules are merely a starting point; they
govern only when the parties to a transaction do not negotiate for a
different set of rules. As legal scholar Ian Ayres and economist Robert
Gertner explain, “default rules” are rules “that parties can contract
around by prior agreement” while “immutable rules” (or inalienabil-
ity rules) are rules that “parties cannot change by contractual agree-
ment.”8 Most market proponents favor default rules that can be
bargained around. Market solution proponents, however, are cer-
tainly not in agreement over the types of property entitlements and
contractual default rules that should be required. But once these are
established, then the market can do the rest. People and companies
can buy and sell personal information and make contracts about
the protection of privacy. For example, a number of commentators
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recommend contractual solutions to safeguard privacy, such as
where consumers license the use of their data to businesses.9
Although some might argue that personal information is owned by
the individual to whom it pertains based on a natural rights theory or
some form of inherent connection, many commentators who ap-
proach privacy in terms of property rights assign initial entitlements
instrumentally. They claim that the market will achieve the ideal
amount of privacy by balancing the value of personal information to
a company (i.e., its commercial value in the marketplace) against the
value of the information to the individual and the larger social value
of having the information within the individual’s control.10 The role of
law is to assign the initial entitlements. Thus, the debate in this dis-
course centers around who should own certain kinds of information.
So who should own personal information when people transact
with businesses? The individuals to whom the information pertains?
Or the companies that collect it?
Judge Richard Posner suggests that the law should often favor the
companies over the individuals. Posner translates control of informa-
tion into property concepts. Society should provide individuals a
property right in true information about themselves when it will fos-
ter more efficient transactions.11 With regard to the sale of customer
lists, Posner argues that “the costs of obtaining subscriber approval
would be high relative to the value of the list.” He concludes: “If,
therefore, we believe that these lists are generally worth more to the
purchasers than being shielded from possible unwanted solicitations
is worth to subscribers, we should assign the property right to the
[companies]; and the law does this.”12
In contrast, law professor Richard Murphy concludes that in many
instances, contractual default rules mandating confidentiality of per-
sonal information are more efficient than default rules permitting
disclosure.13 For Murphy, privacy has “substantial economic benefits”
because “[u]nless a person can investigate without risk of reproach
what his own preferences are, he will not be able to maximize his own
happiness.”14
Likewise, Jerry Kang views personal information as a form of prop-
erty and advocates for a market solution. He recognizes that there are
compelling non-market perceptions of privacy that view privacy as a
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human value and that this way of understanding privacy is “poorly
translated, if at all, into efficiency terms.” Nevertheless, he favors the
market approach. Kang recognizes that merely assigning a default
rule as to the ownership of information will be ineffective because in-
dividuals lack convenient ways to find out what information about
them is collected and how it is used. Thus, he advocates a contractual
default rule that “personal information may be processed in only
functionally necessary ways” and that parties are “free to contract
around the default rule.” Kang claims that inalienability rules would
be too paternalistic because individuals should be able to sell or dis-
close their information if they desire. Inalienability rules will risk “sur-
rendering control over information privacy to the state.”15
Internet law expert Lawrence Lessig also recommends a market-
based approach. He argues that a property regime permits each indi-
vidual to decide for herself what information to give out and “protects
both those who value their privacy more than others and those who
value it less.” Lessig notes that our existing system of posting privacy
policies and enabling consumers to opt in or out has high transaction
costs because people do not have “the time or patience to read
through cumbersome documents describing obscure rules for con-
trolling data.” Therefore, Lessig recommends that computer software
be crafted to act akin to an “electronic butler,” negotiating our privacy
concerns: “The user sets her preferences once—specifies how she
would negotiate privacy and what she is willing to give up—and from
that moment on, when she enters a site, the site and her machine ne-
gotiate. Only if the machines can agree will the site be able to obtain
her personal data.”16 In other words, Lessig suggests a technological
implementation for a market system where people have property
rights in their information.
Self-Regulation. Some commentators—especially people in the data-
base industry—argue that the market is functioning optimally and is
already adequately accounting for privacy concerns.17 The market,
they argue, is already treating personal information as a property
right owned by individuals. Companies have increasingly been
adopting privacy policies, which can operate as a form of contractual
promise limiting the future uses of the information. The exchange of
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personal information for something of value is already beginning to
take place. Many websites require people to supply personal informa-
tion in order to gain access to information on the website. Under the
market approach, this practice can be justified as an information
trade.18 In order to receive such services as book recommendations,
software upgrades, free email, and personal web pages, users must re-
linquish personal information not knowing its potential uses. In
short, useful information and services are being exchanged for per-
sonal information, and this represents the going “price” of privacy.
Moreover, there are market incentives for companies to keep their
data secret and to be honest about their data collection. There have
been a number of instances where companies have canceled various
initiatives due to public outcry over privacy. For example, in response
to privacy concerns, Yahoo! eliminated the reverse telephone number
search from its People Search site.19 In the early s, in response to a
public outcry, Lotus Corporation scrapped plans to sell a database
containing the names, addresses, income brackets, and lifestyle data
of  million citizens.20 In , Lexis-Nexis announced its P-TRAK
Personal Locator, which would provide addresses, maiden names,
and SSNs of millions of people. After an intensive -day outcry by In-
ternet users, Lexis-Nexis canceled P-TRAK.21 In , AOL halted its
plans to sell customers’ phone numbers to direct marketing firms.22
Furthermore, proponents of self-regulation argue that information
flow has many beneficial uses. Legal scholar Fred Cate contends that
information flow makes the consumer credit system cheaper and
faster, “enhances customer convenience and service,” and enables
businesses “to ascertain customer needs accurately and meet those
needs rapidly and efficiently.”23 Many people want some targeted
marketing and enjoy receiving information about products more tai-
lored to their tastes.
Cate points out that self-regulation is “more flexible and more sen-
sitive to specific contexts and therefore allow[s] individuals to deter-
mine a more tailored balance between information uses and privacy
than privacy laws do.” The most effective way for people to protect
their privacy, Cate contends, is to take actions themselves.24
Law professor Eric Goldman argues that “consumers’ stated pri-
vacy concerns diverge from what consumers do.” People are quick to
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say in the abstract that they want privacy, but when offered money or
discounts in return for their personal information, they readily relin-
quish it. “[P]eople won’t take even minimal steps to protect them-
selves,” Goldman asserts, “[so] why should government regulation do
it for them?” Finally, Goldman argues, “online businesses will invest
in privacy when it’s profitable.”25
Thus, the self-regulation proponents conclude that to the extent
that consumers want their privacy protected, the market will respond
to this demand and appropriately balance it against other interests.
The fact that privacy is not afforded much protection demonstrates
that people value other things more than privacy—such as efficient
and convenient transactions.
Misgivings of the Market
Understanding the privacy problem of databases in terms of the
Kafka metaphor—our helplessness and vulnerability in the face of the
powerful bureaucracies that handle our personal data—reveals that
there are several deficiencies in market solutions.
The Limitations of Contract Law. Although contract law can protect pri-
vacy within relationships formed between parties, it does not redress
privacy invasions by third parties outside of the contractual bonds.
Warren and Brandeis recognized this problem back in  when they
spoke of new photographic technologies. Cameras had been quite
large, and people had to pose to have their picture taken. This would
likely require people to establish some sort of contractual relation-
ship with the photographer. But the development of cheaper portable
cameras in the s enabled strangers to take pictures without the
subject ever knowing.26
Today, our personal information is increasingly obtained by people
and organizations that have never established any relationship with
us. For example, as public health law expert Lawrence Gostin notes,
the law of patient-physician confidentiality “is premised on the exis-
tence of a relationship between a physician and a patient, although
most health information is not generated within this relationship.”27
Information is often maintained not just by one’s physician, but one’s
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health plan, government agencies, health care clearinghouse organi-
zations, and many others.
Problems with Bargaining Power. There are great inequalities in bargain-
ing power in many situations involving privacy, such as employment
contracts or contracts between big corporations and individuals.
How many people are able to bargain effectively over their contracts
with their Internet Service Providers, cable providers, telephone com-
panies, and the like? Oscar Gandy observes that “individuals are
largely ‘contract term takers’ in the bulk of their economic relations
with organizations.”28 People frequently accede to standardized con-
tract terms without putting up much of a fight.29
Nor does it appear that market competition is producing a wide
menu of privacy protections. Companies only rarely compete on the
basis of the amount of privacy they offer. People often do not weigh
privacy policies heavily when choosing companies. For example,
people rarely choose phone companies based on their privacy poli-
cies.
Self-regulatory proponents would respond that this fact indicates
that privacy isn’t very important to most people. If people really cared
about privacy, the self-regulators argue, then they would refuse to
deal with companies offering inadequate levels of privacy. But as Paul
Schwartz contends, there are coordination problems because “indi-
viduals may have difficulty finding effective ways to express collec-
tively their relative preferences for privacy.”30
Although more companies that routinely collect and use personal
information are posting privacy policies, these policies have several
difficulties. Privacy policies are often written in obtuse prose and
crammed with extraneous information.31 But market proponents—
especially those favoring self-regulation—counter that many people
don’t bother to read privacy policies. This may not necessarily stem
from their turgid prose, but from the fact that consumers don’t want
to take the time to read them. Perhaps people just don’t care.
However, perhaps the lack of interest in privacy policies may stem
from the fact that the policies hardly amount to a meaningful con-
tract, where the parties bargain over the terms. Privacy policies are lit-
tle more than “notices” about a company’s policies rather than a
82 t h e  l i m i t s  o f  m a r k e t - b a s e d  s o l u t i o n s▲
contract. Privacy policies tend to be self-indulgent, making vague
promises such as the fact that a company will be careful with data;
that it will respect privacy; that privacy is its number one concern.
These public relations statements are far from reliable and are often
phrased in a vague, self-aggrandizing manner to make the corpora-
tion look good. What consumers do not receive is a frank and detailed
description of what will and will not be done with their information,
what specific information security measures are being taken, and
what specific rights of recourse they have. People must rely on the
good graces of companies that possess their data to keep it secure
and to prevent its abuse. They have no say in how much money and
effort will be allocated to security; no say in which employees get ac-
cess; and no say in what steps are taken to ensure that unscrupulous
employees do not steal or misuse their information. Instead, privacy
policies only vaguely state that the company will treat information se-
curely. Particular measures are not described, and individuals have
no control over those measures.
Most privacy policies provide no way for customers to prevent
changes in the policy, and they lack a binding enforcement mecha-
nism. Frequently, companies revise their privacy policies, making it
even more difficult for an individual to keep track. Yahoo!’s privacy
policy indicates that it “may change from time to time, so please
check back periodically.”32 AOL once told its subscribers that their pri-
vacy preferences had expired and that if they did not fill out a new
opt-out form, then their personal information would be distributed
to marketers.33 Further, personal information databases can be sold to
other businesses with less protective privacy policies, especially when
a company goes bankrupt. For example, in , Internet toy retailer
Toysmart.com filed for bankruptcy and attempted to auction off its
personal information database of over , customers.34 Dot-com
bankruptcies create a breakdown in the relationship between compa-
nies and consumers, resulting in little incentive for the bankrupt
company to take measures to protect consumer data. Personal infor-
mation databases are often a company’s most valuable asset and
could be sold to third parties at bankruptcy to pay off creditors.35
Second, to the extent that privacy policies do provide individuals
with privacy protection, it is often provided with an opt-out system,
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in which personal data can be collected and used unless the individ-
ual expressly says no. Opt-out systems require individuals to check a
box, send a letter, make a telephone call, or take other proactive steps
to indicate their preferences. However, these steps are often time-
consuming. There are too many collectors of information for a right
of opt-out to be effective. Without a centralized mechanism for indi-
viduals to opt-out, individuals would have to spend much of their
time guarding their privacy like a hawk.
The Direct Marketing Association (DMA) has established a system
where consumers can be placed on a no-solicitation list. This is es-
sentially a database of people who do not want to be in databases.
The service records their preference, but does not remove their name
from any list.36 The database is then sent to the subscribing compa-
nies so that they can stop mailings to those names.37 However, many
people are unaware of this option, numerous companies are not
members of the DMA, and many members fail to comply with DMA
guidelines. As legal scholar Jeff Sovern argues, opt-out systems pro-
vide little incentive to companies to make opting-out easy; “compa-
nies will incur transaction costs in notifying consumers of the
existence of the opt-out option and in responding to consumers who
opt out.”38 Since companies want to use personal information, their
incentive in an opt-out system is to make opting-out more difficult.39
These problems arise because people often lack sufficient bargain-
ing power over their privacy. As privacy law expert Peter Swire ob-
serves, it is difficult for consumers to bargain with large corporations
about their privacy because they lack expertise in privacy issues and
because it takes substantial time and effort.40 Information collection
is duplicitous, clandestine, and often coerced. The law currently does
not provide meaningful ability to refuse to consent to relinquish in-
formation. The FCRA, for example, mandates that individuals con-
sent before an employer can obtain their credit report. According to
Joel Reidenberg: “Frequently, individuals will be asked to sign blanket
consent statements authorizing inquiry into credit reporting agency
files and disclosures of information for any purpose. These consents
rarely identify the credit reporting agencies or all the uses to which
the personal information will be put.”41 This consent is virtually
meaningless. When people seek medical care, among the forms they
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sign are general consent forms which permit the disclosure of one’s
medical records to anyone with a need to see them. Giving people
property rights or default contract rules is not sufficient to remedy
the problem because it does not address the underlying power in-
equalities that govern information transactions. Unless these are ad-
dressed, any privacy protections will merely be “contracted” around,
in ways not meaningful either to the problem or to the contract no-
tions supposedly justifying such a solution. People will be given con-
sent forms with vague fine-print discussions of the contractual
default privacy rules that they are waiving, and they will sign them
without thought. As Julie Cohen correctly contends, “[f]reedom of
choice in markets requires accurate information about choices and
other consequences, and enough power—in terms of wealth, num-
bers, or control over resources—to have choices.”42 The bargaining
process must be made easier. The way things currently stand, most
people don’t know even know where to begin if they want to assert
their preference for privacy.
The One-Size-Fits-All Problem. Even assuming these problems could be
dealt with, a number of additional difficulties remain that prevent in-
dividuals from exercising their preferences to protect their privacy.
Affording individuals a right to control their personal data improperly
assumes that individuals have the ability to exercise meaningful con-
trol over their information.43 Paul Schwartz notes how consent
screens on a website asking users to relinquish control over informa-
tion often do so on a “take-it-or-leave-it basis” resulting in the “fic-
tion” that people have “expressed informed consent to [the website’s]
data processing practices.”44 Individuals are often presented with an
all-or-nothing choice: either agree to all forms of information collec-
tion and use or to none whatsoever. Such a limited set of choices does
not permit individuals to express their preferences accurately. Indi-
viduals frequently desire to consent to certain uses of their personal
information, but they do not want to relinquish their information for
all possible future uses.
For example, a person may want to purchase books from an online
bookseller. Suppose that the person’s privacy preferences consist of
the information being kept very secure, not being disclosed to the
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government, and not being traded or disclosed to other companies
(even in the event that the company goes bankrupt). But the online
bookseller’s privacy policy is standardized and often does not address
these points with any reasonable degree of specificity. And since pri-
vacy policies are remarkably similar among many companies, many
other online bookstores offer comparable terms. If the person de-
cides to purchase the book in a bricks-and-mortar bookstore, she
faces the same difficulties if she pays by credit card. There, the privacy
policies are not even readily available to the purchaser.
This state of affairs exists partly because not many choices are
available to people regarding their privacy and partly because people
are often not aware of the problems, risks, and dangers about how
their information is handled. Even if they were, it is doubtful whether
a person could create a special deal with a company to provide
greater protections for her privacy.45 Therefore, with regard to the level
of privacy protection offered by companies, a person must simply
take it or leave it. People are not afforded enough choices to exercise
their privacy preferences. A more complete range of choices must
permit individuals to express their preferences for how information
will be protected, how it will be used in the future, and with whom it
will be shared. Moreover, because companies controlling personal in-
formation are secretive about its uses and vague about their privacy
policies, people lack adequate knowledge to make meaningful
choices.
Market proponents might respond that it is not economically fea-
sible for companies to offer customized privacy policies. This would
require companies to keep track of each particular customer’s privacy
preferences, which could be cumbersome and expensive. However,
companies maintain very complex databases, able to handle count-
less fields of data and multiple variables. Why can’t various privacy
preferences be recorded along with various pieces of information?
Inequalities in Knowledge. The argument that the market is already pro-
viding the optimal level of privacy protection fails because there are
vast inequalities in knowledge and much data collection is clandes-
tine. Despite the few instances where information collection initia-
tives were canceled due to public complaints over privacy, many new,
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ambitious information gathering endeavors occur outside of the pub-
lic eye. At any given time, one of thousands of companies or govern-
ment agencies could decide on a new use of information or on a new
form of collection. People should not always have to be ready to
mount a large campaign anytime such an eruption could occur. Many
of the activities of the database industry are not well known to the
public, and will remain that way under default notions of corporate
privacy and trade secrets unless something is changed. Ironically,
corporate bureaucracies sometimes have more privacy rights than in-
dividuals.
The Value of Personal Information
A key aspect of property rights, observes information law scholar
Pamela Samuelson, is that property is alienable—people can readily
trade it away.46 Market solutions, which view information as property
that can be traded in the market, depend upon the ability of people to
accurately assess the value of information. As legal scholar Katrin By-
ford aptly notes, assigning property rights in information “values pri-
vacy only to the extent it is considered to be of personal worth by the
individual who claims it.”47 The value of personal information is de-
termined by how much it takes for a person to relinquish it. Since
people routinely give out their personal information for shopping
discount cards, for access to websites, and even for free, some market
proponents (especially the self-regulators) argue that the value of the
data is very low to the individuals. The market is thus already ade-
quately compensating individuals for the use of their information.
In a well-functioning market, assuming no market failure, the mar-
ket might work quite well in valuing personal information. But the
market in privacy is not a well-functioning market, and thus its valua-
tion determinations are suspect. 
The Aggregation Effect. The aggregation effect severely complicates the
individual’s ability to ascribe a value to personal information. An in-
dividual may give out bits of information in different contexts, each
transfer appearing innocuous. However, when aggregated, the infor-
mation becomes much more revealing. As law professor Julie Cohen
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observes, each instance in which we give out personal information
may seem “trivial and incremental,” which “tends to minimize its ulti-
mate effect.”48 It is the totality of information about a person and how
it is used that poses the greatest threat to privacy. From the stand-
point of each particular information transaction, individuals will not
have enough facts to make a truly informed decision.
Uncertain Future Uses. The potential future uses of personal informa-
tion are too vast and unknown to enable individuals to make the ap-
propriate valuation. The value of much personal information, such as
one’s SSN, does not stem from its intimacy, its immediate revelations
of selfhood, or the fact that the individual has authored it. Rather, the
value is in the ability to prevent others from gaining power and con-
trol over an individual; from revealing an individual’s private life; and
from making the individual vulnerable to fraud, identity theft, prying,
snooping, and the like. Because this value is linked to uncertain fu-
ture uses, it is difficult, if not impossible, for an individual to ade-
quately value her information. Since the ownership model involves
individuals relinquishing full title to the information, they have little
idea how such information will be used when in the hands of others.
For example, a person who signs up for a discount supermarket
shopper card might have some vague knowledge that her personal in-
formation will be collected. In the abstract, this knowledge may not
be all that disconcerting. But what if the person were told that infor-
mation about the contraceptives and over-the-counter medications
she buys would be made available to her employer? Or given to the
government? Or used to send her advertisements or spam? Without
being informed about how the information will be used, the individ-
ual lacks the necessary knowledge to assess the implications of sur-
rendering her personal data.
Is Privacy a Property Right? When personal information is understood as
a property right, the value of privacy often is translated into the com-
bined monetary value of particular pieces of personal information.
Privacy becomes the right to profit from one’s personal data, and the
harm to privacy becomes understood as not being adequately paid
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for the use of this “property.” But is this really the harm? Can privacy
be translated into property concepts without losing some of its
meaning?49
An initial difficulty with understanding personal information as a
form of property is that it is unclear who really creates the informa-
tion. Some pro-privacy commentators quickly assume that because
information pertains to a person, the person should have a right to
own it. However, information is often not created by the individual
alone. We often develop personal information through our relation-
ships with others. When a person purchases a product, information is
created through the interaction of seller and buyer.
Consider the case of Dwyer v. American Express Co. American Ex-
press cardholders sued American Express for renting their names to
merchants under both invasion of privacy and appropriation. The
court held that by using the credit card, “a cardholder is voluntarily,
and necessarily, giving information to defendants that, if analyzed,
will reveal a cardholder’s spending habits and shopping preferences.”
Thus, there was no invasion of privacy. As for appropriation, the court
reasoned:
Undeniably, each cardholder’s name is valuable to defendants.
The more names included on a list, the more that list will be
worth. However, a single, random cardholder’s name has little or
no intrinsic value to defendants (or a merchant). Rather, an indi-
vidual name has value only when it is associated with one of the
defendants’ lists. Defendants create value by categorizing and
aggregating these names. Furthermore, defendants’ practices do
not deprive any of the cardholders of any value their individual
names may possess.50
This case indicates what is omitted when information privacy is re-
duced to property rights in information. The court only focused on
the value of the information to each individual, not on the systemic
harms to which American Express’s practices contributed—namely,
the powerlessness of the individuals to have any meaningful control
over information pertaining to their personal lives. The problem with
databases is not that information collectors fail to compensate people
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for the proper value of personal information. The problem is people’s
lack of control, their lack of knowledge about how data will be used in
the future, and their lack of participation in the process. It is not
merely sufficient to allow people to sell their information, relinquish
all title to it, and allow companies to use it as they see fit. This provides
people with an all-or-nothing type of exchange, which they are likely
to take when they are unaware of how information can or might be
used in the future. Nor is it enough to attach some default contractual
rights to information transactions such as nondisclosure obligations
or a requirement of notification when a future use of information is
employed. These solutions cannot work effectively in a situation
where the power relationship between individuals and public and
private bureaucracies is so greatly unbalanced. In other words, the
problem with market solutions is not merely that it is difficult to com-
modify information (which it is), but also that a regime of default
rules alone (consisting of property rights in information and contrac-
tual defaults) will not enable fair and equitable market transactions in
personal information. As Julie Cohen warns, giving people property
rights in a defective market runs the risk of leading to more trade in
personal information, not less.51
Due to the problems with ascribing a value to personal informa-
tion and because privacy is an issue about societal structure involving
our relationships with public and private bureaucracies, some form
of regulation is necessary that exceeds the narrow measures pro-
posed by proponents of a market solution. There are certain rights we
cannot bargain away because they are not mere individual posses-
sions but are important for the structure of society as a whole.
Too Much Paternalism?
Market proponents are wary of government regulation because it
threatens to usurp individual choice. They argue that people should
be free to contract as they see fit. If people want to give up their pri-
vacy, the government shouldn’t paternalistically say that it knows
best. Market proponents contend that people are capable of making
rational decisions about their personal information and that the law
shouldn’t interfere.
90 t h e  l i m i t s  o f  m a r k e t - b a s e d  s o l u t i o n s▲
This argument is quite compelling, for not all individuals want pri-
vacy. For example, people may want their names sold to other com-
panies because they like receiving catalogs. Market proponents thus
aim to preserve individual choice.
The problem, however, is that the market currently fails to provide
mechanisms to enable individuals to exercise informed meaningful
choices. Even market approaches favoring a more pro-privacy regime
of contractual default rules neglect to account for the core of the
database problem as illustrated by the Kafka metaphor—the power
inequalities that pervade the world of information transfers between
individuals and bureaucracies.
As a result of these problems, there is little economic incentive for
companies to adopt strong privacy protection in the absence of legal
regulation. Although the Direct Marketing Association (DMA) main-
tains standards for self-regulation, polls suggest that less than  per-
cent of DMA members adhere to self-regulatory practices.52 The
individual’s lack of knowledge about the use of personal information
also makes companies less responsive to privacy concerns. One em-
ployee at a bank stated: “We joke about it all the time because we offi-
cially say that we don’t reveal information and we treat it with the
utmost respect. What a crock. I hear people laughing in the elevator
about credit reports they’ve pulled!”53 Unless people have greater
knowledge about the uses of their information and practices within a
company, they won’t be able even to raise an outcry.
I am not arguing that the market can’t protect privacy. The market
can work well, but not in the absence of structural legal protections. A
set of laws and rights is necessary to govern our relationship with bu-
reaucracies. These laws must consist of more than default rules that
can be contracted around or property entitlements that can be
bartered away. Market-based solutions work within the existing mar-
ket; the problem with databases is the very way that the market deals
with personal information—a problem in the nature of the market it-
self that prevents fair and voluntary information transactions.
Inalienability rules do not necessarily have to limit a person’s abil-
ity to disclose or sell certain information; nor must they limit many
forms of information collection. If the problem is understood with
the Kafka metaphor, the solution to regulating information flow is not
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to radically curtail the collection of information but to regulate uses.
For example, Amazon.com’s book recommendation service collects
extensive information about a customer’s taste in books. If the prob-
lem is surveillance, then the most obvious solution would be to pro-
vide strict limits on Amazon.com’s collection of information. This
solution, however, would curtail much data gathering that is neces-
sary for business in today’s society and that is put to beneficial uses.
Indeed, many Amazon.com customers, myself included, find Ama-
zon.com’s book recommendation service to be very helpful. In con-
trast, if the problem is understood as I have depicted it, then the
problem is not that Amazon is spying on its users or that it can use
personal data to induce its customers to buy more books. What is
troubling is the unfettered ability of Amazon.com to do whatever it
wants with this information. This problem was underscored when
Amazon.com abruptly changed its privacy policy to allow the transfer
of personal information to third parties in the event Amazon.com
sold any of its assets or went bankrupt.54 As a customer, I had no say in
this change of policy; no ability to change it or bargain for additional
privacy protection; and no sense about whether it would apply
retroactively to the purchases I already made. And what’s to prevent
Amazon.com in the future from changing its policy once again, per-
haps retroactively?
Therefore, privacy regulations should focus on our relationships
with bureaucracies, for unless these relationships are restructured,
markets in information will not consist of fair, voluntary, and in-
formed information transactions. Markets can certainly work to pro-
tect privacy, but a precondition of a successful market is establishing
rules governing our relationships with bureaucracies.
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Architecture and the
Protect ion of  Pr ivacy
Although information privacy law has taken some important steps to
protect privacy, it has thus far suffered numerous failures and diffi-
culties in addressing the privacy problems we are currently facing
with digital dossiers. Why has such a diverse body of law failed to be
effective? In a world constantly being transformed by technology,
how can we erect a robust and effective law of privacy when the
ground is constantly shifting?
Two Models for the Protection of Privacy
The Invasion Conception. The question of how to protect privacy was of
paramount importance to Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis in 
when they wrote their profoundly influential article, The Right to Pri-
vacy. The primary remedy for privacy invasions, they suggested,
should be a tort action for damages, and to a limited extent, injunc-
tions and criminal penalties.1
Warren and Brandeis’s conception of privacy problems has been
highly influential in the development of privacy law, and I will refer to
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this understanding as the “invasion conception.” Under this concep-
tion, privacy is understood as a series of discrete wrongs—inva-
sions—to specific individuals. These wrongs occur through the
actions of particular wrongdoers. The injury is experienced by the in-
dividuals who are wronged. For example, a privacy violation that
would fit well into the invasion conception is a newspaper publishing
a photograph of a person in the nude without that person’s consent.
There is a particular wrongdoer (the newspaper) that engages in a
particular action (publishing the photograph) which causes harm to a
particular individual. This harm consists of mental distress and any
consequent physical or mental impairment.
Under the invasion conception, privacy protections safeguard
against these wrongs to individuals. Protection consists of rights and
remedies for each instance of harm, and in certain cases, criminal
punishments for the wrongdoers. Thus, the invasion conception is re-
active. It waits for harms to materialize in concrete form and then re-
acts. The invasion conception works to prevent future harms through
the deterrent effects of civil liability and criminal penalties.
Another aspect of the invasion conception is that it often views pri-
vacy protections in the form of rights possessed and remedied at the
initiative of the individuals whose privacy has been invaded. The
value of protecting privacy is measured in terms of the value of pre-
venting harm to the individual. In the words of one court, “[p]rivacy is
inherently personal. The right to privacy recognizes the sovereignty of
the individual.”2 According to the Restatement of Torts: “The right
protected by the action for invasion of privacy is a personal right, pe-
culiar to the individual whose privacy is invaded.”3 Under this view,
privacy is enforced by allowing individuals to seek remedies for pri-
vacy invasions.
The privacy torts are designed to redress specific harms. In many
cases, however, damages are likely to be small, thus creating little in-
centive to sue. The result is that privacy is most protected in situa-
tions where damages can be defined palpably, such as where
skeletons in the closet are revealed, where nudity is publicly dis-
closed, or where the press sneaks into a person’s home to obtain per-
sonal information.
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Like tort law, criminal law focuses on punishing specific wrongdo-
ers. It aims to deter crime by establishing penalties for privacy inva-
sions. Criminal law is often reactive, responding to crime with
punishments after its occurrence. Frequently, criminal law fails to be
proactive in preventing crime. Although criminal law certainly works
to deter crime, some crimes are difficult to deter. Criminal law can
only reach a certain level of deterrence, which can be limited by diffi-
culties in catching and prosecuting the perpetrators. Crimes involv-
ing the use and dissemination of personal information present
complicated enforcement problems, since these crimes can occur
from anywhere in the world, are easy to conceal, and take a long time
to detect.
Although the invasion conception works for a number of privacy
problems, not all privacy problems are the same, and many do not
fit well into this model. In particular, the invasion conception does
not adequately account for many of the privacy problems arising to-
day. The problems of digital dossiers do not consist merely of a se-
ries of isolated and discrete invasions or harms, but are systemic in
nature, caused by a particular social or legal structure. Moreover, as
I explained earlier, the aggregation effect complicates the applica-
tion of tort law in specific cases. In isolation, a particular piece of
information may not be very invasive of one’s privacy. But when
pieces of information are combined, they may form a detailed ac-
count of an individual. The whole may be greater than the sum of
the parts.
Further, the exchange of personal information between businesses
cannot be readily analogized to the widespread disclosure of infor-
mation by the media. When companies buy and sell information,
they disclose it to only a few other entities. How are damages to be as-
sessed? These harms do not translate well to tort law or criminal law,
which focus on isolated actors and address harms individually rather
than collectively.
The traditional view of privacy harms pervades much of the law
of information privacy. Courts often look for specific injuries. For
example, in U.S. West, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission,
the court of appeals struck down FCC regulations requiring that
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consumers opt-in (by affirmatively giving their consent) before
telecommunications carriers could use or disclose their personal in-
formation. The court reasoned that the governmental interest in pro-
tecting privacy wasn’t “substantial” because the government failed to
“show that the dissemination of the information desired to be kept
private would inflict specific and significant harm on individuals,
such as undue embarrassment or ridicule, intimidation or harass-
ment, or misappropriation of sensitive personal information for the
purposes of assuming another’s identity.”4 First Amendment scholar
Eugene Volokh epitomizes this view when he writes:
[M]any of the proposals to restrict communication of consumer
transactional data would apply far beyond a narrow core of
highly private information, and would cover all transactional in-
formation, such as the car, house, food, or clothes one buys. I
don’t deny that many people may find such speech vaguely omi-
nous and would rather that it not take place, and I acknowledge
that some people get extremely upset about it. . . . If such rela-
tively modest offense or annoyance is enough to justify speech
restrictions, then the compelling interest bar has fallen quite
low.5
This way of viewing the harm to privacy fails to acknowledge the
larger systemic problems involved with information flow. As I have
argued in chapter , the growing use and dissemination of personal
information creates a Kafkaesque world of bureaucracy, where we are
increasingly powerless and vulnerable, where personal information is
not only outside our control but also is subjected to a bureaucratic
process that is itself not adequately controlled. This generalized harm
already exists; we need not wait for specific abuses to occur.
Enforcement at the initiative of the individual also creates difficul-
ties. Arguing from the invasion conception, Fred Cate contends that
although people claim they desire more privacy, their actions illus-
trate that they do not want to sacrifice much time or energy in obtain-
ing it.6 The goal of the law, says Cate, should be to assist those who
want to protect their privacy rather than to thrust a uniform wall of
privacy around everyone: “The law should serve as a gap-filler, facili-
tating individual action in those situations in which the lack of com-
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petition has interfered with private privacy protection.”7 Further-
more, according to Cate, the purpose of privacy rights is to “facilitate
. . . the development of private mechanisms and individual choice as
a means of valuing and protecting privacy.”8
However, enforcement mechanisms that rely upon individual ini-
tiative often fail because individuals lack the knowledge and re-
sources to use them. Individual remedies are only effective to the
extent that individuals have power to exercise them. In the face of
forces created by social structure, individual remedies are often pow-
erless. A person may have the legal opportunity to bargain to modify
a contract, lease, or employment agreement or to sue for redress if
wronged. But unless that person has the knowledge and ability to
bargain or to sue, the opportunities are often not very empowering.
Rights to consent to the collection of data lack much meaning if peo-
ple can be readily pressured, misled, or coerced into relinquishing
their information.9
Additionally, the invasion conception’s focus on privacy invasions
as harms to specific individuals often overlooks the fact that certain
privacy problems are structural—they affect not only particular indi-
viduals but society as a whole. Privacy cannot merely be enforced at
the initiative of particular individuals. Privacy, as Paul Schwartz con-
tends, should be viewed as a “constitutive value” because “access to
personal information and limits on it help form the society in which
we live and shape our individual identities.”10 Since certain privacy
problems are structural in nature, they affect more than specific ag-
grieved individuals. As data privacy expert Spiros Simitis aptly ob-
serves, “privacy considerations no longer arise out of particular
individual problems; rather, they express conflicts affecting every-
one.”11
Architecture. If we look at privacy more as an aspect of social and legal
structure, then we begin to see that certain types of privacy harms are
systemic and structural in nature, and we need to protect against
them differently.
The concept of “architecture” is useful for understanding how cer-
tain privacy problems should be understood and dealt with. The term
“architecture” typically refers to the design of spaces—of buildings or
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cities. I use the term architecture in a broader way, similar to
Lawrence Lessig and Joel Reidenberg, who contend that architecture
does not merely describe the design of physical structures, but can be
constructed through computer code.12 Our environment is not only
shaped spatially by the architecture of buildings and the layout of
cities, but by the design of information systems. This architecture has
similar effects as spatial design on our behavior, attitudes, norms, so-
cial interaction, sense of freedom, and security. Both computer hard-
ware and software have architectures. Hardware is built with certain
capabilities and limitations; it only has so much memory, a limited
processing speed, and so on. Likewise, software has certain con-
straints—some that exist because programmers have reached the
range of their capabilities, but others that exist because they are cre-
ated by design. The Internet itself has a design, one that affects the
way people communicate, the way data is transferred, and the extent
to which people can be anonymous.
Architecture creates certain psychological and social effects.13 Ac-
cording to Neal Katyal, physical architecture affects human conduct.14
Architecture can structure spaces to “facilitate unplanned social in-
teraction” by positioning door entrances so they face each other.15 Ar-
chitecture also alters perception by its aesthetic design, by what it
expresses. Frank Lloyd Wright observed that architecture involves
“making structure express ideas.”16 By influencing human behavior,
attitudes, thoughts, and interactions, architecture plays a profound
role in the structuring of society.
One of the ways in which architecture affects society is by enhanc-
ing or diminishing privacy. Recall from chapter  Jeremy Bentham’s
design for a prison, the Panopticon. The Panopticon demonstrates
how architecture can shape the very constitution of society by affect-
ing privacy. Through its design with a central observation tower, the
Panopticon creates a constant fear of observation, resulting in in-
creased obedience and discipline. As Michel Foucault observes,
“without any physical instrument other than architecture and geom-
etry, [the Panopticon] acts directly on individuals.”17 Unlike dun-
geons, which served “to enclose, to deprive of light and to hide,” the
Panopticon achieves control through visibility.18 The Panopticon is a
form of architecture that inhibits freedom; it is an architecture of so-
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cial control and discipline. For Foucault, the Panopticon is not
merely consigned to physical structures such as prisons; it is an ar-
chitecture that is increasingly built into the entire social structure.19
Panoptic architecture is increasingly employed in modern society, in
both physical and non-physical forms. Surveillance cameras are a
prime example. Since , Britain has overseen city streets through
the use of about . million surveillance cameras monitored by
closed circuit television (CCTV).20 It is virtually impossible to walk
the streets of London without being captured on camera numerous
times throughout the day. Such a surveillance system replicates
Panoptic architecture.
Panoptic architecture, and the architecture Lessig and Reidenberg
discuss, are “architectures of control,”21 for they function to exercise
greater dominion over individuals. Lessig observes that “[c]yberspace
does not guarantee its own freedom but instead carries an extraordi-
nary potential for control.”22 Lessig is responding to the early buzz
about the Internet, which was hailed as a place of unprecedented
freedom, a freewheeling and uninhibited world. Although the Inter-
net certainly has the potential to be a realm of liberty, Lessig demon-
strates that it can be regulated—through law and computer code.
People can be traced; speech can be censored; access to information
can be limited; anonymity can be restricted. Therefore, the Internet
has the potential to become a realm of comprehensive control.
But beyond control, architecture can function in other problem-
atic ways. In addition to architectures of control, we are seeing the
development of what I call “architectures of vulnerability.” Architec-
ture can create a world where people are vulnerable to significant
harm and are helpless to do anything about it. Architectures of vul-
nerability function differently than architectures of control. Architec-
tures of control are ways in which people are limited in their actions
and their freedom, where they are pressed into conformity to an-
other’s will. In contrast, architectures of vulnerability make people
weaker, expose them to a host of dangers, and take away their power.
Whereas architectures of control are central to Big Brother, architec-
tures of vulnerability pervade the world depicted by Kafka. As I will
discuss later, the rapid rise in identity theft is caused by architectures
of vulnerability.
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For problems that are architectural, the solutions should also be
architectural. Privacy must be protected by reforming the architec-
ture, which involves restructuring our relationships with businesses
and the government. In other words, the law should regulate the rela-
tionships. As I discussed earlier in this book, our relationships with
businesses and the government are becoming more bureaucratic in
nature, and it is this general development that must be addressed.
Thus, an architectural solution goes beyond treating the troublesome
symptoms that materialize from the use of digital dossiers. The law
often works at the surface of the problems, dealing with the overt
abuses and injuries that may arise in specific instances. But thus far
the law does not do enough to redefine the underlying relationships
that cause these symptoms. Unless people’s relationships with bu-
reaucracies are placed on more equal footing, affording people de-
fault property rights in information or other forms of information
control will not adequately protect privacy.
Architecture protects privacy differently than individual remedies.
It is more proactive than reactive; it involves creating structures to
prevent harms from arising rather than merely providing remedies
when harms occur. The invasion conception enforces privacy
through legal remedies employed at the initiative of individuals and
penalties to specific wrongdoers. Architectural remedies are more
systemic in nature, and they work by altering social structure to make
it harder for torts and crimes to occur. As Neal Katyal persuasively ar-
gues, architecture deals with crime differently than criminal penal-
ties; it can prevent crime, facilitate the capture of criminals, and can
even “shape individuals’ attitudes toward lawbreaking.”23
I am not contending that affording individuals with a cause of ac-
tion or a remedy for privacy invasions is completely ineffective. In-
deed, individual remedies must be a component of any architecture.
However, individual remedies alone are often not sufficient, for their
viability and effectiveness depends upon the architecture in which
they are embedded.
I am also not arguing that the invasion conception is incorrect and
should be abandoned. The invasion conception was designed for the
privacy problems experienced when Warren and Brandeis wrote their
article. Although it still works for a number of privacy problems today,
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it does not work for all privacy problems. In fact, understanding pri-
vacy problems with the notion of architecture is not in conflict with
the view of privacy articulated by Warren and Brandeis. A critical part
of Warren and Brandeis’s argument was the importance of the law’s
ability to respond to new problems. Today, we face a host of different
privacy problems. We need to recognize their differences and adapt
the law to grapple with them rather than continue to view them
through old lenses and attempt to resolve them in the same manner
as other problems.
Warren and Brandeis wrote long before the rise of massive record
systems and information networks. The problems created by the
growing accumulation, dissemination, and networking of personal
information are better understood architecturally than under the in-
vasion conception. Viewing these problems through architecture re-
veals that the problems are caused in a different manner than we
might have originally supposed. It recognizes harm within design and
structure. And it alters the strategies by which we seek to adapt law to
solve the problems. 
Thus, the viable protection of privacy must consist of more than a
set of protections for a series of isolated injuries. Rather, the protec-
tion of privacy depends upon an architecture that structures power,
a regulatory framework that governs how information is dissemi-
nated, collected, and networked. We need to focus on controlling
power. Often, new technology is introduced without adequate con-
trols, and as a result, it creates vulnerability and engenders trouble-
some shifts in power, even if the proposed uses of the technology do
not seem immediately troubling and even if the threat of abuse is not
imminent. The protection of privacy does not mean an all-or-noth-
ing tradeoff between the total restriction of information gathering
versus the complete absence of regulation. Many privacy problems
can be ameliorated if information uses are carefully and thoughtfully
controlled.
Toward an Architecture for Privacy and the Private Sector
What should an architecture that regulates the relationships look
like? I propose an architecture that establishes controls over the data
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networking practices of institutions and that affords people greater
participation in the uses of their information.
The first step is to redefine the nature of our relationships to busi-
nesses and government entities that maintain and use our personal
information. At present, the collectors and users of our data are often
not accountable to us. A company can collect a person’s data without
ever contacting that person, without that person ever finding out
about it. The relationship is akin to the relationship between
strangers—with one very important difference: One of the strangers
knows a lot about the other and often has the power to use this infor-
mation to affect the other’s life. But the stranger with the knowledge
doesn’t have many obligations to the other. At other times, we estab-
lish a relationship with a company, a bank, or another institution. We
might buy a product online or open up an account and invest money.
We are no longer strangers, but the quality of our relationship is often
not dramatically improved. Companies collect and maintain our in-
formation; they often use it for a myriad of new purposes; and they
are frequently careless about the security of our data. As discussed
earlier, the law often doesn’t afford people the ability to do much to
change the situation.
Our relationships with the collectors and users of our personal in-
formation thus need to be redefined. Consider another set of rela-
tionships—those between us and our doctors and lawyers. Here, the
law imposes a number of obligations on doctors and lawyers to focus
on our welfare. Indeed, the patient-physician relationship has been
likened by courts to a fiduciary one.24 A fiduciary relationship is a cen-
tral facet of the law of trusts. Trustees stand in a fiduciary relationship
to beneficiaries of the trust. The trustee has been entrusted with the
beneficiary’s money, and because of this position of special trust, the
trustee owes certain special duties to the beneficiary.25 Justice Ben-
jamin Cardozo, then writing for the Court of Appeals of New York, de-
scribed fiduciary duties in a famous passage:
Many forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for
those acting at arm’s length, are forbidden to those bound by
fiduciary ties. A trustee is held to something stricter than the
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morals of the market place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio
of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior.26
The types of relationships that qualify as fiduciary ones are not
fixed in stone. As one court has noted, courts “have carefully refrained
from defining instances of fiduciary relations in such a manner that
other and perhaps new cases might be excluded.”27 Examples of rec-
ognized fiduciary relationships include those between stockbrokers
and clients, lawyers and clients, physicians and patients, parents and
children, corporate officers and shareholders, and insurance compa-
nies and their customers.28
Fiduciaries have a duty to disclose personal interests that could
affect their professional judgment as well as a duty of confidentiality.29
For example, doctors who disclose a patient’s confidential medical in-
formation have been successfully sued by patients for breach of
confidentiality.30 Likewise, banks and schools have been held to be
obliged to keep personal information confidential.31
I posit that the law should hold that companies collecting and us-
ing our personal information stand in a fiduciary relationship with
us. This is a radical proposal. Although the concept of a fiduciary re-
lationship is an open-ended and developing one, the concept has not
been extended nearly as far as I propose. Generally, courts examine a
number of factors to determine the existence of a fiduciary relation-
ship: “[T]he degree of kinship of the parties; the disparity in age,
health, and mental condition; education and business experience be-
tween the parties; and the extent to which the allegedly subservient
party entrusted the handling of . . . business affairs to the other and
reposed faith and confidence in [that person or entity].”32 Most of the
factors look at disparities in power and knowledge, and these lean in
favor of finding a fiduciary relationship between us and the collectors
and users of our data. The last factor, however, understands the rela-
tionship as one in which something has been explicitly entrusted to
the trustee. This will work in the context of companies that we do
business with, for we entrust them with our personal data. But it will
be a significant expansion of the concept of fiduciary relationships
to extend it to third-party companies that gather our information
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without having done business with us. We don’t entrust anything to
these companies; they often take our data surreptitiously, without our
consent. Nevertheless, the law is flexible and in the past has re-
sponded to new situations. The law should grow to respond here,
since all of the other factors for recognizing a fiduciary relationship
seem to counsel so strongly for the need to impose fiduciary obliga-
tions for the collectors and users of our personal information.
If our relationships with the collectors and users of our personal
data are redefined as fiduciary ones, then this would be the start of a
significant shift in the way the law understands their obligations to
us. The law would require them to treat us in a different way—at a
minimum, with more care and respect. By redefining relationships,
the law would make a significant change to the architecture of the in-
formation economy.
More specifically, how should these relationships be recon-
structed? What duties and obligations should the collectors and users
of our personal information have? The foundations should be formed
by the Fair Information Practices, which, as privacy expert Marc
Rotenberg aptly observes, create an architecture for the handling and
use of personal information.33 The Fair Information Practices origi-
nate with a  report by the U.S. Department of Housing, Educa-
tion, and Welfare. The report recommended the passage of a code of
Fair Information Practices:
There must be no personal-data record-keeping systems whose
very existence is secret.
There must be a way for an individual to find out what informa-
tion about him is in a record and how it is used.
There must be a way for an individual to prevent information
about him obtained for one purpose from being used or made
available for other purposes without his consent.
There must be a way for an individual to correct or amend a
record of identifiable information about him.
Any organization creating, maintaining, using, or disseminating
records of identifiable personal data must assure the reliability of
the data for their intended use and must take reasonable precau-
tions to prevent misuse of the data.34
▲
▲
▲
▲
▲
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Subsequently, in , the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD) established guidelines for the protection of
privacy based in large part on the Fair Information Practices.35 Paul
Schwartz, Marc Rotenberg, Joel Reidenberg, and others have long con-
tended that the Fair Information Practices represent the most effective
foundation for the protection of privacy in the Information Age.36
The Fair Information Practices embody a particular understanding
of privacy and its protection. Understood broadly, the Fair Informa-
tion Practices establish an architecture that alters the power dynamic
between individuals and the various bureaucracies that process their
personal information. The Fair Information Practices focus on two
general concerns: participation and responsibility. They aim to struc-
ture the information economy so that people can participate mean-
ingfully in the collection and use of their personal information. This
does not necessarily mean that people are afforded dominion over
their personal information; rather, people are to be kept informed
about the information gathered about them and the purposes of its
use; and people must have some say in the way their information is
processed. In other words, the Fair Information Practices aim to in-
crease individual involvement in personal information systems.
Additionally, the Fair Information Practices bring information pro-
cessing under better control. Currently, information processing is out
of control. Companies collecting and using personal information are
often doing so in careless ways with little concern for the welfare of
the individuals to whom the information pertains. The Fair Informa-
tion Practices recognize that personal data users have special respon-
sibilities and that they must be regulated in order to ensure that they
maintain accurate and secure records and use and disseminate infor-
mation responsibly.
Unfortunately, in the United States the Fair Information Practices
have only been selectively incorporated into various statutes in a lim-
ited number of contexts. A more comprehensive incorporation of the
Fair Information Practices would go far toward addressing the privacy
problem as I have characterized it.
Participation: Opting-Out versus Opting-In. The current self-regulatory
and legislative solution of enabling people to opt-out of having their
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data collected or disseminated is ineffectual. When people have to
opt-out, the default is that they relinquish significant control over
their information unless they take steps (often time-consuming and
cumbersome) to indicate that they do not want a company to use or
disseminate their data. Providing people with opt-out rights and pri-
vacy policies does little to give individuals much control over their in-
formation. Regulation mandating that consumers opt-in rather than
opt-out will more effectively control the flow of information between
unequal parties. Under a system where individuals opt-in, the default
rule is that personal information cannot be collected or used about
an individual unless the individual provides consent. As Jeff Sovern
contends, an opt-in system will place the incentive on entities that
use personal information to “make it as easy as possible for con-
sumers to consent to the use of their personal information.”37 There-
fore, the law should require companies to adopt an opt-in system
rather than an opt-out system.
Even with an opt-in system, steps must be taken to ensure that
consent amounts to more than a “notice and choice” system, which,
as Marc Rotenberg argues, “imagines the creation of perfect market
conditions where consumers are suddenly negotiating over a range of
uses for personal information.”38 Thus, effective privacy regulation
must legally require an opt-in system which contains a meaningful
range of choices as well as addresses inequalities in knowledge and
power and other impediments to voluntary and informed consent.
For example, inequalities in knowledge—the fact that companies
know how they might use data whereas people have little awareness
of these plans—could be addressed by limiting such future uses of
personal data without first obtaining people’s consent.
Limits on the Use of Data. A critical step toward addressing the prob-
lems of digital dossiers is providing limits on the use of data. Interna-
tionally, the OECD Guidelines provide that “[p]ersonal data should be
relevant to the purposes for which they are to be used, and, to the ex-
tent necessary for those purposes, should be accurate, complete, and
kept up-to-date.”39 In , the European Union issued the European
Community Directive on Data Protection, which outlines the basic
principles for privacy legislation for European Union member coun-
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tries. The Directive provides for a comprehensive protection of per-
sonal information maintained by a broad range of entities. This om-
nibus approach exists in stark contrast to the United States’
approach, which regulates privacy “sectorally” in various narrow con-
texts.40
Although the Directive is far from perfect, it recognizes some of the
dimensions of the problem that are neglected by U.S. privacy law. For
example, Article  provides:
Member States shall grant the right to every person not to be
subject to a decision which produces legal effects concerning
him or significantly affects him and which is based solely on au-
tomated processing of data intended to evaluate certain per-
sonal aspects relating to him, such as his performance at work,
creditworthiness, reliability, conduct, etc.41
Further, Article  prohibits, subject to a number of necessary ex-
ceptions, “the processing of personal data revealing racial or ethnic
origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade-
union membership, and the processing of data concerning health or
sex life.”42 These two provisions of the Directive limit the ways per-
sonal information can be used to make important decisions affecting
people’s lives.
Enforcement. The Fair Information Practices are broad principles,
and they do not specify how they are to be carried out in practice or
enforced. As I discussed earlier, individual remedies can only go so
far. Of course, individual remedies are important, and people should
be able to sue when injured by companies that fail to follow the Fair
Information Practices. But with many of the new types of architec-
tural harms I described—such as making people more vulnerable to
fraud and identity theft—damages will be difficult to calculate. When
a person actually suffers from identity theft, it is easy to comprehend
the harm. When a person is made more vulnerable—such as being
exposed to a greater risk of injury but not yet actually injured—it is
harder to establish damages because one can’t point to concrete eco-
nomic loss or physical pain and suffering. Nevertheless, increased
vulnerability is a palpable harm—just as weakening a person’s
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immune system would be, or disabling her home security system.
Part of the challenge for law is to begin to recognize the harms cre-
ated by increased vulnerability and powerlessness. But until the law
does this, enforcement must also occur through the work of govern-
ment agencies tasked with policing the corporate world of informa-
tion networking. Just as the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
regulates food and drugs, just as the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission (SEC) regulates the securities markets, we need a federal
agency to regulate the collection and use of personal information.43
As I discussed in chapter , the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has
started to undertake this role, but it has a long way to go.
The FTC must receive expanded jurisdiction and resources to be
more proactive in policing the security practices of companies. In a
handful of cases thus far, the FTC has preemptively brought actions
against companies for maintaining shoddy security even before in-
formation was leaked or obtained improperly. As discussed in chap-
ter , the FTC brought an action against Microsoft for failing to
provide adequate security for its users’ personal data. In In re
Guess.com, Inc.,44 the FTC reached a settlement with Guess, a com-
pany that sold clothing and accessories over the Internet, for main-
taining flawed security of its customers’ personal information. Guess
promised that all personal information “including . . . credit card in-
formation and sign-in password, are stored in an unreadable, en-
crypted format at all times.” This statement was false, and the FTC
brought an action even before there was any evidence that hackers or
others improperly gained access to the data. Cases like these are
promising developments, but many more need to be brought.
As discussed before, one problem with the FTC’s jurisdiction is that
it is triggered when a company breaches its own privacy policy. But
what if a company doesn’t make explicit promises about security?
One hopeful development is the Gramm-Leach-Bliley (GLB) Act. The
GLB Act requires a number of agencies that regulate financial institu-
tions to promulgate “administrative, technical, and physical safe-
guards for personal information.”45 In other words, financial
institutions must adopt a security system for their data, and the mini-
mum specifications of this system are to be defined by government
agencies. A broader but similar provision must be passed to govern all
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the collectors and users of personal information. It must be enforced
by a federal agency that will examine each company’s security prac-
tices and ensure that they are adequate. As I will discuss later, the se-
curity practices at countless companies that collect and use our
personal data are notoriously insufficient, a reality that has led to the
rapid growth of identity theft.
Reconceptualizing Identity Theft
Thus far, what I have said has been relatively abstract. In the remain-
der of this chapter, I will provide a specific demonstration of these
points through the example of one of the most rapidly growing and
troubling problems of the information economy—the problem of
identity theft. It is a privacy problem that resembles a Kafkaesque
nightmare.
The Identity Theft Problem. A person loses his wallet while on vacation
in Florida. His wallet contains his driver’s license and other personal
information. An identity thief uses the victim’s information for several
years to buy and sell property, open bank accounts, establish phone
service, and so on.46 Pursuant to a Florida warrant based on the crimi-
nal conduct of the identity thief, the victim is arrested in California
and imprisoned for over a week. The victim also has civil judgments
issued against him.47
The identity of a retired -year-old man is stolen. Debts continue
to amass on his credit reports. Although the victim lives in Maryland,
a Texas bank issues a car loan to the identity thief in Texas.48 The vic-
tim continually fights to have the debts removed from his credit re-
ports, but he is told to take up the issues with the creditors who claim
that the debts are legitimate. Even after debts are removed, they reap-
pear on his credit reports because a different collection agency re-
places them.49
These are examples of what has come to be called “identity theft,”
which is a problem involving personal information. As defined by the
U.S. General Accounting Office, “identity theft or identity fraud gen-
erally involves ‘stealing’ another person’s personal identifying infor-
mation . . . and then using that information to fraudulently establish
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credit, run up debt, or take over existing financial accounts.”50 Identity
theft is not the same as ordinary credit card fraud, where a thief steals
and uses a person’s credit card. In identity theft, the culprit obtains
personal information and uses it in a variety of fraudulent ways to im-
personate the victim. The thief gathers personal information from
database companies and public records, or by stealing wallets, pilfer-
ing mail, or rooting through trash to find data on discarded docu-
ments.51
Identity theft is the most rapidly growing type of white-collar crim-
inal activity.52 According to an FTC estimate in September , “al-
most  million Americans have discovered that they were the victim
of some form of ID theft within the past year.”53 Identity theft can be a
harrowing experience. According to estimates, a victim typically
spends over two years and close to  hours to repair the damage
that identity theft causes.54 Victims often spend thousands of dollars
to remedy the harm, and many experience great anxiety.55 They have
difficulty getting a loan, securing a mortgage, obtaining a security
clearance, or even being hired for a job.56 And victims are sometimes
arrested based on warrants for the crimes of the identity thieves.57
Identity theft creates these problems because our digital dossiers
are becoming so critical to our ability to function in modern life.
Credit reporting agencies construct dossiers about us to report our
financial status to creditors. Without these reports, people can’t ob-
tain loans, mortgages, or leases. Personal information is also used to
establish accounts with merchants, ISPs, cable companies, phone
companies, and so on.
The identity thief not only pilfers victims’ personal information,
but also pollutes their dossiers by adding false information, such as
unpaid debts, traffic violations, parking tickets, and arrests. The harm
of identity theft is not solely financial; it can seep into a person’s
everyday life. The victim cannot readily recover the personal informa-
tion in the way that stolen property can be recovered. The victim
must constantly defend against the identity thief’s next move. Even
after the victim cleans up her credit reports, if the identity thief re-
mains at large, there may be further pollution. This is another way in
which identity theft differs from credit card fraud or the theft of an
ATM card or access card. Once the card is cancelled, the crime ends.
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With identity theft, the crime can continue, for personal information
works like an “access card” that cannot be readily deactivated.
Identity Theft and the Invasion Conception. Thus far, the law has viewed
identity theft under the invasion conception—as a harm to individu-
als by criminals. Identity theft unquestionably harms individuals and
certainly involves criminals. Therefore, it is no surprise that identity
theft is viewed under the invasion conception and that the solutions
to identity theft emerge from this model. As I will argue later, this
model is deeply flawed and as a result, its solutions are ineffective.
In , Congress passed the Identity Theft and Assumption Deter-
rence Act, which erected a comprehensive penal regime for identity
theft.58 Subsequently, the vast majority of states have passed laws to
criminalize identity theft.59 Thus, it is only recently that policymakers
have turned their attention to identity theft, and the overwhelming
approach is to classify identity theft as a species of crime and to focus
on the actions of these criminals.
There are several problems with viewing identity theft exclusively
in this manner. First, law enforcement agencies have thus far not de-
voted adequate resources toward investigating and prosecuting iden-
tity theft cases. In a U.S. General Accounting Office survey of  states,
officials admitted that they have insufficient resources to respond to
identity theft because violent crimes and drug offenses consume
most of the resources. Additionally, the survey reported, “[i]dentity
theft cases require highly trained investigators, require longer-than-
usual efforts, and often end without an arrest.” Identity theft often oc-
curs across different jurisdictions, and law enforcement officials
“sometimes tend to view identity theft as being ‘someone else’s prob-
lem.’” As a result, most identity thefts remain unsolved.60 Research
firm Gartner, Inc. estimates that less than  in  instances of iden-
tity theft result in a conviction.61
Second, victims experience great difficulty in obtaining redress for
identity theft. Victims are often unaware that their identities have
been stolen until long after the identity theft has begun. A report
based on victim surveys estimates that it takes victims over a year to
discover that they have been victimized.62 According to FTC esti-
mates,  percent of identity theft victims don’t learn of the theft until
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two years later.63 One tip-off that a person is a victim of identity theft
is an unusual item on a credit report. The identity thief often takes out
loans and uses lines of credit which the thief never pays back. These
delinquencies show up on the victim’s credit report, and destroy the
victim’s credit rating. Unfortunately, the Fair Credit Reporting Act
(FCRA),64 which regulates credit reporting agencies, fails to provide
people with adequate resources to discover that they are being vic-
timized or repair the damage done by identity theft. Although the
FCRA permits individuals to contest the accuracy of information in
their credit histories65 and enables individuals to sue to collect dam-
ages for violations of the Act,66 these rights often are ineffectual. One
problem is that people often are unaware of the information their
credit reports contain. To obtain such information, people must re-
quest a copy of their credit report from each of the three major credit
reporting agencies—Experian, Equifax, and Trans Union. And if indi-
viduals want to ensure that their credit reports remain accurate, they
must request reports regularly.
Credit reporting agencies have a duty to investigate consumer dis-
putes with the accuracy of their reports, but this often is ineffective in
cases of identity theft. In a compelling article, legal scholar Lynn LoP-
ucki observes that the “victim is asked to prove a negative: namely,
that he or she is not the person who borrowed from the creditor. The
victim’s evidence is likely to be complex and circumstantial.” Credi-
tors do not have a sufficient incentive to investigate, for if the victim is
correct, creditors cannot recover on the debt. LoPucki also aptly ar-
gues that the “victim lacks a forum in which to proceed. The victim
has no right to a hearing on the accuracy of the information re-
quested.” Moreover, the “FTC seldom acts on the complaint of a sin-
gle customer.”67
The FCRA does not allow people to sue for “defamation, invasion of
privacy, or negligence” when the credit reporting agency discloses
false information or a creditor reports false information to a credit re-
porting agency unless the information is “furnished with malice or
willful intent to injure such consumer.” Instead, the FCRA provides a
cause of action for negligently failing to comply with its provisions,
but a victim must bring an action within two years “from the date on
which the liability arises.”68 In TRW, Inc. v. Andrews, the Supreme Court
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held that the two-year statute of limitations period begins to run
when a violation occurs, even if the plaintiff remains unaware of it.69
In December , Congress passed a law, called the Fair and Ac-
curate Credit Transactions Act (FACTA), that revised the FCRA.70 The
FACTA makes several improvements to the FCRA. It overturns An-
drews and expands the statute of limitations to five years from the vi-
olation or two years following the discovery of the violation. A person
can ask a credit reporting agency to place a “fraud alert” in her file,
and the agency must contact all the other credit reporting agencies to
do the same. The Act also makes it easier for identity theft victims to
obtain records from companies where the thief opened accounts or
purchased goods. People can request a free credit report each year
from all of the national credit reporting agencies. The Act provides
consumers with the ability to opt-out of offers of prescreened credit.
However, the Act is still moored in the invasion conception. The
law does not allow individuals enough involvement in the uses and
dissemination of their personal information to quickly discover that
they are victims of identity theft or to obtain redress after identity
theft occurs. The FACTA makes it slightly easier for victims to repair
the damage from identity theft, but this is akin to a better bandage.
Many of the Act’s protections are already being carried out voluntarily
by credit reporting agencies. Prior to the FACTA, victims of identity
theft could call one credit reporting agency, which would voluntarily
alert the others to the fraud. Most victims could already obtain a free
credit report so long as they believed in good faith that they had been
defrauded. Consumers who had never been victimized had to pay
only $ for their credit report. Thus, the FACTA takes some forward
steps, but it does not progress very far. FACTA’s reforms are remedial;
the Act does little to proactively prevent identity theft.
More disturbingly, the FACTA also gives credit reporting agencies
and the companies that use our personal information a great be-
nefit—states are barred from passing stricter laws. The states, not the
federal government, had been providing stronger and more effective
protection. The Act thus comes at the price of removing valuable pro-
tections to millions of individuals and preventing the states from fur-
ther experimentation in combating the mounting threat of identity
theft.
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Viewing identity theft under the invasion conception—as a series
of isolated thefts from particular individuals—results in commenta-
tors often urging individuals to take a variety of steps to avoid being
victimized. Fred Cate argues that identity theft could be greatly cur-
tailed if people exercised more care over their data:
Despite all the bills introduced to combat the theft of identity, in-
dividual action may provide the best defense: keeping a close
watch on account activity; reporting suspicious or unfamiliar
transactions promptly; properly destroying commercial solicita-
tions; storing valuable documents securely; protecting account
names and passwords; and never disclosing personal informa-
tion to unknown callers.71
A report by the FDIC suggests several tips for people to “minimize”
the risk of identity theft:
Pay attention to your billing cycles.
Guard your mail from theft.
Do not give out personal information.
Keep items with personal information in a safe place.
Give your SSN only when absolutely necessary.
Don’t carry your SSN card; leave it in a secure place.
Order a copy of your credit report from each of the three major
credit reporting agencies every year.72
The general advice is that if people take a number of steps, identity
theft will be minimized. However, personal data is often collected un-
wittingly, without consent; SSNs are frequently used, and refusal to
give out one’s SSN results in considerable inconvenience; and many
people cannot even name the three major credit reporting agencies,
let alone request a copy of their credit reports. Even if people did take
all these steps, the risks of identity theft are still not significantly min-
imized. According to an official at the FTC, “[t]here is no way you can
fully immunize yourself from identity theft because the information
is out there.”73
I contend that the prevailing approach to dealing with identity
theft—by relying on criminal penalties and by depending upon indi-
viduals to take great lengths to try to protect themselves—has the
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wrong focus. Of course, identity thieves should be prosecuted and
people should avoid being careless with their data. The law has signi-
ficant room to improve in prosecuting identity theft. But these solu-
tions fail to address the foundations of the problem.
Identity Theft as Architecture. The underlying cause of identity theft is
an architecture that makes us vulnerable to such crimes and unable
to adequately repair the damage. This architecture is not created by
identity thieves; rather, it is exploited by them. It is an architecture of
vulnerability, one where personal information is not protected with
adequate security, where identity thieves have easy access to data and
the ability to use it in detrimental ways. We are increasingly living
with digital dossiers about our lives, and these dossiers are not con-
trolled by us but by various entities, such as private-sector companies
and the government. These dossiers play a profound role in our exis-
tence in modern society. The identity thief taps into these dossiers
and uses them, manipulates them, and pollutes them. The identity
thief’s ability to so easily access and use our personal data stems from
an architecture that does not provide adequate security to our per-
sonal information and that does not afford us with a sufficient degree
of participation in its collection, dissemination, and use. Conse-
quently, it is difficult for the victim to figure out what is going on and
how to remedy the situation.
The traditional legal view of identity theft fails to address this ar-
chitecture, for it focuses on identity theft as a series of discrete in-
stances of crime rather than as a larger problem about the way our
personal information is handled. Even the term “identity theft” views
it as an instance of crime—a “theft” rather than the product of inade-
quate security.
The architecture enabling identity theft emerges from the govern-
ment and the private sector. With regard to the government part of
the structure, the SSN and public record systems create a regime
where identity is readily stolen and the consequences are severe.
SSNs are a key piece of information for identity theft, for they can un-
lock a wealth of other information held by the government and the
private sector.74 Created in  as part of the Social Security System,
SSNs were not designed to be used as a general identifier. Indeed, for
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many years, the Social Security card stated that it was “not for
identification.”75 However, over time, numerous federal agencies
began using the SSN for identification, as did state and local govern-
ments, schools, banks, hospitals, and other private-sector entities.76
In the early s, the growing uses of the SSN raised serious con-
cerns that the SSN would become a de facto universal identifier.77 In
the Privacy Act of , Congress partially responded to these con-
cerns by prohibiting government agencies from denying any right,
benefit, or privilege merely because an individual refused to disclose
her SSN. However, the Privacy Act did not restrict the use of SSNs by
the private sector.
The use of the SSN continued to escalate after the Privacy Act. As
one commentator has observed, “governmental dissemination of
personal identifying numbers is still widespread, and limits on pri-
vate actors are also virtually nonexistent.”78 Today, the SSN functions
in the United States as a de facto identifier, and there is scant protec-
tion on its use. SSNs are often widely available. Schools frequently use
student SSNs as student identifiers, which makes student SSNs avail-
able to a large number of university personnel. States often place
SSNs on driver’s licenses, which exposes SSNs to anyone who checks
a driver’s license for identification. Additionally, SSNs are requested
on a wide variety of applications and forms, such as employment ap-
plications, hospital admittance forms, college applications, video
store membership applications, and credit card applications.
SSNs are used as passwords to obtain access to a host of personal
records from banks, investment companies, schools, hospitals, doc-
tors, and so on.79 The SSN is a powerful number, for with it a person
can open and close accounts, change addresses, obtain loans, access
personal information, make financial transactions, and more. In
short, the SSN functions as a magic key that can unlock vast stores of
records as well as financial accounts, making it the identity thief’s
best tool.
Viewed in terms of architecture, the government has created an
identification number without affording adequate precautions
against its misuse. In so doing, the government has exposed every cit-
izen to significant vulnerability to identity theft and other crimes
such as fraud and stalking.
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Not only are the uses of SSNs inadequately controlled, but SSNs
are relatively easy for the identity thief to obtain. SSNs are harvested
by database firms from a number of public and non-public sources,
such as court records or credit reports. It is currently legal for private
firms to sell or disclose SSNs. SSNs and other personal information
that assists identity thieves can be obtained from public records or
the database companies that market personal data mined from pub-
lic records.80 SSNs are in fact required by law to be publicly disclosed
in bankruptcy records.81 Identity thieves thus can plunder public
records, which are increasingly being made readily accessible on the
Internet, for personal information to carry out their crimes. For ex-
ample, recently the clerk of courts for Hamilton County, Ohio placed
the county’s public records on the Internet. From a speeding ticket
placed on the website, an identity thief accessed a victim’s SSN, ad-
dress, birth date, signature, and other personal information and
opened up credit card accounts in the victim’s name.82 Further, iden-
tity thieves can obtain SSNs along with a detailed dossier about their
victims simply by paying a small fee to various database companies.83
The problem of identity theft also stems from the private sector’s
inadequate security measures in handling personal information.
Companies lack adequate ways of controlling access to records and
accounts in a person’s name, and numerous companies engage in the
common practice of using SSNs, mother’s maiden names, and ad-
dresses for access to account information.84 Additionally, creditors
give out credit and establish new accounts if the applicant supplies a
name, SSN, and address.
The credit reporting system also employs inadequate precautions
to ensure against inaccuracies in credit reports and improper access
to the system. Credit reporting agencies don’t work for the individuals
they report on; rather, they are paid by creditors. Even though the
FCRA gives people certain rights with regard to credit reporting agen-
cies, there is still a significant lack of accountability because credit re-
porting agencies have no incentive to compete for the business of
those on whom they report. According to Lynn LoPucki, the problem
emerges because “creditors and credit-reporting agencies often lack
both the means and the incentives to correctly identify the persons
who seek credit from them or on whom they report.”85 LoPucki aptly
117a r c h i t e c t u r e  a n d  t h e  p r o t e c t i o n  o f  p r i v a c y
▲
shifts the focus to the companies that control personal data and cor-
rectly contends that identity theft stems from the private sector’s use
of SSNs for identification.86
Viewed in terms of architecture, identity theft is part of a larger
problem, which is best articulated by using the Kafka metaphor. The
problem is that we have so little participation in the use of our per-
sonal data combined with the fact that it flows so insecurely and care-
lessly without sufficient control. The harm is not simply measured in
the overt instances of identity theft and abuse, but in the fact that we
are made more vulnerable to a series of errors, abuses, and dangers.
Indeed, with ever more frequency, we are hearing stories about se-
curity glitches and other instances of personal data being leaked and
abused. For example, in , identity thieves improperly used Ford
Motor Credit Company’s code to access the credit files of , of
Ford’s customers, which were maintained by Experian, a major credit
reporting agency.87 Citibank employed a database marketing com-
pany to collect the email addresses of its credit card customers and
send them emails offering them access to their financial informa-
tion.88 This was done without verifying whether the email addresses
actually belonged to the particular customers.89
The problems of information handling are most vividly illustrated
by an incident involving Princeton University officials who improp-
erly accessed personal information in a Yale University database. Yale
established a website enabling undergraduate applicants to find out
whether they had been accepted or denied admission.90 The website
invited students to enter additional information, such as their inter-
ests and hobbies.91 To access the website, the students were asked
their name, birth date, and SSN.92 However, in April , a Princeton
admissions official accessed certain applicants’ accounts on Yale’s
website by using their SSNs.93 After discovering the unauthorized ac-
cess by Princeton, Yale reported the incident to the FBI.94 Although
the shady actions of the Princeton official grabbed the most atten-
tion, the problem was created by Yale’s inept security measures, ones
that resemble in many ways those used by companies that hold even
more sensitive personal data.
The identity thief, then, is only one of the culprits in identity theft.
The government and businesses bear a significant amount of respon-
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sibility, yet this is cloaked in the conception of identity theft as a dis-
crete crime that the victim could have prevented had she exercised
more care over her personal data. Identity theft does not merely hap-
pen; rather, it is manufactured by a legally constructed architecture.
Further, the architecture contributes to the harm caused to victims
of identity theft. Identity theft plunges people into a bureaucratic
nightmare. The identity theft injury to victims is often caused by the
frustration and sense of helplessness in attempting to stop and repair
the damage caused by the identity thief. Victims experience profound
difficulty in dealing with credit reporting agencies,95 and often find re-
curring fraudulent entries on their credit reports even after contact-
ing the agencies.96 Identity theft laws do not adequately regulate the
bureaucratic system that injures victims. The bureaucracies control-
ling personal information are often indifferent to the welfare of the
individuals to whom the information pertains.
Forging a New Architecture
If we see the problem architecturally, we see an architecture of vul-
nerability, one with large holes, gaps, and weak spots. The harm is
caused by the architecture itself. Living in a dilapidated structure—a
building with flimsy walls, no locks, peepholes, inadequate fire pro-
tection, and no emergency exits—is harmful, even without a disaster
occurring. Modern society is built on expectations that we will be
kept secure, that our money will not be stolen, that our homes will
not be invaded, that we will be protected against violence. It is diffi-
cult to imagine how we could maintain a free society if we did not
have protection against rape, assault, murder, and theft. If these pro-
tections are inadequate, there is harm even without being victimized.
Effective safety is thus partly a design question. According to legal
scholar Neal Katyal, physical architecture can be proactive in com-
bating crime, for it can prevent crime. For example, “cleanliness and
aesthetic appeal” can make people perceive that a place is safe and
orderly, and make miscreants less likely to disrupt it.97 In a similar
manner, the architecture of information flows can be redesigned to
prevent identity theft and ameliorate its effects. Identity theft is the
product of an architecture that creates vulnerability and insecurity, so
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the most effective way to combat identity theft is to reconstruct this
faulty architecture. But what should an appropriate architecture look
like?
Participation and Responsibility. The problem of identity theft can be ad-
dressed with an architecture built around participation and responsi-
bility, the key concepts of the Fair Information Practices. At the most
basic level, the Fair Information Practices place the burden of ad-
dressing the identity theft problem on the entities that cause it—
those using personal information. The effectiveness of the Fair
Information Practices depends upon how they are applied to particu-
lar privacy problems and how they are enforced. In what follows, I will
discuss how the two general aims of the Fair Information Practices—
participation and responsibility—can be implemented to help grap-
ple with the identity theft problem.
First, the architecture should allow for people to have greater par-
ticipation in the collection and use of their personal information.
Currently, information can be readily disseminated and transferred
without a person’s knowledge or consent. Few requirements exist for
how secure information must be kept, and information can be used
for whatever purpose the entity possessing it desires.
I recommend an architecture that requires companies gathering
personal information about people to keep individuals informed
about their information. Presently, even with the FCRA, credit report-
ing agencies are not responsive enough to the people whose informa-
tion they collect and disseminate. The recently passed FACTA allows
people to access their credit reports on a yearly basis, but identity
theft can occur in the interim and can cause much damage even in a
few months. People should be allowed to more regularly access their
credit reports for free.98 But LoPucki fears that increasing a person’s
ability to access information held by credit reporting agencies will
also increase the identity thief’s ability to gain access.99 A more radical
change in the credit reporting system may be necessary to fix this
difficulty. An opt-in regime to credit reporting would significantly
curtail problems of improper access to credit records. Currently,
credit reporting agencies need not establish any relationship with the
people on whom they report. In an opt-in regime, credit reporting
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agencies would have to contact individuals and would be legally ac-
countable for improper access to credit records. Individuals could ac-
cess their credit records through passwords or account numbers
rather than by supplying SSNs or other personal data.
When there is an unusual change in the behavior of a record sub-
ject, such as when a person who regularly repays her loans suddenly
starts defaulting, credit reporting agencies should notify that person.
The architecture should empower people with an easy, quick, and
convenient way to challenge inaccuracies about their personal infor-
mation as well as fraudulent entries in their credit reports. Disputes
can be resolved with a special arbitration system that can function
quickly and inexpensively rather than resorting to expensive court
proceedings.
If these measures are taken, victims will be able to discover more
quickly the existence of identity theft since they will be better in-
formed about the data collected about them and how it is being used.
The architecture should also be premised on the notion that the
collection and use of personal information is an activity that carries
duties and responsibilities. The law should establish specific meas-
ures of control over entities maintaining systems of personal data. For
example, if a company is providing background check information
about a person, it should be held responsible for any inaccuracies or
deficiencies in the information.
To establish greater responsibility, the law would regulate private-
sector security practices. Minimum security practices must be estab-
lished for handling people’s personal information or accounts. Use of
a SSN, mother’s maiden name, and birth date as the means of gaining
access to accounts should be prohibited. Identity theft can be cur-
tailed by employing alternative means of identification, such as pass-
words.
This solution does not come without difficulties, as passwords can
be easily forgotten or discovered. The use of multiple questions and
answers supplied by the customer at the time the account is created
can be effective. Questions might include favorite songs, places a per-
son has visited, and so on, and these questions must vary from insti-
tution to institution. If varying methods of identification are used, an
identity thief will no longer be able to use a few pieces of information
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to access everything, which will minimize the severity of the impact
of identity theft. The thief may be able to access one or two accounts,
but not all of them. Unfortunately, so much personal information is
already maintained by various database companies that a person’s
answers may exist in these databases. For example, a person might
use as a password the name of her college, spouse, pet, or child.
Therefore, unique and less common questions and answers will pro-
vide better security against identity theft.
The possibility that databases will eventually include the types of
information that people generally use for these questions demon-
strates the importance of thinking architecturally. The problem of
identity theft is part of a larger structure in which companies are not
effectively regulated in the collection, use, and dissemination of per-
sonal information. If database companies are regulated to prohibit
the dissemination of certain types of information, then this data can
be better protected from falling into the hands of an identity thief.
Of course, this method of identification is far from foolproof. But
the level of sophistication and difficulty required to carry out an iden-
tity theft would be increased. Additionally, identity theft can be more
readily halted. It is currently a difficult and cumbersome process to
change one’s SSN.100 And a person cannot change her height, birth
date, or mother’s maiden name. Passwords, however, can easily be
changed. Thus, once discovered, identity theft will be easier to stop
and will not continue long after the victim becomes aware of it.
These suggestions pertain to already established accounts. Much
identity theft, however, occurs through the identity thief opening up
new accounts in the victim’s name. Currently, it is far too easy to es-
tablish a new account through the mail and the Internet.101 Pre-ap-
proved credit card applications, for example, enable the recipient to
easily establish an account and change addresses. Companies that
want to open a new account through the mail should verify an appli-
cant’s address, date of birth, and phone number with a credit report-
ing agency, and then send written confirmation both to the address
listed on the application and to the address that the credit reporting
agency has. Further, the company should follow-up by calling the ap-
plicant’s telephone number listed with the credit reporting agency. In
the event of any discrepancies in the information held by the credit
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reporting agency and the individual, the individual should be noti-
fied. Of course, this solution would only work well if people had
greater participation in the collection and use of their information by
credit reporting agencies. Many attempts at identity theft can be
halted if creditors take greater care scrutinizing applications. Al-
though the identity thief can still intercept the notification,102 it re-
quires additional steps to carry out the identity theft, ones that can
increase the chances of the thief getting caught.
The solutions just discussed are only recommendations of the
types of solutions that can be employed once we recognize that we
need to focus on architecture. Viewing identity theft under the inva-
sion conception has diverted attention from these architectural con-
cerns. If the architecture recognizes the responsibilities of companies
maintaining personal data, it will provide a strong incentive for com-
panies to devise creative solutions and better security.
Understanding certain privacy problems as architectural demon-
strates that protecting privacy involves more than protecting against
isolated infractions. It is about establishing a particular social struc-
ture, one that ensures individual participation in the collection and
use of personal information and responsibilities for entities that con-
trol that data. The problem of identity theft may never be completely
eradicated, but in a world with the appropriate architecture, its preva-
lence and negative effects will be significantly curtailed.
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The Problem of  
Publ ic  Records
From the beginning of the twentieth century, we have witnessed a
vast proliferation in the number of government records kept about
individuals as well as a significant increase in public access to these
records. These trends together have created a problematic state of
affairs—a system where the government extracts personal informa-
tion from the populace and places it in the public domain, where it is
hoarded by private-sector corporations that assemble dossiers on al-
most every American citizen.
Records from Birth to Death
Today, federal, state, and local government entities maintain a smor-
gasbord of public records.1 State public records cover one’s life from
birth to death. Birth records can contain one’s name, date of birth,
place of birth, full names and ages of one’s parents, and mother’s
maiden name.2 In particular, mother’s maiden names are important
because many companies use them as passwords to access more
sensitive data. Shortly after birth, the federal government stamps an
127
▲
7
individual with a SSN, which will be used throughout her life to iden-
tify her and consolidate records about her. States also maintain other
records relating to one’s personal life, such as records about mar-
riages, divorces, and death. These are often referred to collectively as
“vital records.” Records of marriages, which are public in most states,3
contain maiden names, the date and place of birth of both spouses,
as well as their residential addresses.4
Beyond vital records, states keep records for almost every occasion
an individual comes into contact with the state bureaucracy. Accident
reports and traffic citation records are made publicly available by
many states. Voting records can reveal one’s political party affiliation,
date of birth, place of birth, email address, home address, telephone
number,5 and sometimes SSN.6 In many states, this information is
publicly available.
An individual’s profession and place of employment often generate
a number of records. Many professions require licenses, such as doc-
tors, lawyers, engineers, insurance agents, nurses, police, account-
ants, and teachers. If an individual is injured at work, worker’s
compensation records may disclose the date of birth, type of injury,
and SSN.7 If a person is a public employee, many personal details are
released to the public by way of personnel records, including home
address, phone number, SSN, salary, sick leave, and sometimes even
email messages.8 In Massachusetts, government officials are required
by law to maintain “street lists” containing the names, addresses,
dates of birth, veteran statuses, nationalities, and occupations of all
residents. These lists, which organize residents by the streets they live
on, are made available to the police, to all political committees and
candidates, and to businesses and other organizations.9
One’s home and property are also a matter of public record. Prop-
erty tax assessment records contain a detailed description of the
home, including number of bedrooms and bathrooms, amenities
such as swimming pools, the size of the house, and the value. Other
property ownership records unveil lifestyle information such as
whether one owns a boat, and if so, its size and type.10
Often, any contact with law enforcement officials will yield a
record. Arrest records can include a person’s name, occupation, phys-
ical description, date of birth, and the asserted factual circumstances
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surrounding the arrest.11 Police records also contain information
about victims of crime.
Court records can be very revealing. In almost all states, court
records are presumed to be public.12 Although current practice and
existing physical constraints limit the extent to which personal infor-
mation in court documents can be accessed, new technologies are on
the verge of changing this reality.
In civil cases, court files may contain medical histories, mental
health data, tax returns, and financial information.13 For example, in
an ordinary civil lawsuit over an automobile accident, the plaintiff
must submit medical information, including any pre-existing condi-
tions that might be responsible for her symptoms. This data could
even include psychological information. To establish damages, the
plaintiff must also reveal details about her lifestyle, activities, and em-
ployment. If this information is contained in a document filed with
the court or is mentioned in a hearing or at trial, it can potentially be-
come accessible to the public unless protected by a protective order.
In addition to plaintiffs, civil defendants must also yield personal in-
formation in many instances.
Witnesses and other third parties who are involved in cases can
have deeply personal details snared by discovery and later exposed in
court documents. If a person serves as a juror, her name, address,
spouse’s name, occupation, place of employment, and answers to
voir dire questions may become part of the court record.14 Some
courts have held that the public may have access to questionnaires
given to jurors as part of voir dire.15 Voir dire questions can involve
sensitive matters such as whether a juror was the victim of a crime,
the juror’s political and religious beliefs, any medical and psychologi-
cal conditions that might affect the juror’s performance, and other
private details.16
Beyond ordinary civil lawsuits, special civil proceedings, such as
appeals from the denial of Social Security benefits, release much in-
formation into court records, including a person’s disability, work per-
formance, SSN, birth date, address, phone number, and medical
records.17 In federal bankruptcy courts, any “paper filed . . . and the
dockets of a bankruptcy court are public records and open to exami-
nation by an entity at reasonable times without charge.”18 Information
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involved in bankruptcy proceedings includes one’s SSN, account
numbers, employment data, sources of income, expenses, debts
owed, and other financial information.19 Additionally, in certain cir-
cumstances, employees of a company that declares bankruptcy can
have their personal information divulged in public bankruptcy
records.20
In some states, family court proceedings are public. For example, a
divorce proceeding can unmask the intimacies of marital relation-
ships. As the New Hampshire Supreme Court held, “[a] private citizen
seeking a divorce in this State must unavoidably do so in a public fo-
rum, and consequently many private family and marital matters be-
come public.”21
Parties in criminal cases have even less privacy. Beyond the per-
sonal details about a defendant released at trial or in the govern-
ment’s indictment or charging papers, conviction records are made
public.22 Information about victims—their lifestyles, medical data,
and occupation—can also be found in court records. Pre-sentence re-
ports prepared by probation officers about convicted defendants fac-
ing sentence are used by judges in arriving at the appropriate
sentence. These reports contain a summary of the defendant’s prior
criminal conduct, social history, character, family environment, edu-
cation, employment and income, and medical and psychological in-
formation.23 Although in many states and in federal court,
pre-sentence reports remain confidential, in some states, such as Cal-
ifornia, the pre-sentence report becomes part of the court file after
sentencing.24
Community notification laws for sex offenders, often referred to as
“Megan’s Laws,” require the maintenance of databases of information
about prior sex offenders and disclosure of their identities and where
they live. All  states have enacted some version of Megan’s Law.25
Sex offender records often contain SSNs, photographs, addresses,
prior convictions, and places of employment.26 A number of states
have placed their sex offender records on the Internet.
Some localities are even publicizing records about individuals ar-
rested, but not yet convicted, of certain crimes. In  Kansas City
initiated “John TV,” broadcasting on a government-owned television
station the names, photographs, addresses, and ages of people who
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had merely been arrested (not convicted) for soliciting prostitutes,
and other cities have initiated similar programs.27 Additionally, a
growing number of states are furnishing online databases of all of
their current inmates and parolees.28
The Impact of Technology
For a long time, public records have been accessible only in the vari-
ous localities in which they were kept. A person or entity desiring to
find out about the value of an individual’s home would have to travel
to the town or county where the property was located and search
through the records at the local courthouse. Depending upon local
practice, the seeker of a record might be able to obtain a copy through
the mail. Court records, such as bankruptcy records, would typically
be obtained by visiting a courthouse or engaging in a lengthy corre-
spondence with the clerk’s office.29 The seeker of a record could not
obtain records en masse; records could only be obtained for specific
individuals.
This reality is rapidly changing. As records are increasingly com-
puterized, entire record systems rather than individual records can be
easily searched, copied, and transferred. Private-sector organizations
sweep up millions of records from record systems throughout the
country and consolidate them into gigantic record systems. Many
websites now compile public records from across the country.30 There
are more than  companies offering public record information over
the Internet.31 These companies have constructed gigantic databases
of public records that were once dispersed throughout different agen-
cies, offices, and courthouses—and with the click of a mouse, mil-
lions of records can be scoured for details.32
The increasing digitization of documents and the use of electronic
filing will soon result in much greater accessibility to court records
online. Currently, most courts post only court rulings and schedules
on their websites. Only a handful of courts now post complaints and
other legal documents.33 However, states are beginning to require
documents to be filed electronically and to convert existing records
into digital format. For example, in New Jersey, bankruptcy records
(including a debtor’s bankruptcy petition) are scanned into electronic
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format and can be accessed through the Internet.34 Some companies
are beginning to make digital images of records available over the In-
ternet.35 The federal court system is currently developing a system
that makes full case files accessible via the Internet.36
Beyond greater accessibility, technology may also lead to the reten-
tion of greater amounts of personal information in public records.
Under current practice, due to storage space constraints, clerks’
offices often do not maintain copies of exhibits and other documents
related to trials. However, as court documents such as pleadings and
exhibits are filed in digital format, they will become easier to store.
Further, under current practice, transcripts are typically produced
only when a case is appealed. New technology enables transcripts of
court proceedings to be made instantaneously without having to be
transcribed. The increased use of such technology could result in the
existence of more transcripts of trials, which can potentially include
personal information about many parties and witnesses.
In sum, the increasing digitization of documents enables more
documents to be retained by eliminating storage constraints, in-
creases the ability to access and copy documents, and permits the
transfer of documents en masse. Personal information in public
records, once protected by the practical difficulties of gaining access
to the records, is increasingly less obscure.
The Regulation of Public Records
As it currently stands, public records law is a complicated and diverse
hodge-podge of various statutes, court practices, and common law
rights that vary from state to state and leave much personal informa-
tion unprotected. A broad overview of the law that governs public
records reveals that it is disconnected, often outdated, and inade-
quate to meet the challenges of the new technologies of the Informa-
tion Age.
The Common Law, Court Records, and Protective Orders. At common law,
English courts rarely encountered cases involving an individual seek-
ing to gain access to government records.37 Only in unusual circum-
stances could individuals inspect government records, such as when
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people needed them for court proceedings.38 Access to court records,
as opposed to other public records, was broader. When documents
were introduced into evidence, individuals were permitted access.39
Early U.S. courts followed the English practice.40 Only if a person
had a “special interest” in examining records would access be
granted.41 Later on, the common law evolved to expand the “interest”
required for inspection to include redressing public wrongs and mon-
itoring government functions.42 The law then broadened even further
to include all purposes that were not improper or harmful to others.43
One of the most commonly mentioned improper purposes was “to
satisfy idle curiosity or for the purpose of creating a public scandal.”44
In contrast to public records, the right to inspect court records was
generally broader and was shaped by the supervisory authority of the
courts.45 The courts had a long tradition of permitting open access to
court records, and access was rarely limited based on the purposes
for which the records were sought.46 In , in Nixon v. Warner Com-
munications, Inc., the Supreme Court noted that “[i]t is clear that the
courts of this country recognize a general right to inspect and copy
public records and documents, including judicial records and docu-
ments.”47 The right is justified by “the citizen’s desire to keep a watch-
ful eye on the workings of public agencies, and in a newspaper
publisher’s intention to publish information concerning the opera-
tion of government.” The common law right of access isn’t absolute,
especially for court records, because “[e]very court has supervisory
power over its own records and files,” and can deny access when
records reveal embarrassing personal information or cause harm.
The decision over whether to permit access “is one best left to the
sound discretion of the trial court.”48
In the federal court system, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure (c), judges have discretion “for good cause shown” to issue
protective orders to shield information from disclosure where it
might cause a party “annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or un-
due burden or expense.”49 Protective orders allow documents to be
used by parties to a case, but restrict public access. Most states have a
rule similar to Rule (c).50 Since court records are presumed to be
publicly accessible, a party seeking a protective order must overcome
the presumption.51 Courts balance a party’s interest in privacy against
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the public interest in disclosure.52 If a court decides to deny access, it
“must set forth substantial reasons.”53
Courts also retain discretion to issue special orders to keep certain
proceedings and information confidential. A court will sometimes,
under very limited circumstances, seal court proceedings such as tri-
als.54 A court can allow a plaintiff to proceed anonymously with the
use of a pseudonym.55 Courts can also permit anonymous juries when
jurors might otherwise be placed in danger. These decisions, how-
ever, are within the discretion of the trial court, and courts differ
greatly in the exercise of their discretion. For example, one court per-
mitted a woman who had been raped at a train station and was suing
Amtrak to keep her identity secret because of the potential embar-
rassment she would suffer if the details of her rape became known in
her community.56 In contrast, another court held that a victim of sex-
ual assault could not sue her assailant for civil damages under a pseu-
donym because “[f]airness requires that she be prepared to stand
behind her charges publicly” and because she was “seeking to vindi-
cate primarily her own interests.”57
In sum, under modern American common law, there is a limited
right to access public records so long as one’s purpose is not im-
proper. For court records, the common law right to access follows the
supervisory authority of the courts, and judges have significant dis-
cretion in granting or denying access.58
Freedom of Information Laws. State legislatures gradually replaced or
supplemented the common law right of access with open records
statutes, which generally mandated broad access.59 These statutes are
called “freedom of information,” “open access,” “right to know,” or
“sunshine” laws. States were initially slow in enacting statutory public
access rights; by , only  states had open records statutes.60 In
, Congress passed the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), pro-
viding substantial public access to records of the federal government.
When he signed the FOIA into law, President Lyndon Johnson de-
clared that “democracy works best when the people have all the infor-
mation that the security of the Nation permits. No one should be able
to pull curtains of secrecy around decisions which can be revealed
without injury to the public interest.”61 Under FOIA, “any person” (in-
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cluding associations, organizations, and foreign citizens) may request
“records” maintained by an executive agency.62 Requesters of records
don’t need to state a reason for requesting records.63 FOIA does not
apply to records kept by Congress or the Judiciary.64
Today, all  states have open records statutes, a majority of which
are modeled after the FOIA.65 Like the federal FOIA, state FOIAs are
justified by a strong commitment to openness and transparency.66
Following FOIA, many states eliminated the common law require-
ment that requesters establish an interest in obtaining the records.
Most state FOIAs contain a presumption in favor of disclosure.67
Open access laws never mandate absolute disclosure. They con-
tain exemptions, typically (although not always) including an exemp-
tion to protect individual privacy. The federal FOIA contains nine
enumerated exemptions to disclosure, two of which pertain to pri-
vacy. One applies generally to records which “would constitute a
clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy”; the other applies
to law enforcement records that could “constitute an unwarranted in-
vasion of personal privacy.”68 If possible, private information can be
deleted from records, and the redacted records disclosed to the re-
quester.
The federal FOIA doesn’t require that a person be given notice that
his or her personal information is encompassed within a FOIA re-
quest. Even if an individual finds out about the request, she has no
right under FOIA to prevent or second-guess an agency’s decision to
disclose the records. FOIA does not require that the government with-
hold information; it is up to the government agency to assert and to
litigate the individual’s privacy interest.69
State FOIA privacy exemptions come in myriad shapes and sizes.
Many state FOIAs contain privacy exemptions similar to those found
in the federal FOIA, applying when disclosure would constitute a
“clearly unwarranted” invasion of privacy.70 However, not all state
FOIAs have privacy exemptions. Pennsylvania’s Right to Know Act
does not contain a privacy exemption; it prohibits only access to
records “which would operate to the prejudice or impairment of a
person’s reputation or personal security.”71 As one court stated, “the
phrase ‘personal security’ does not mean ‘personal privacy.’”72 Ohio’s
Public Records Act does not contain any privacy exemption.73
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In applying FOIA privacy exemptions, many states follow the fed-
eral FOIA approach and balance interests of privacy against the inter-
ests of public access.74 However, states have adopted widely differing
approaches often stemming from vastly different judicial concep-
tions of privacy.
Privacy Acts. The Privacy Act of  regulates the record systems of
federal agencies. The Act prohibits the disclosure of personal infor-
mation; requires records to be kept secure; and gives people the right
to review their records and to ask the agency to correct any errors.75
People can sue if they are harmed by an agency’s failure to comply
with the Act. The Privacy Act has significant limitations. It is limited
only to the public sector. It applies to federal, not state and local
agencies. Further, the Act has been eroded by about a dozen excep-
tions. For example, agencies can disclose information without the
consent of individuals to the Census Bureau, to law enforcement enti-
ties, to Congress, and to credit reporting agencies. When FOIA re-
quires that information be released, the Privacy Act does not apply.
Nor does the Privacy Act apply to court records.76
The broadest exception is that information may be disclosed for
any “routine use” if disclosure is “compatible” with the purpose for
which the agency collected the information.77 The “routine use” ex-
ception has repeatedly been criticized as being a gigantic loophole.78
As privacy law expert Robert Gellman writes, “[t]his vague formula
has not created much of a substantive barrier to external disclosure of
personal information.”79
Although the Privacy Act requires an individual’s permission be-
fore his or her records can be disclosed, redress for violations of the
Act is virtually impossible to obtain.80 The Privacy Act provides indi-
viduals with a monetary remedy for disclosures of personal informa-
tion only if the disclosure was made “willfully and intentionally.”81
This restriction on recovery of damages fails to redress the most com-
mon form of mistakes—those due to carelessness. This leaves little
incentive to bring suit against violators.82 For example, in Andrews v.
Veterans Administration, the Veterans Administration released inade-
quately redacted personnel records of nurses, resulting in what the
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court called a “substantial” violation of nurses’ privacy. However, the
agency could not be sued under the Privacy Act because it acted neg-
ligently, not willfully.83 Moreover, less than a third of the states have
enacted a general privacy law akin to the Privacy Act.84 Paul Schwartz
observes that most states lack “omnibus data protection laws” and
have “scattered laws [that] provide only limited protections for per-
sonal information in the public sector.”85
Access and Use Restrictions. Confronted with increased information
trade, some states have attempted to restrict access to personal infor-
mation in public records as well as certain uses of personal informa-
tion obtained from public records. In the last decade, a number of
states have enacted access restrictions for some of their public
records, often excluding access for commercial uses, such as solicit-
ing business or marketing services or products. For example, Georgia
amended its public records law in , making it unlawful to access
law enforcement or motor vehicle accident records “for any commer-
cial solicitation of such individuals or relatives of such individuals.”86
In , Louisiana restricted access to accident records for commer-
cial solicitation purposes.87 Kentucky, in response to “a public
groundswell [that] developed against the release of accident reports
to attorneys and chiropractors,”88 amended its public records law in
 to restrict access for these and other commercial uses.89 In ,
Florida barred the access of driver information in traffic citations
from those seeking it for commercial solicitation purposes.90 Col-
orado curtailed access to criminal justice records unless those seek-
ing access signed a statement that such records would not be used
“for the direct solicitation of business for pecuniary gain.”91 California
restricted access to arrest records by providing that the records “shall
not be used directly or indirectly to sell a product or service . . . and
the requester shall execute a declaration to that effect under penalty
of perjury.”92 Almost half of the states prohibit the commercial use of
voter registration records.93
The federal government also has certain access and use restric-
tions for its public records. Pursuant to the Federal Election Cam-
paign Act (FECA), reports of contributors to political committees are
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“available for public inspection . . . except that any information
copied from such reports . . . may not be sold or used by any person
for the purpose of soliciting contributions or for commercial pur-
poses.”94
In sum, although in certain contexts laws are beginning to limit ac-
cess to public records for some purposes, the vast majority of public
records remain virtually unrestricted in access.
Restrictions on State Information Practices. In a rare instance, the federal
government has directly regulated the states’ use of public records. In
, Congress passed the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act (DPPA) to
curtail states’ selling their motor vehicle records to marketers.95 In
Reno v. Condon, the Supreme Court concluded that DPPA was a
proper exercise of Congress’s authority to regulate interstate com-
merce. Further, the Court concluded that DPPA “regulates the States
as the owners of databases” and does not require them to enact regu-
lation or to assist in enforcing federal statutes concerning private in-
dividuals.96 Although DPPA is an important first step in bringing state
public records systems under control, DPPA applies only to motor ve-
hicle records and does not forbid the dissemination of all the other
public records states maintain.
The Regulatory Regime of Public Records. As illustrated throughout this
chapter, states vary significantly in what information they make pub-
licly available. Often such decisions are made by agencies and bu-
reaucrats or left to the discretion of the courts. Decisions as to the
scope of access—whether one must obtain a record by physically go-
ing to a local agency office, by engaging in correspondence by mail, or
by simply downloading it from the Internet—are often made by local
bureaucrats. Frequently, it is up to the individual to take significant
steps to protect privacy, such as overcoming the presumption of ac-
cess to court records. In many instances, individuals are never even
given notice or an opportunity to assert a privacy interest when
records containing their personal information are disclosed.
Differing protection of personal information with no minimum
floor of protection presents significant problems in today’s age of in-
creasing mobility and information flow. There is no federal law estab-
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lishing a baseline for the regulation of public records. Thus, personal
information is regulated by a bewildering assortment of state statu-
tory protections, which vary widely from state to state.97
This chaotic state of affairs is troublesome in an Information Age
where information so fluidly passes throughout the country and is
being made more widely available through the Internet. The privacy
protection that currently exists for public records is largely designed
for a world of paper records and has been slow to adapt to an age
where information can be downloaded from the Internet in an in-
stant.
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Access  and Aggregat ion
Rethink ing Pr ivacy 
and Transparency
The Tension between Transparency and Privacy
A  episode of the television newsmagazine Dateline illustrates
one way that the tension between transparency (open access to pub-
lic records) and privacy can arise.1 A man, imprisoned for murder, ob-
tained under a state FOIA the address of a former girlfriend. When she
learned that her ex-boyfriend obtained her address, the woman be-
came quite scared because her ex-boyfriend was prone to losing his
temper and held a grudge against her. She lived in fear, knowing that
someday he would be released and might come after her. The pris-
oner, however, claimed that he was the father of her child and needed
the address because he wanted to file a paternity suit. This story illus-
trates why it is important for people to be able to obtain certain infor-
mation about others, yet also demonstrates the dangers and threat to
privacy caused by the ready availability of information.
There are at least four general functions of transparency: () to shed
light on governmental activities and proceedings; () to find out in-
formation about public officials and candidates for public office; ()
to facilitate certain social transactions, such as selling property or ini-
tiating lawsuits; and () to find out information about other individu-
als for a variety of purposes.
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First, and perhaps most importantly, transparency provides the
public with knowledge about the government and an understanding
of how it functions. By promoting awareness of the workings of gov-
ernment, transparency serves a “watchdog” function. Open access to
government proceedings ensures that they are conducted fairly. Open
access exposes the government to public scrutiny and enables a
check on abuse and corruption. “Sunlight is said to be the best of dis-
infectants,” declared Justice Brandeis, “electric light the most efficient
policeman.”2 Making arrest records public, for example, protects
against secret arrests and government abuses.3 Open access to public
court records “allows the citizenry to monitor the functioning of our
courts, thereby insuring quality, honesty, and respect for our legal sys-
tem.”4 As James Madison observed: “A popular Government, without
popular information, or the means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to
a Farce or a Tragedy; or, perhaps both. Knowledge will forever govern
ignorance: And a people who mean to be their own Governors, must
arm themselves with the power which knowledge gives.”5 According
to Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes:
It is desirable that the trial of [civil] causes should take place un-
der the public eye not because the controversies of one citizen
with another are of public concern, but because it is of the high-
est moment that those who administer justice should always act
under the sense of public responsibility, and that every citizen
should be able to satisfy himself with his own eyes as to the
mode in which a public duty is performed.6
Access to court records permits people to examine the information
considered by courts making decisions affecting the public at large.
Issues raised in a product liability case could have significance for
millions of others who use a product. Information about how certain
types of cases are resolved—such as domestic abuse cases, medical
malpractice cases, and others—is important for assessing the compe-
tency of the judicial system for resolving important social matters.
Scholars and the media need to look beyond a judicial decision or a
jury verdict to scrutinize the records and evidence in a case. The abil-
ity to identify jurors enables the media to question them about the
reasons for their verdict. Courts and commentators have pointed out
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that the Watergate Scandal might never have been uncovered if the
original bail hearing had been closed to the press because reporters
Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein would not have been suspicious
that expensive attorneys were representing the burglars.7
The second function of transparency is to enable the scrutiny of
public officials or candidates for public office. Information about a
politician’s criminal history might be informative to many voters. In-
formation about a politician’s property may provide insight into the
politician’s wealth, a factor that might shape the politician’s values
and public decisions. Some voters may find a politician’s divorce
records and marital history illustrative of the person’s character.
Other possibly informative information about a politician could in-
clude that she was sued many times or sued others many times; that
she once declared bankruptcy; that she never voted in any elections;
that she was formerly registered in another political party; that she
owns property in other states; and so on. Open access to public
records enables voters to find out such information so they may make
more informed choices at the polls.
Third, transparency facilitates certain social transactions. Access to
public records is an essential function for the sale and transfer of
property, as it enables people to trace ownership and title in land.
Public record information is useful in locating witnesses for judicial
proceedings as well as locating heirs to estates. Further, access to
public records can allow individuals and entities to track down indi-
viduals they want to sue and to obtain the necessary information to
serve them with process.
The fourth function of transparency is to enable people to find out
information about individuals for various other purposes. Public
records can help verify individual identity, investigate fraud, and lo-
cate lost friends and classmates. Public records enable law enforce-
ment officials to locate criminals and investigate crimes, and can
assist in tracking down deadbeat parents. Public records can permit
people to investigate babysitters or child care professionals. Employ-
ers can use public record information to screen potential employees,
such as examining the past driving records of prospective truck driv-
ers or taxicab drivers. Criminal history information might be relevant
when hiring a worker in a child care facility or a kindergarten teacher.
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Transparency, however, can come into tension with privacy. Can
both of these important values be reconciled? Before turning to this
question, I must first address how the privacy problem to which pub-
lic records contribute should be understood. We must rethink certain
longstanding notions about privacy before we can reach an appropri-
ate balance between transparency and privacy.
Conceptualizing Privacy and Public Records
Access: The Public Is Private. The secrecy paradigm, as discussed in
chapter , is deeply entrenched in information privacy law. In addi-
tion to focusing on whether information is completely secret or not,
the paradigm categorizes information as either public or private.
When information is private, it is hidden, and as long as it is kept se-
cret, it remains private. When it is public, it is in the public domain
available for any use. Information is seen in this black-and-white
manner; either it is wholly private or wholly public.
This paradigm is outmoded in the Information Age. Unless we live
as hermits, there is no way to exist in modern society without leaving
information traces wherever we go. Therefore, we must abandon the
secrecy paradigm. Privacy involves an expectation of a certain degree
of accessibility of information. Under this alternative view, privacy
entails control over and limitations on certain uses of information,
even if the information is not concealed. Privacy can be violated by
altering levels of accessibility, by taking obscure facts and making
them widely accessible. Our expectation of limits on the degree of ac-
cessibility emerges from the fact that information in public records
has remained relatively inaccessible until recently. Our personal in-
formation in public records remained private because it was a needle
in a haystack, and usually nobody would take the time to try to find it.
This privacy is rapidly disappearing as access to information is in-
creasing.
In limited contexts, some courts are beginning to abandon the se-
crecy paradigm, although most courts still cling to it. In United States
Department of Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press,
the Supreme Court held that the release of FBI “rap sheets” was an in-
vasion of privacy within the privacy exemption of FOIA. The FBI rap
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sheets contained the date of birth, physical description, and a history
of arrests, charges, and convictions on over  million people. The re-
porters argued that the rap sheet wasn’t private because it was merely
a collection of data that had previously been publicly disclosed. The
Court didn’t agree, noting that “there is a vast difference between the
public records that might be found after a diligent search of court-
house files, county archives, and local police stations throughout the
country and a computerized summary located in a single clearing-
house of information.”8
In cases involving the privacy torts, a few courts have recognized a
privacy interest in information exposed to the public. In Melvin v.
Reid, a former prostitute who was once criminally prosecuted for
murder had left the prostitution business long ago and got married.
When the movie The Red Kimono, depicted her life story and used her
maiden name, she sued under the tort of public disclosure. The court
held that although she could not claim that the facts about her life
were private because they were in the public record, there was no
need for the movie to use her real name.9
Likewise, in Briscoe v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, an article in Reader’s Di-
gest magazine about hijacking disclosed that the plaintiff had hi-
jacked a truck  years earlier. Briscoe had rehabilitated himself, and
his new friends, family, and young daughter weren’t aware of his
crime. The court held that although the facts of the crime could be
disclosed, Briscoe could sue for the use of his name, which had no rel-
evance to the article.10
Generally, however, most courts still adhere to the secrecy para-
digm and do not recognize a privacy interest when information is ex-
posed to the public. As a result, most courts have rejected the Reid
and Briscoe approach.11 In Forsher v. Bugliosi,12 the court considered
Briscoe “an exception to the more general rule that ‘once a man has
become a public figure, or news, he remains a matter of legitimate re-
call to the public mind to the end of his days.’”13 Likewise, the Re-
statement for the tort of public disclosure explains: “There is no
liability when the defendant merely gives further publicity to infor-
mation about the plaintiff that is already public. Thus there is no lia-
bility for giving publicity to facts about the plaintiff’s life which are
matters of public record.”14 Similarly, for the tort of intrusion upon
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seclusion, the Restatement provides that “there is no liability for the
examination of a public record concerning the plaintiff.”15 Further,
Briscoe seems foreclosed by the Supreme Court’s decision in Cox
Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, which held that when information is dis-
closed in documents open to the public, the press cannot be pun-
ished for publishing it.16
In a number of cases, courts applying the constitutional right to in-
formation privacy have become mired in the secrecy paradigm.
Courts have refused to find a constitutional right to information pri-
vacy for data exposed to the public. In Scheetz v. Morning Call, Inc., a
court held that a husband and wife had no constitutional right to in-
formation privacy in a police report disclosed to the press containing
the wife’s allegations of spousal abuse. Although her complaint to the
police did not result in charges, “[t]he police could have brought
charges without her concurrence, at which point all the information
would have wound up on the public record, where it would have been
non-confidential.”17 In Cline v. Rogers, the court held that police
records weren’t private “since arrest and conviction information are
matters of public record.”18 In Walls v. City of Petersburg, public em-
ployees were questioned about the criminal histories of their family
members, their complete marital history, including marriages, di-
vorces, and children, and any outstanding debts or judgments against
them. According to the court, the information wasn’t private because
it was already available in public records.19
Courts have also adhered to the secrecy paradigm in challenges to
Megan’s Laws, which mandate the public disclosure of information
about prior sex offenders. In Russell v. Gregoire, convicted sex offen-
ders challenged the disclosure of their picture, name, age, date of
birth, crimes, and neighborhoods in which they lived. The court held
that the information wasn’t private because it was “already fully avail-
able to the public.”20 Likewise, in Paul P. v. Verniero, the court held
there was no privacy interest in the names and physical descriptions
of previously convicted sex offenders.21
In sum, although divided, most courts adhere to the secrecy para-
digm. Unless the secrecy paradigm is abandoned, people will lose any
ability to claim a privacy interest in the extensive personal informa-
tion in public records.
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Aggregation: The Digital Biography. Another longstanding notion of pri-
vacy—the invasion conception, which I discussed in chapter —
doesn’t recognize an infringement of privacy unless there is a
palpable invasion. Information protected as private must be embar-
rassing or harmful to one’s reputation. The problem with the invasion
conception is that public record information often consists of fairly
innocuous details—such as one’s birth date, address, height, weight,
and so on. 
Following the invasion conception, a number of courts have re-
jected claims that certain information falls within state FOIA privacy
exemptions because the information didn’t pose immediate harms to
reputation or security. One court reasoned that “[n]ames and ad-
dresses are not ordinarily personal, intimate, or embarrassing pieces
of information.”22 Another court held that police payroll records con-
taining each employee’s name, gender, date of birth, salary, and other
data could be disclosed because the records didn’t harm their reputa-
tions.23 Information about teacher salaries, according to one court,
didn’t fall within the privacy exemption because “[t]he salaries of
public employees and schoolteachers are not ‘intimate details . . . the
disclosure of which might harm the individual.’”24
If the release of certain information in public records doesn’t make
one blush or reveal one’s deepest secrets, then what is the harm? The
harm stems from the aggregation effect discussed in chapter .
Viewed in isolation, each piece of our day-to-day information is not
all that telling; viewed in combination, it begins to paint a portrait
about our personalities. Moreover, these digital biographies greatly
increase our vulnerability to a variety of dangers. As public record in-
formation becomes more readily available, criminals can use it to
gain access to a person’s financial accounts. For example, one indus-
trious criminal gained access to the financial accounts of a number of
individuals on Forbes magazine’s list of the  richest people in
America such as Oprah Winfrey and George Lucas.25 Identity thieves
frequently obtain personal information necessary for their criminal
activity through information brokers, who sell reports about individ-
uals based on public record data combined with other information.26
As discussed in chapter , the SSN is the most useful tool of the iden-
tity thief, and SSNs are often available in various public records.
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Public record information also can expose people to violence. In
, a fan obsessed with actress Rebecca Shaeffer located her home
address with the help of a private investigator who obtained it from
California motor vehicles records. The fan murdered her outside her
home. This killing spurred Congress to pass the Driver’s Privacy Pro-
tection Act (DPPA), which restricts the states’ ability to release motor
vehicle records.27 In another example, an Internet site known as the
“Nuremberg Files” posted information about doctors working in
abortion clinics, including names, photos, SSNs, home addresses, de-
scriptions of their cars, and information about their families.28 Doc-
tors who were killed had a black line drawn through their names.
Names of wounded doctors were shaded in gray. The doctors sued. At
trial, they testified as to how their lives became riddled with fear, how
some wore bulletproof vests and wigs in public. They won the suit
and were able to block the use of their personal information on the
website.29 This case demonstrates the dangers from increased access
to personal information, even relatively non-intimate information
such as one’s address.
At a more abstract level, the existence of digital dossiers alters the
nature of the society we live in. In , in his highly influential book,
The Assault on Privacy, law professor Arthur Miller warned of the
“possibility of constructing a sophisticated data center capable of
generating a comprehensive womb-to-tomb dossier on every indi-
vidual and transmitting it to a wide range of data users over a national
network.”30 On a number of occasions, the federal government has
flirted with the idea of creating a national database of personal infor-
mation. The Johnson administration contemplated creating a Na-
tional Data Center that would combine information collected by
various federal agencies into one large computer database, but the
plan was scrapped after a public outcry arose.31 Again, in the early
s, an official in the General Services Administration proposed
that all of the federal government’s computer systems be connected
in a network called FEDNET. Responding to a public outcry, Vice
President Gerald Ford stopped the plan.32
Although these proposals have been halted due to public outcries,
we have been inching toward a system of de facto national identifica-
tion for some time and are precariously close to having one.33 The
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Immigration Reform and Control Act of  requires new employees
to supply identification and proof of U.S. citizenship before obtaining
a new job.34 In a recent effort to track down parents who fail to pay
child support, the federal government has created a vast database
consisting of information about all people who obtain a new job any-
where in the nation. The database contains their SSNs, addresses,
and wages.35 The ready availability of one’s SSN and the ability to
combine it with a host of other information about individuals will
make increasingly more possible a reality where typing an individ-
ual’s name into a searchable database will pull up a “womb-to-tomb”
dossier.
Such a reality can pose significant dangers. “Identity systems and
documents,” observes political scientist Richard Sobel, “have a long
history of uses and abuses for social control and discrimination.”36
Slaves were required to carry identifying papers to travel; identifica-
tion cards were used by the Nazis in locating Jews; and the slaughter
of Tutsis in Rwanda was aided by a system of identifiers.37 In addition
to facilitating the monitoring and control of individuals, such a
dossier may make a person a “prisoner of his recorded past.”38
Records of personal information can easily be used by government
leaders and officials for improper monitoring of individuals. Data can
be exploited for whatever task is at hand—a tool available to anyone
in power in government to use in furtherance of the current passion
or whim of the day. For example, in , the Census Bureau used its
data from the  census to assist in the effort to intern Japanese
Americans during World War II.39 Currently, we do not know the full
consequences of living in a dossier society, but we are rapidly moving
toward becoming such a society without sufficient foresight and
preparation.
The problems and dangers just illustrated are not merely the prod-
uct of the actions of the government. Rather, these troubles are
caused by the way that both public- and private-sector entities are
using personal information. The issue concerns more than isolated
threats and harms, but is fundamentally about the structure of our
society. Not only are public records altering the power that the gov-
ernment can exercise over people’s lives, but they are also contribut-
ing to the growing power of businesses. As I discussed earlier in this
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book, although people may be aware that dossiers are being assem-
bled about them, they have no idea what information the dossiers
contain or how the dossiers are being used. This reality leads to un-
ease, vulnerability, and powerlessness—a deepening sense that one is
at the mercy of others, or, perhaps even more alarming, at the mercy
of a bureaucratic process that is arbitrary, irresponsible, opaque, and
indifferent to people’s dignity and welfare.
The problem with information collection and use today is not
merely that individuals are no longer able to exercise control over
their information; it is that their information is subjected to a bureau-
cratic process that is itself out of control. Without this process being
subject to regulation and control and without individuals having
rights to exercise some dominion over their information, individuals
will be routinely subjected to the ills of bureaucracy.
Public records contribute to this privacy problem because they are
often a principal source of information for businesses in the con-
struction of their databases. Marketers stock their databases with
public record information, and the uses to which these databases are
put are manifold and potentially limitless. The personal information
in public records is often supplied involuntarily and typically for a
purpose linked to the reason why particular records are kept. The
problem is that, often without the individual’s knowledge or consent,
the information is then used for a host of different purposes by both
the government and businesses.
Therefore, the privacy problem caused by public records concerns
the structure of information flow—the way that information circu-
lates throughout our society. The problem is not necessarily the dis-
closure of secrets or the injury of reputations, but is one created by
increased access and aggregation of data. Privacy is an issue that con-
cerns what type of society we want to construct for the future. Do we
want to live in a Kafkaesque world where dossiers about individuals
circulate in an elaborate underworld of public- and private-sector
bureaucracies without the individual having notice, knowledge, or
the ability to monitor or control the ways the information is used?
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Transparency and Privacy: Reconciling the Tension
How can the tension between transparency and privacy be recon-
ciled? Must access to public records be sacrificed at the altar of pri-
vacy? Or must privacy evaporate in order for government to be
disinfected by sunlight?
Both transparency and privacy can be balanced through limita-
tions on the access and use of personal information in public records.
Of course, we must rethink what information belongs in public
records. But we must also regulate the uses of our digital dossiers. The
government is not doing enough to protect against the uses of the in-
formation that it routinely pumps into the public domain. If we aban-
don the notion that privacy is an exclusive status, and recognize that
information in public records can still remain private even if there is
limited access to it, then we can find a workable compromise for the
tension between transparency and privacy. We can make information
accessible for certain purposes only. When government discloses in-
formation, it can limit how it discloses that information by preventing
it from being amassed by companies for commercial purposes, from
being sold to others, or from being combined with other information
and sold back to the government.
Much of the personal information in public records is not neces-
sary to shed light on the way government carries out its functions.
Rather, this information reveals more about the people who are the
subjects of the government’s regulatory machinery. Although the fed-
eral FOIA has served to shed light on government activities and has
supplied critical information for hundreds of books and articles, it
has also been used as a tool for commercial interests. The vast major-
ity of FOIA requests are made by businesses for commercial pur-
poses.40 According to Judge Patricia Wald, FOIA turns agencies into
“information brokers” rather than “a window for public assessment of
how government works.”41 When weighing interests under the privacy
exceptions to the federal FOIA, although courts can’t consider the
identity and purpose of the requester, they can take into account the
relationship of the requested document to the purposes of FOIA.42
Unlike the federal FOIA, many states routinely permit access by infor-
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mation brokers without looking to the purposes of their open access
laws or the public interest.
State FOIAs generally do not permit any discrimination among re-
questers. In a number of cases, officials wanting to restrict access to
people requesting records for commercial use had no statutory au-
thority to do so. In Dunhill v. Director, District of Columbia Depart-
ment of Transportation, a marketer of personal information about
individuals sought a listing on computer tape of the names, ad-
dresses, birth dates, gender, and expiration date of drivers’ permits of
all people holding valid District of Columbia drivers’ permits. The
court held that the government had to release the information be-
cause the statute didn’t authorize the government to look to the mo-
tives of the request.43 In In re Crawford, a preparer of bankruptcy
petitions for debtors challenged the requirement that he divulge his
SSN on the petition, which would then be made public. The court rec-
ognized that although disclosure of his SSN exposed him to potential
fraud and identity theft, the interest in public access “is of special im-
portance in the bankruptcy arena, as unrestricted access to judicial
records fosters confidence among creditors regarding the fairness of
the bankruptcy system.”44 Thus, the court formalistically invoked the
principle of transparency, relying on the vague argument that total
transparency fosters “confidence.”
The danger with any principle is that it can drift to different uses
over time. Jack Balkin identifies this problem as “ideological drift.”
“Ideological drift in law means that legal ideas and symbols will
change their political valence as they are used over and over again in
new contexts.”45 Laws fostering transparency are justified as shedding
light into the dark labyrinths of government bureaucracy to expose its
inner workings to public scrutiny, and preventing the harrowing situ-
ation in Kafka’s The Trial—a bureaucracy that worked in clandestine
and mysterious ways, completely unaccountable and unchecked.
These are certainly laudable goals, for they are essential to democ-
racy and to the people’s ability to keep government under control.
However, freedom of information laws are increasingly becoming a
tool for powerful corporations to collect information about individu-
als to further their own commercial interests, not to shed light on the
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government. A window to look in on the government is transforming
into a window for the government and allied corporations to peer in
on individuals. The data collected about individuals is then subject to
a bureaucratic process that is often careless, uncontrolled, and clan-
destine. Because private-sector bureaucracies lack the transparency
of government bureaucracies, there is a greater potential for personal
information to be abused. Paradoxically, a right of access designed to
empower individuals and protect them from the ills of bureaucracy
can lead to exactly the opposite result.
There are certainly instances where information about individuals
can illuminate government functioning. Examination of accident re-
ports may reveal widespread problems with particular vehicles.
Scrutiny of police records may indicate problems in police investiga-
tion and enforcement. Information about the salaries of public offi-
cials and employees allows the public to assess whether they are
being over- or under-compensated. Disciplinary information about
public employees allows taxpayers to scrutinize the performance of
those who are earning their tax dollars. However, many of these pur-
poses can be achieved through evaluating aggregate statistical data or
by examining records with redacted personal identifying information.
The solution is not to eliminate all access to public records, but to
redact personal information where possible and to regulate specific
uses of information. Real property information must be made avail-
able for certain purposes, but it should not be available for all pur-
poses. A person may need to obtain the address of a celebrity to serve
process in a lawsuit; however, disclosing the address to fans or on the
Internet is different.
Use restriction laws, such as those discussed in chapter , are a
step in the right direction. These laws attempt to navigate the tension
between transparency and privacy by permitting the use of public
record information for certain purposes but not all purposes. One of
the longstanding Fair Information Practices is purpose specifica-
tion—that personal information obtained for one purpose cannot be
used for another purpose without an individual’s consent.46 Often the
purposes for the government collection of personal information vary
widely from the purposes for which the data is used after it is dis-
closed in public records. Governments collecting personal informa-
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tion should limit such uncontrolled drift in use. Access should be
granted for uses furthering traditional functions of transparency such
as the watchdog function; access should be denied for commercial
solicitation uses because such uses do not adequately serve the func-
tions of transparency. Rather, these uses make public records a cheap
marketing tool, resulting in the further spread of personal informa-
tion, which is often resold among marketers.
Use restriction laws must go beyond basic restrictions on access
for commercial solicitation. The use of public records by information
brokers or other entities that aggregate personal information and sell
it to others is deeply problematic for the reasons discussed earlier in
this chapter. Although information brokers have brought a new level
of accessibility to public records, they have also contributed greatly to
the creation of digital dossiers. This type of aggregated public record
information is often not used for the purposes of checking govern-
mental abuse or monitoring governmental activities. Rather, it is used
to investigate individuals. This investigation is at the behest of other
individuals, private detectives, employers, and law enforcement offi-
cials. Information brokers such as ChoicePoint collect public record
information and supplement it with a host of other personal informa-
tion, creating a convenient investigation tool for government entities.
The use of information brokers by the government to investigate citi-
zens runs directly counter to the spirit of freedom of information
laws, which were designed to empower individuals to monitor their
government, not vice versa.
Certain information should be restricted from public records com-
pletely. The proposal by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Court
System to separate both paper and electronic documents into a pub-
lic and private file for civil cases and to restrict access to certain docu-
ments in criminal proceedings such as pre-sentence reports is a step
in the right direction.47 One example of information that should be ex-
cluded from public records is a person’s SSN.48 SSNs serve as a gate-
way to highly sensitive information such as financial accounts, school
records, and a host of other data. As a routine practice, SSNs should
be redacted from every document before being disclosed publicly.
Jurors, parties to litigation, and witnesses should all be informed of
the extent to which their personal information could become a public
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record and must be given an opportunity to voice their privacy con-
cerns and have information redacted.
Of course, provisions in the law can be made for people who want
to consent to the disclosure of their personal information. If the re-
quester desires personal information about a specific individual in a
specific case, the agency or court can contact the individual, inform
her of the purpose of the request, and ask if she consents to disclo-
sure. People may want to consent if the data is being used by a re-
searcher, but may not if the information is requested for marketing
purposes.
The federal Privacy Act must be amended to provide more mean-
ingful protection. Its restrictions on the use of SSNs must be strength-
ened to regulate and restrict the use of SSNs by the private sector.
Thus, the Privacy Act should prohibit the use of SSNs as identifiers by
businesses, schools, and hospitals. Further, the Privacy Act should
contain meaningful remedies for violations. People should be permit-
ted to sue for negligent infringements of the Act—not just willful
ones. Rarely do government agencies willfully disclose personal infor-
mation in violation of the Privacy Act; most disclosures occur because
of carelessness and inadvertence. By expanding the Act in this way,
agencies will have a strong incentive to treat their record systems with
more care and to provide greater security for the personal informa-
tion they maintain. Government agency information-handling prac-
tices should be routinely audited by a governmental oversight agency.
Moreover, the “routine use” exception must be significantly tight-
ened.
Finally, more laws like the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act are nec-
essary to ensure that states maintain adequate privacy protection in
their public records law. A federal baseline should not preempt states
from adopting stricter protections of privacy, but it must provide a
meaningful floor of protection. Although each state should adopt its
own statute akin to the federal Privacy Act, one option would be to ex-
tend the federal Privacy Act to the states.
We may never be able to achieve complete secrecy of information
in many situations and, in some situations, complete secrecy would
be undesirable. But we can limit accessibility and use.
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Public Records and the First Amendment
Do the access and use restrictions I propose pass muster under the
First Amendment? Understood broadly, the First Amendment pro-
tects openness in information flow. First, the Court has held that the
First Amendment provides certain rights of access to at least some
government proceedings. Restrictions on the information available in
public records might infringe upon this right. Second, freedom of
speech prevents the government from restricting the disclosure and
dissemination of information. A close analysis of the Court’s deci-
sions, however, reveals that access and use restrictions are constitu-
tional.
The Right of Access. The Supreme Court has held that the First Amend-
ment mandates that certain government proceedings be open to the
public. In Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, a plurality of the
Court concluded that the public had a First Amendment right of ac-
cess to criminal trials.49 Two years later, in Globe Newspaper Co. v. Su-
perior Court, the Court struck down a law closing criminal trials when
juvenile sexual assault victims testified. According to the Court, a
“major purpose” of the First Amendment is “to protect the free dis-
cussion of governmental affairs.” The Court articulated a two-
pronged test to determine whether the right to access applies, first
looking to whether the proceeding “historically has been open to the
press and general public” and then examining whether access “plays
a particularly significant role in the functioning of the judicial process
and the government as a whole.”50 Shortly after Globe, the Court ex-
tended the right to access beyond the immediate criminal trial to jury
selection and to pretrial proceedings.51 Lower courts have proclaimed
that the right of access applies to hearings for pretrial suppression,
due process, entrapment, and bail.52
Although the Court has never squarely addressed whether the right
of access applies beyond the criminal arena, several lower courts have
extended it to civil cases. For example, in Publicker Industries, Inc. v.
Cohen, the court reasoned that “the civil trial, like the criminal trial,
plays a particularly significant role in the functioning of the judicial
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process and the government as a whole.”53 Several courts have even
concluded that the right to access “extends to at least some categories
of court documents and records,” but not all courts agree.54 Although
courts have rarely applied the right of access beyond court records,
since the rationale for the right is to provide knowledge about the
workings of the government, the right might logically extend to other
public records. Even under such an expansive view, however, the right
of access shouldn’t prohibit many access and use restrictions. When
public records illuminate government functioning, access to them is
generally consistent with the rationale for the right of access. How-
ever, the grand purposes behind the right are not present in the con-
text of much information gathering from public records today. Public
records are becoming a tool for powerful companies to use in further-
ance of commercial gain. These uses do not shed light on the govern-
ment.
In fact, the Constitution does not simply require open informa-
tion flow; it also establishes certain responsibilities for the way that
the government uses the information it collects. The Court has held
that there are circumstances where the government cannot force in-
dividuals to disclose personal information absent a compelling gov-
ernment interest. In NAACP v. Alabama, the Court struck down a
statute requiring the NAACP to disclose a list of its members because
this could expose them to potential economic reprisal and physical
violence, thus chilling their freedom of association.55 Similarly, in
Greidinger v. Davis, the Fourth Circuit held that Virginia’s voter regis-
tration system was unconstitutional because it forced people to pub-
licly disclose their SSNs in order to vote, thus deterring people from
voting by exposing them to potential harms such as identity theft and
fraud.56 These cases establish that government disclosure of personal
information it has collected can be unconstitutional when it inter-
feres with the exercise of fundamental rights.
Further, under the constitutional right to privacy, the Court has
held that government has a duty to protect privacy when it collects
personal data. In Whalen v. Roe, which I discussed in chapter , the
Court held that the right to privacy encompassed the protection of
personal information:
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We are not unaware of the threat to privacy implicit in the accu-
mulation of vast amounts of personal information in computer-
ized data banks or other massive government files. . . . The right
to collect and use such data for public purposes is typically ac-
companied by a concomitant statutory or regulatory duty to
avoid unwarranted disclosures. . . . [I]n some circumstances that
duty arguably has its roots in the Constitution.57
Whalen recognized that when the government collects personal in-
formation, it has a responsibility to keep it secure and confidential.
Since its creation in Whalen, the constitutional right to informa-
tion privacy has begun to evolve in the courts, but it is still in the early
stages of growth.58 The full extent of the government’s responsibilities
in handling personal data awaits further development. Based on the
cases decided thus far, the Constitution requires public access when
information will shed light on the functioning of the government, and
it requires confidentiality when information pertains to the personal
lives of individuals.
Freedom of Speech. The First Amendment more directly fosters infor-
mation flow about government activities by forbidding restrictions on
freedom of speech. Understanding how use and access restrictions
on public record information interact with the First Amendment re-
quires a difficult navigation through a number of cases. In one series
of cases, the Court has struck down statutes prohibiting the disclo-
sure of information gleaned from public records. In Cox Broadcasting
Corp. v. Cohn, the Court held that a state could not impose civil liabil-
ity based upon publication of a rape victim’s name obtained from a
court record: “Once true information is disclosed in public court doc-
uments open to public inspection, the press cannot be sanctioned for
publishing it.” Punishing the press for publishing public record infor-
mation would “invite timidity and self-censorship and very likely lead
to the suppression of many items that would otherwise be published
and that should be made available to the public.”59 In Smith v. Daily
Mail, the Court struck down a statute prohibiting the publication of
the names of juvenile offenders: “[I]f a newspaper lawfully obtains
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truthful information about a matter of public significance then state
officials may not constitutionally punish publication of the informa-
tion, absent a need to further a state interest of the highest order.”60
This line of cases culminated in Florida Star v. B.J.F. in which a
newspaper published the name of a rape victim, which it obtained
from a publicly released police report. The report was in a room with
signs stating that rape victims’ names weren’t part of the public
record and weren’t to be published. The reporter even admitted that
she knew she wasn’t allowed to report on the information. When the
story ran, many of the victim’s friends learned about her rape, and a
man made threatening calls to her home. As a result, she had to
change her phone number and residence, seek police protection, and
obtain mental health counseling. Based upon a Florida law prohibit-
ing the disclosure of rape victims’ names, a jury found the paper li-
able. The Supreme Court, however, held that the verdict ran afoul of
the newspaper’s First Amendment rights.61 Taken together, these
cases support the premise that once the government makes informa-
tion public, the government cannot subsequently sanction its further
disclosure.
However, in Los Angeles Police Department v. United Reporting
Publishing Co., the Court upheld a law restricting access for public ar-
restee information. Requesters of the information had to declare un-
der penalty of perjury that the address information would not be used
“directly or indirectly to sell a product or service.” Rejecting a chal-
lenge that the law infringed upon commercial speech, the Court rea-
soned that the statute was not “prohibiting a speaker from conveying
information that the speaker already possesses” but was merely “a
governmental denial of access to information in its possession.” As
long as the government doesn’t have a duty to provide access to infor-
mation, it can selectively determine who can obtain it.62
The Court’s jurisprudence thus creates a distinction between pre-
access conditions on obtaining information and post-access restric-
tions on the use or disclosure of the information. If the government is
not obligated to provide access to certain information by the First
Amendment, it can amend its public access laws to establish pre-ac-
cess conditions, restricting access for certain kinds of uses. Govern-
ments can make a public record available on the condition that
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certain information is not disclosed or used in a certain manner.
However, once the information is made available, governments can-
not establish post-access restrictions on its disclosure or use.
The Court’s distinction between pre-access and post-access re-
strictions seems rather tenuous. States can easily redraft their statutes
to get around Florida Star. For example, Florida could rewrite its law
to make rape victims’ names available on the condition that the press
promise the names not be disclosed. Conditional access and use re-
strictions thus appear to be an end-run around Florida Star. Can the
Court’s distinction between pre- and post-access restrictions be de-
fended?
I believe it can. First, in Florida Star, the Court was concerned
about the government’s failure “to police itself in disseminating infor-
mation.” The mistake was made by the police department in failing to
redact the name, and thus it was unfair “to sanction persons other
than the source of its release.”63 In contrast, with pre-access restric-
tions, the government is taking the appropriate care to protect the in-
formation itself.
Second, in both Cox and Florida Star, the Court was concerned
about the chilling effects to speech from the uncertainty over whether
certain public record information could be disclosed. Pre-access re-
strictions alleviate these concerns. Since the recipient of the informa-
tion has to expressly agree to any restrictions on using the
information beforehand, she will be on clear notice as to her obliga-
tions and responsibilities in handling the data.
Third, and most importantly, the distinction is a good practical
compromise. Without a distinction between post- and pre-access
conditions, the government would be forced into an all-or-nothing
tradeoff between transparency and privacy. The government could
make records public, allowing all uses of the personal information, or
the government could simply not make records available at all. By
making access conditional on accepting certain responsibilities when
using data, the public can have access to a wide range of records
while privacy remains protected at the same time.
Has the Court too quickly dispatched with the free speech implica-
tions of conditional or limited access regulation? For example, some
argue that restrictions on commercial access are unconstitutional
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content-based restrictions on free speech because they single out
specific messages and viewpoints—namely, commercial ones. Dis-
senting in United Reporting Publishing Corp., Justice Stevens argued
that the California access and use restriction improperly singled out
“a narrow category of persons solely because they intend to use the
information for a [commercial] purpose.”64 However, commercial ac-
cess restrictions are not being applied because of disagreement with
the message that commercial users wish to send. Nor do they favor a
particular speaker or specific ideas. Although particular categories of
use (i.e., commercial) are being singled out, avoiding viewpoint dis-
crimination does not entail avoiding all attempts to categorize or
limit uses of information. Indeed, the First Amendment constitu-
tional regime depends upon categorizing speech. The Supreme Court
protects certain categories of speech much less stringently than other
forms of speech. Obscene speech, words that incite violence, and
defamatory speech about private figures all receive minimal protec-
tion.65 Commercial speech is also singled out, safeguarded with only
an intermediate level of scrutiny.66 Although there is no bright line
that distinguishes when certain categories map onto particular view-
points to such a degree as to constitute discrimination based on view-
point, the category of commercial speech is broad enough to
encompass a multitude of viewpoints and is a category that forms
part of the architecture of the current constitutional regime.
Therefore, governments should be able to restrict access for cer-
tain purposes or condition access on an enforceable promise not to
engage in certain uses of information. Of course, it would be im-
proper for the government to single out particular viewpoints. Thus,
for example, governments should not restrict access to public records
to those who wish to use the information to advocate for certain
causes rather than others. Nor could the government restrict access
based on the particular beliefs or ideas of the person or entities seek-
ing access to the information. In short, the government can’t single
out certain uses because it dislikes the ideas or views of a particular
speaker. A limitation on commercial use is broad enough to encom-
pass a diverse enough range of viewpoints, and the government is
merely limiting uses of information rather than the expression of par-
ticular ideas.
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Public Records in the Information Age. Public records are increasingly
posing a serious threat to privacy in the Information Age. To under-
stand this threat, our conceptions of privacy must be adapted to to-
day’s technological realities. We must abandon the secrecy paradigm
and recognize that what is public can be private—not in the sense
that it is secret, but in the limitation of the uses and disclosures of the
information. Privacy is about degrees of accessibility. The threat to
privacy is not in isolated pieces of information, but in increased ac-
cess and aggregation, the construction of digital dossiers and the uses
to which they are put. States must begin to rethink their public record
regimes, and the federal government should step in to serve as the
most efficient mechanism to achieve this goal. It is time for the public
records laws of this country to mature to meet the problems of the In-
formation Age.
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Information Gathering
Thus far, I have discussed how personal information is being more
readily collected, stored, transferred, and combined with other infor-
mation. Part I of this book discussed the problems of information
flow among various businesses, and part II focused on information
flows from the government to the private sector. But there is another
problematic type of information flow that is rapidly escalating—data
transfers from the private sector to the government. The vast digital
dossiers being constructed by businesses are becoming an increas-
ingly desirable resource for law enforcement officials. And this threat-
ens to transform the relationship between government and citizen in
some very troubling ways.
Third Party Records and the Government
Earlier in this book, I described the extensive amount of informa-
tion that companies are stockpiling about us. To live in the modern
world, we must enter into numerous relationships with other people
and businesses: doctors, lawyers, businesses, merchants, magazines,
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newspapers, banks, credit card companies, employers, landlords,
ISPs, insurance companies, phone companies, and cable companies.
The list goes on and on. Our relationships with all of these entities
generate records containing personal information necessary to estab-
lish an account and record our transactions and preferences. We are
becoming a society of records, and these records are not held by us,
but by third parties.
These record systems are becoming increasingly useful to law en-
forcement officials. Personal information can help the government
detect fraud, espionage, fugitives, drug distribution rings, and terror-
ist cells. Information about a person’s financial transactions, pur-
chases, and religious and political beliefs can assist the investigation
of suspected criminals and can be used to profile people for more
thorough searches at airports.
The government, therefore, has a strong desire to obtain personal
information found in records maintained by third parties. For in-
stance, from pen registers and trap and trace devices, the government
can obtain a list of all the phone numbers dialed to or from a particu-
lar location, potentially revealing the people with whom a person as-
sociates. From bank records, which contain one’s account activity and
check writing, the government can discover the various companies
and professionals that a person does business with (ISP, telephone
company, credit card company, magazine companies, doctors, attor-
neys, and so on). Credit card company records can reveal where one
eats and shops. The government can obtain one’s travel destinations
and activities from travel agent records. From hotel records, it can
discover the numbers a person dialed and the pay-per-view movies a
person watched.1 The government can obtain one’s thumbprint from
car rental companies that collect them to investigate fraud.2 From
video stores, the government can access an inventory of the videos
that a person has rented.
The government can also glean a wealth of information from the
extensive records employers maintain about their employees.3 Em-
ployers frequently monitor their employees.4 Some use software to
track how employees surf the Internet.5 Employers often record infor-
mation about an employee’s email use, including back-up copies of
the contents of email. A number of employers also conduct drug test-
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ing, and many require prospective employees to answer question-
naires asking about drug use, finances, psychological treatment, mar-
ital history, and sexuality.6 Some even require prospective hires to
take a psychological screening test.7
Landlords are another fertile source of personal information.
Landlord records often contain financial, employment, and pet infor-
mation, in addition to any tenant complaints. Many landlords also
maintain log books at the front desk where visitors sign in. Some
apartment buildings use biometric identification devices, such as
hand scanners, to control access to common areas such as gyms.
Increasingly, companies and entities that we have never estab-
lished any contact with nevertheless have dossiers about us. Credit
reporting agencies maintain information relating to financial trans-
actions, debts, creditors, and checking accounts. The government can
also find out details about people’s race, income, opinions, political
beliefs, health, lifestyle, and purchasing habits from the database
companies that keep extensive personal information on millions of
Americans.
Beyond the records described here, the Internet has the potential
to become one of the government’s greatest information gathering
tools. There are two significant aspects of the Internet that make it
such a revolutionary data collection device. First, it gives many indi-
viduals a false sense of privacy. The secrecy and anonymity of the In-
ternet is often a mirage. Rarely are people truly anonymous because
ISPs keep records of a subscriber’s screen name and pseudonyms. ISP
account information includes the subscriber’s name, address, phone
numbers, passwords, information about web surfing sessions and
durations, and financial information.8 By learning a person’s screen
name, the government can identify who posted messages in news-
groups or conversed in chatrooms.
At the government’s request, an ISP can keep logs of the email ad-
dresses with which a person corresponds. Further, if a person stores
email that is sent and received with the ISP, the government can ob-
tain the contents of those emails.
Second, the Internet is unprecedented in the degree of information
that can be gathered and stored. It is one of the most powerful gener-
ators of records in human history. As discussed in chapter , websites
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often accumulate a great deal of information about their users, from
transactional data to information collected through cookies. The gov-
ernment can glean a substantial amount of information about visi-
tors to a particular website. From Internet retailers, the government
can learn about the books, videos, music, and electronics that one
purchases. Some Internet retailers, such as Amazon.com, record all
the purchases a person has made throughout many years. Based on
this information, the government can discover a consumer’s interests,
political views, religious beliefs, and lifestyle.
The government may also obtain information from websites that
operate personalized home pages. Home pages enable users to keep
track of the stocks they own, favorite television channels, airfares for
favorite destinations, and news of interest. Other websites, such as
Microsoft Network’s calendar service, allow users to maintain their
daily schedule and appointments. Further, as discussed in chapter ,
there are database companies that amass extensive profiles of peo-
ple’s websurfing habits.
While life in the Information Age has brought us a dizzying amount
of information, it has also placed a profound amount of information
about our lives in the hands of numerous entities. As discussed ear-
lier, these digital dossiers are increasingly becoming digital biogra-
phies, a horde of aggregated bits of information combined to reveal a
portrait of who we are based upon what we buy, the organizations we
belong to, how we navigate the Internet, and which shows and videos
we watch. This information is not held by trusted friends or family
members, but by large bureaucracies that we do not know very well or
sometimes do not even know at all.
Government–Private-Sector Information Flows
In late , the news media reported that the Department of De-
fense was planning a project known as Total Information Awareness
(TIA). The project was to be run by John Poindexter, who had been
convicted in  for his activities during the Iran-contra scandal. TIA
envisioned the creation of a gigantic government database of per-
sonal information, including data culled from private-sector entities
concerning finances, education, travel, health, and so on. This infor-
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mation would then be analyzed under various models to detect pat-
terns and profiles for terrorist activities.9 The website for the project
contained the symbol of a pyramid with beams of light emanating
from an eye at the top. Next to the pyramid was a globe, illuminated
by the light. Underneath the image were the words scientia est poten-
tia—“knowledge is power.”10
When TIA broke as a major news story, civil liberties groups and
many commentators and politicians voiced stinging criticism. In a
New York Times editorial, William Safire wrote that Poindexter “is de-
termined to break down the wall between commercial snooping and
secret government intrusion. . . . And he has been given a $ mil-
lion budget to create computer dossiers on  million Americans.”11
After these outcries, the pyramid and eye logo was quickly removed
from the Department of Defense website. The Senate amended its
spending bill in January  to temporarily suspend funding for TIA
until the details of the program were explained to Congress.12 In May
, the Department of Defense issued its report to Congress, re-
naming the program “Terrorism Information Awareness” and declar-
ing (without specifying how) that it would protect privacy. Later on, in
July, the Senate voted unanimously to stop funding for TIA. The pro-
gram had been killed.
But TIA is only one part of the story of government access to per-
sonal information and its creation of dossiers on American citizens.
In fact, for quite some time, the government has been increasingly
contracting with businesses to acquire databases of personal infor-
mation. Database firms are willing to supply the information and the
government is willing to pay for it. Currently, government agencies
such as the FBI and IRS are purchasing databases of personal infor-
mation from private-sector companies.13 A private company called
ChoicePoint, Inc. has amassed a database of  billion records and
has contracts with at least  federal agencies to share the data with
them. In , the Justice Department signed an $ million contract
with ChoicePoint, and the IRS reached a deal with the company for
between $ and $ million. ChoicePoint collects information from
public records from around the country and then combines it with
information from private detectives, the media, and credit reporting
firms. This data is indexed by people’s SSNs. The Center for Medicare
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and Medicaid Services uses ChoicePoint’s data to help it identify
fraudulent Medicare claims by checking health care provider ad-
dresses against ChoicePoint’s list of “high-risk and fraudulent busi-
ness addresses.” ChoicePoint’s information is not only used by
government agencies but also by private-sector employers to screen
new hires or investigate existing employees.14
ChoicePoint’s information is a mixture of fact and fiction. There are
a number of errors in the records, such as when a ChoicePoint report
falsely indicated that a woman was a convicted drug dealer and
shoplifter, resulting in her being fired from her job.15 ChoicePoint also
had a hand in the  presidential election problems in Florida.
ChoicePoint supplied Florida officials with a list of , “ex-felons”
to eliminate from their voter lists.16 However, many of the , were
not guilty of felonies, only misdemeanors, and were legally eligible to
vote. Although the error was discovered prior to the election and offi-
cials tried to place the individuals back on the voter rolls, the error
may have led to some eligible voters being turned away at the polls.
Additionally, many states have joined together to create a database
system called Multi-State Anti-Terrorism Information Exchange, or
MATRIX for short. Run by SeisInt, Inc., a private-sector company in
Florida, MATRIX contains personal information gathered from public
records and from businesses. In its vast fields of data, MATRIX in-
cludes people’s criminal histories, photographs, property ownership,
SSNs, addresses, bankruptcies, family members, and credit informa-
tion. The federal government has provided $ million to help support
the program.17
A second form of information flow from the private sector to the
government emerges when the government requests private-sector
records for particular investigations or compels their disclosure by
subpoena or court order. Voluntary disclosure of customer informa-
tion is within the third party company’s discretion. Further, whether a
person is notified of the request and given the opportunity to chal-
lenge it in court is also within the company’s discretion.
The September ,  terrorist attacks changed the climate for
private sector-to-government information flows. Law enforcement
officials have a greater desire to obtain information that could be
helpful in identifying terrorists or their supporters, including infor-
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mation about what people read, the people with whom they associ-
ate, their religion, and their lifestyle. Following the September  at-
tack, the FBI simply requested records from businesses without a
subpoena, warrant, or court order.18 Recently, Attorney General John
Ashcroft has revised longstanding guidelines for FBI surveillance
practices. Under the previous version, the FBI could monitor public
events and mine the Internet for information only when “facts or cir-
cumstances reasonably indicate that a federal crime has been, is be-
ing, or will be committed.”19 Under the revised version, the FBI can
engage in these types of information gathering without any require-
ment that it be part of a legitimate investigation or related in any
manner to criminal wrongdoing. The FBI can now collect “publicly
available information, whether obtained directly or through services
or resources (whether nonprofit or commercial) that compile or ana-
lyze such information; and information voluntarily provided by pri-
vate entities.”20 Further, the FBI can “carry out general topical
research, including conducting online searches and accessing online
sites and forums.”21
In conjunction with the government’s greater desire for personal
information, the private sector has become more willing to supply it.
Background check companies, for instance, experienced a large
boost in business after September .22 Several large financial compa-
nies developed agreements to provide information to federal law en-
forcement agencies.23 Indeed, in times of crisis or when serious
crimes are at issue, the incentives to disclose information to the gov-
ernment are quite significant. Shortly after September , around 
universities admitted to giving the FBI access to their records on for-
eign students—often without a subpoena or court order.24 In violation
of its privacy policy, JetBlue Airlines shared the personal data of  mil-
lion customers with Torch Concepts, an Alabama company contract-
ing with the Defense Department to profile passengers for security
risks. Torch combined the JetBlue data with SSNs, employment infor-
mation, and other details obtained from Acxiom, Inc., a database
marketing company.25 In a similar incident, Northwest Airlines se-
cretly turned over to NASA its customer data—including addresses,
phone numbers, and credit card information—for use in a govern-
ment data mining project.26 In a December  survey of nearly 
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chief security officers, almost  percent said that they would supply
information to the government without a court order, with  percent
doing so in cases involving national security.27
When businesses refuse to cooperate, the government can compel
production of the information by issuing a subpoena or obtaining a
court order. These devices are very different from warrants because
they offer little protection to the individual being investigated. Notifi-
cation of the target of the investigation is often within the discretion
of the third party. Further, it is up to the third party to challenge the
subpoena. So, rather than spend the money and resources to chal-
lenge the subpoena, companies can simply turn it over or permit the
government to search their records. Since September , AOL and
Earthlink, two of the largest ISPs, have readily cooperated with the in-
vestigation of the terrorist attacks.28 Often, ISPs have their own tech-
nology to turn over communications and information about targets
of investigations. If they lack the technology, law enforcement offi-
cials can install devices such as “Carnivore” to locate the informa-
tion.29 Carnivore, now renamed to the more innocuous “DCS,” is
a computer program installed by the FBI at an ISP.30 It can monitor all
ISP email traffic and search for certain keywords in the content or
headers of the email messages.
These developments are troubling because private-sector compa-
nies often have weak policies governing when information may be
disclosed to the government. The privacy policy for the MSN network,
an affiliation of several Microsoft, Inc. websites such as Hotmail (an
email service), Health, Money, Newsletters, eShop, and Calendar,
states:
MSN Web sites will disclose your personal information, without
notice, only if required to do so by law or in the good faith belief
that such action is necessary to: (a) conform to the edicts of the
law or comply with legal process served on Microsoft or the site.31
Though somewhat unclear, this privacy policy appears to require a
subpoena or court order for the government to obtain personal data.
Amazon.com’s privacy policy reads: “We release account and other
personal information when we believe release is appropriate to com-
ply with law . . . or protect the rights, property, or safety of
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Amazon.com, our users, or others.”32 It is unclear from this policy the
extent to which Amazon.com, in its discretion, can provide informa-
tion to law enforcement officials.
EBay, a popular online auction website, has a policy stating that
[it] cooperates with law enforcement inquiries, as well as other
third parties to enforce laws, such as: intellectual property rights,
fraud and other rights. We can (and you authorize us to) disclose
any information about you to law enforcement or other govern-
ment officials as we, in our sole discretion, believe necessary or
appropriate, in connection with an investigation of fraud, intel-
lectual property infringements, or other activity that is illegal or
may expose us or you to legal liability.33
This policy gives eBay almost complete discretion to provide the gov-
ernment with whatever information it deems appropriate.
Truste.com, a nonprofit organization providing a “trustmark” for
participating websites that agree to abide by certain privacy princi-
ples, has drafted a model privacy statement that reads: “We will not
sell, share, or rent [personal] information to others in ways different
from what is disclosed in this statement.”34 The statement then says
that information may be shared with “an outside shipping company
to ship orders, and a credit card processing company to bill users for
goods and services.” Personal data is also shared with third parties
when the user signs up for services that are provided by those third
parties. This policy, however, does not contain any provision about
supplying information to the government. Further, the policy does
not inform people that under existing law, information must be dis-
closed to the government pursuant to a subpoena or court order.
The government is also increasing information flow from the pri-
vate sector by encouraging it to develop new information gathering
technologies. Private-sector firms stand to profit from developing
such technologies. Since September , companies have expressed
an eagerness to develop national identification systems and face-
recognition technology.35 In addition, the federal government has
announced a “wish list” for new surveillance and investigation tech-
nologies.36 Companies that invent such technologies can obtain lu-
crative government contracts.
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The government has also funded private-sector information gath-
ering initiatives. For instance, a company that began assembling a
national database of photographs and personal information as a tool
to guard against consumer fraud has received $. million from the
Secret Service to aid in the development of the database.37
In certain circumstances, where institutions do not willingly coop-
erate with the government, the law requires their participation. For
example, the Bank Secrecy Act of  forces banks to maintain
records of financial transactions to facilitate law enforcement
needs—in particular, investigations and prosecutions of criminal,
tax, or regulatory matters.38 All federally insured banks must keep
records of each customer’s financial transactions and must report to
the government every financial transaction in excess of $,.39 The
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of
 requires employers to report personal information from all new
employees including SSNs, addresses, and wages.40 The Communica-
tions Assistance for Law Enforcement Act of  requires telecom-
munications service providers to develop technology to assist
government surveillance of individuals.41 Passed in , the USA-PA-
TRIOT Act authorizes the FBI to obtain a court order to inspect or
seize “books, records, papers, documents, or other items” for use in
an investigation for terrorism or intelligence activities.42 This provi-
sion contains a gag order, prohibiting anybody from disclosing that
the FBI has sought or obtained anything.43
All of this suggests that businesses and government have become
allies. When their interests diverge, the law forces cooperation. The
government can increasingly amass gigantic dossiers on millions of
individuals, conduct sweeping investigations, and search for vast
quantities of information from a wide range of sources, without any
probable cause or particularized suspicion. Information is easier to
obtain, and it is becoming more centralized. The government is in-
creasingly gaining access to the information in our digital dossiers. As
Justice Douglas noted in his dissent when the Court upheld the con-
stitutionality of the Bank Secrecy Act:
These [bank records] are all tied to one’s SSN; and now that we
have the data banks, these other items will enrich that store-
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house and make it possible for a bureaucrat—by pushing one
button—to get in an instant the names of the  million Ameri-
cans who are subversives or potential and likely candidates.44
Thus, we are increasingly seeing collusion, partly voluntary, partly
coerced, between the private sector and the government. While pub-
lic attention has focused on the Total Information Awareness project,
the very same goals and techniques of the program continue to be
carried out less systematically by various government agencies and
law enforcement officials. We are already closer to Total Information
Awareness than we might think.
The Orwellian Dangers
Although there are certainly many legitimate needs for law enforce-
ment officials to obtain personal data, there are also many dangers to
unfettered government access to information. There are at least two
general types of harms, some best captured by the Orwell metaphor
and others that are more fittingly described with the Kafka metaphor.
I turn first to the Orwellian dangers.
Creeping toward Totalitarianism. Historically, totalitarian governments
have developed elaborate systems for collecting data about people’s
private lives.45 Although the possibility of the rise of a totalitarian state
is remote, if our society takes on certain totalitarian features, it could
significantly increase the extent to which the government can exer-
cise social control. Justice Brandeis was prescient when he observed
that people “are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by
evil-minded rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in the insidi-
ous encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without under-
standing.”46
Democracy and Self-Determination. Even if government entities are not
attempting to engage in social control, their activities can have col-
lateral effects that harm democracy and self-determination. Paul
Schwartz illustrates this with his theory of “constitutive privacy.” Ac-
cording to Schwartz, privacy is essential to both individuals and
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communities: “[C]onstitutive privacy seeks to create boundaries
about personal information to help the individual and define terms of
life within the community.” As a form of regulation of information
flow, privacy shapes “the extent to which certain actions or expres-
sions of identity are encouraged or discouraged.” Schwartz contends
that extensive government oversight over an individual’s activities
can “corrupt individual decision making about the elements of one’s
identity.”47 Likewise, Julie Cohen argues that a “realm of autonomous,
unmonitored choice . . . promotes a vital diversity of speech and be-
havior.” The lack of privacy “threatens not only to chill the expression
of eccentric individuality, but also, gradually, to dampen the force of
our aspirations to it.”48
Freedom of Association. Government information collection interferes
with an individual’s freedom of association. The Court has held that
there is a “vital relationship between freedom to associate and pri-
vacy in one’s associations.”49 In a series of cases, the Court has re-
stricted the government’s ability to compel disclosure of membership
in an organization.50 In Baird v. State Bar,51 for example, the Court has
declared: “[W]hen a State attempts to make inquiries about a person’s
beliefs or associations, its power is limited by the First Amendment.
Broad and sweeping state inquiries into these protected areas . . . dis-
courage citizens from exercising rights protected by the Constitu-
tion.”52 The government’s extensive ability to glean information about
one’s associations from third party records without any Fourth
Amendment limitations threatens the interests articulated in these
cases.53
Anonymity. Extensive government information gathering from third
party records also implicates the right to speak anonymously. In Tal-
ley v. California, the Court struck down a law prohibiting the distribu-
tion of anonymous handbills as a violation of the First Amendment.
The Court held that “[p]ersecuted groups and sects from time to time
throughout history have been able to criticize oppressive practices
and laws either anonymously or not at all.” Further, the Court rea-
soned, “identification and fear of reprisal might deter perfectly
peaceful discussions of public matters of importance.”54 The Court
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has reiterated its view of the importance of protecting anonymous
speech in subsequent cases.55 From third parties, especially ISPs, the
government can readily obtain an anonymous or pseudonymous
speaker’s identity. Only computer-savvy users can speak with more
secure anonymity. Although private parties attempting to identify an
anonymous speaker through subpoenas have been required to satisfy
heightened standards,56 no such heightened standards have yet been
applied when the government seeks to obtain the information.
Further, beyond typical anonymity is the ability to receive informa-
tion anonymously. As Julie Cohen persuasively contends: “The free-
dom to read anonymously is just as much a part of our tradition, and
the choice of reading materials just as expressive of identity, as the
decision to use or withhold one’s name.”57 The lack of sufficient con-
trols on the government’s obtaining the extensive records about how
individuals surf the web, the books and magazines they read, and the
videos or television channels they listen to can implicate this interest.
Additionally, the increasing information flow between the private
sector and the government not only impacts the privacy of the target
of an investigation, but can also affect the privacy of other individu-
als. The names, addresses, phone numbers, and a variety of data
about a number of individuals can be ensnared in records pertaining
to the target.
These types of harms can inhibit individuals from associating with
particular people and groups and from expressing their views, espe-
cially unpopular ones. This kind of inhibition is a central goal of Or-
well’s Big Brother. Although it certainly does not approach the same
degree of oppressiveness as Big Brother, it reduces the robustness of
dissent and weakens the vitality of our communication.
The Kafkaesque Dangers
The second general type of danger promoted by government infor-
mation gathering consists of the harms routinely arising in bureau-
cratic settings: decisions without adequate accountability, dangerous
pockets of unfettered discretion, and choices based on short-term
goals without consideration of the long-term consequences or the
larger social effects. These bureaucratic harms have similarities to
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those I discussed earlier when discussing the Kafka metaphor, al-
though these harms take on some new dimensions with government
law enforcement bureaucracy. As in Kafka’s The Trial, dossiers circu-
late throughout a large government bureaucracy, and individuals are
not informed how their information is used and how decisions are
made based on their data. The existence of dossiers of personal infor-
mation in government bureaucracies can lead to dangers such as
hasty judgment in times of crisis, the disparate impact of law enforce-
ment on particular minorities, cover-ups, petty retaliation for criti-
cism, blackmail, framing, sweeping and disruptive investigations,
racial or religious profiling, and so on.
The most frequent problem is not that law enforcement agencies
will be led by corrupt and abusive leaders, although this arguably
happened for nearly  years when J. Edgar Hoover directed the FBI.
The problem is the risk that judgment will not be exercised in a care-
ful and thoughtful manner. In other words, it stems from certain
forms of government information collection shifting power toward a
bureaucratic machinery that is poorly regulated and susceptible to
abuse. This shift has profound social effects because it alters the bal-
ance of power between the government and the people, exposing in-
dividuals to a series of harms, increasing their vulnerability and
decreasing the degree of power they exercise over their lives.
When the Fourth Amendment was ratified, organized police forces
did not exist.58 Colonial policing was the “business of amateurs.”59
Sheriffs did not have a professional staff; they relied heavily on ordi-
nary citizens to serve as constables or watchmen, whose primary
duties consisted of patrolling rather than investigating.60 The govern-
ment typically became involved in criminal investigations only after
an arrest was made or a suspect was identified, and in ordinary crimi-
nal cases, police rarely conducted searches prior to arrest.61
Organized police forces developed during the nineteenth century,
and by the middle of the twentieth century, policing reached an un-
precedented level of organization and coordination.62 At the center of
the rise of modern law enforcement was the development of the FBI.
When the FBI was being formed in , there was significant opposi-
tion in Congress to a permanent federal police force.63 Members of
Congress expressed trepidation over the possibility that such an in-
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vestigatory agency could ascertain “matters of scandal and gossip”
that could wind up being used for political purposes.64 These con-
cerns related to the potential dangers of the agency’s information
gathering capabilities, and as will be discussed later, the fears eventu-
ally became realities.
Today, we live in an endless matrix of law and regulation, adminis-
tered by a multitude of vast government bureaucracies. Like most
everything else in modern society, law enforcement has become bu-
reaucratized. There are large police departments armed with sophis-
ticated technology that coordinate with each other. There are massive
agencies devoted entirely to investigation and intelligence gathering.
One of the distinctive facets of law enforcement bureaucracy in the
United States is that low-ranking officials exercise a profound degree
of discretion, and most of their discretionary decisions are undocu-
mented.65
Many factors make it difficult for law enforcement officials to strike
a delicate balance between order and liberty. Among them, there are
tremendous pressures on law enforcement agencies to capture crimi-
nals, solve notorious crimes, keep crime under control, and prevent
acts of violence and terrorism. This highly stressful environment can
lead to short cuts, bad exercises of discretion, or obliviousness and in-
sensitivity to people’s freedom. One of the most crucial aspects of
keeping government power under control is a healthy scrutiny. Most
law enforcement officials, however, are unlikely to view themselves
with distrust and skepticism. Police and prosecutors are too en-
veloped in the tremendous responsibilities and pressures of their jobs
to remain completely unbiased.
In short, one need not fear the rise of a totalitarian state or the in-
hibition of democratic activities to desire strong controls on the
power of the government in collecting personal information. The
Kafka metaphor more aptly captures what is harmful about these
types of bureaucratic realities. The harm is that our personal data is
stored within a bureaucratic system, where we are vulnerable to
abuses, careless errors, and thoughtless decisions.
Leaks, Lapses, and Vulnerability. As more private-sector data becomes
available to the government, there could be a de facto national
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database, or a large database of “suspicious” individuals.66 Federal
governmental entities have engaged in extensive data gathering cam-
paigns on various political groups throughout the twentieth century.
From  through , for example, the FBI and CIA conducted a se-
cret domestic intelligence operation, reading the mail of thousands of
citizens. The FBI’s investigations extended to members of the
women’s liberation movement and prominent critics of the Vietnam
War, and the FBI obtained information about personal and sexual re-
lationships that could be used to discredit them. During the Mc-
Carthy era and again in the s, the FBI sought information from
libraries about the reading habits of certain individuals. Between 
and , the U.S. Army conducted wide-ranging surveillance, amass-
ing extensive personal information about a broad group of individu-
als. The impetus for the Army’s surveillance was a series of riots that
followed Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.’s assassination. The information
collected involved data about finances, sexual activity, and health. In
, Congress significantly curtailed the Army’s program, and the
records of personal information were eventually destroyed.67
The danger of these information warehousing efforts is not only
that it chills speech or threatens lawful protest, but also that it makes
people more vulnerable by exposing them to potential future dangers
such as leaks, security lapses, and improper arrests. For example, dur-
ing the late s and early s, the Philadelphia Police Department
(PPD) compiled about , files on various dissident individuals
and groups. During a national television broadcast, PPD officials dis-
closed the names of some of the people on whom files were kept.68
Automated Investigations and Profiling. Government agencies are using
personal information in databases to conduct automated investiga-
tions. In , in order to detect fraud, the federal government began
matching its computer employee records with those of people receiv-
ing federal benefits.69 With the use of computers to match records of
different government entities, the government investigated millions
of people. Some matching programs used data obtained from mer-
chants and marketers to discover tax, welfare, and food stamp fraud
as well as to identify drug couriers.70 This sharing of records between
different government agencies, ordinarily a violation of the Privacy
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Act, was justified under the “routine use” exception.71 Computer
matching raised significant concerns, and in , Congress finally
passed a law regulating this practice.72 The law has been strongly criti-
cized as providing scant substantive guidance and having little practi-
cal effect.73
This type of automated investigation is troubling because it alters
the way that government investigations typically take place. Usually,
the government has some form of particularized suspicion, a factual
basis to believe that a particular person may be engaged in illegal
conduct. Particularized suspicion keeps the government’s profound
investigative powers in check, preventing widespread surveillance
and snooping into the lives and affairs of all citizens. Computer
matches, Priscilla Regan contends, investigate everyone, and most
people who are investigated are innocent.74
With the new information supplied by the private sector, there is
an increased potential for more automated investigations, such as
searches for all people who purchase books about particular topics
or those who visit certain websites, or perhaps even people whose
personal interests fit a profile for those likely to engage in certain
forms of criminal activity. Profiles work similarly to the way that
Amazon.com predicts which products customers will want to buy.
They use particular characteristics and patterns of activity to predict
how people will behave in the future. Of course, profiles can be mis-
taken, but they are often accurate enough to tempt people to rely on
them. But there are even deeper problems with profiles beyond inac-
curacies. Profiles can be based on stereotypes, race, or religion. A
profile is only as good as its designer. Profiles are often kept secret,
enabling prejudices and faulty assumptions to exist unchecked by
the public. As Oscar Gandy observes, the use of profiling to form pre-
dictive models of human behavior incorrectly assumes that “the
identity of the individual can be reduced, captured, or represented by
measurable characteristics.” Profiling is an “inherently conservative”
technology because it “tends to reproduce and reinforce assessments
and decisions made in the past.”75 Spiros Simitis explains that a
profiled individual is “necessarily labeled and henceforth seen as a
member of a group, the peculiar features of which are assumed to
constitute her personal characteristics. Whoever appears in the lists
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as a ‘tax-evader,’ ‘assistance-chiseler,’ or ‘porno-film viewer’ must be
constantly aware of being addressed as such.”76
Profiling or automated investigations based on information gath-
ered through digital dossiers can result in targets being inappropri-
ately singled out for more airport searches, police investigations, or
even arrest or detention. Indeed, the federal government recently an-
nounced the creation of CAPPS II, the Computer Assisted Passenger
Prescreening System, which employs computer databases to profile
individuals to determine their threat level when flying. Based on their
profiles, airline passengers are classified as green, yellow, or red. Pas-
sengers labeled green are subject to a normal security check; those in
the yellow category receive additional searching; and those branded
as red are not permitted to fly.77 The government has not released de-
tails about what information is gathered, how people are profiled,
whether race or nationality is a factor, or what ability, if any, people
will have to challenge their classification.
People ensnared in the system face considerable hassle and delay.
For example, in , a -year-old member of the U.S. national row-
ing team was stopped at the gate when flying from Newark to Seattle.
Although born in the United States, the young rower had a Muslim
last name, which was probably a factor that led him to be placed on
the no-fly list. When officials investigated, they cleared him, but it was
too late—his flight had already left. This wasn’t an isolated incident; it
happened to him a few months earlier as well.78 With no way to clear
his name, he remains at risk of being detained, hassled, and delayed
every time he goes to an airport.
Overreacting in Times of Crisis. The government can use dossiers of
personal information in mass roundups of distrusted or suspicious
individuals whenever the political climate is ripe. As legal scholar
Pamela Samuelson observed: “One factor that enabled the Nazis to
efficiently round up, transport, and seize assets of Jews (and others
they viewed as ‘undesirables’) was the extensive repositories of per-
sonal data available not only from the public sector but also from pri-
vate sector sources.”79 In the United States, information archives
greatly assisted the roundups of disfavored groups, including Japan-
ese Americans during World War II. Following the bombing of Pearl
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Harbor on December , , the FBI detained thousands of Japanese
American community leaders in internment camps. These initial
roundups were facilitated by an index of potentially subversive peo-
ple of Japanese descent compiled by the Justice Department begin-
ning in the late s. In , in the name of national security, about
, people of Japanese descent living on the West Coast were im-
prisoned in internment camps. The Census Bureau prepared special
tabulations of Japanese Americans, which assisted in the relocation.80
The acquisition of personal data also facilitated the Palmer Raids
(or “Red Scare”) of –. A bomb blew up at the doorstep of At-
torney General A. Mitchell Palmer’s home.81 Shortly thereafter, bombs
went off in eight other cities. Letter bombs were mailed to many
elites, but most were halted at the post office due to inadequate
postage.82 In a climate rife with fear of “Reds,” anarchists, and labor
unrest, Congress tasked the Bureau of Investigation (the organization
that became the FBI in ) with addressing these terrorist threats.83
Under the direction of a young J. Edgar Hoover, the Bureau of Investi-
gation developed an extensive index of hundreds of thousands of rad-
icals.84 This data was used to conduct a massive series of raids, in
which over , individuals suspected of being Communists were
rounded up, many without warrants.85 The raids resulted in a number
of deportations, many based solely on membership in certain organi-
zations.86 When prominent figures in the legal community such as
Roscoe Pound, Felix Frankfurter, and Zechariah Chafee, Jr., criticized
the raids, Hoover began assembling a dossier on each of them.87
Additionally, personal information gathered by the FBI enabled the
extensive hunt for Communists during the late s and s—a pe-
riod of history that has since been criticized as a severe over-reaction,
resulting in the mistreatment of numerous individuals, and impeding
the reform agenda begun in the New Deal.88 According to historian
Ellen Schrecker, federal agencies’ “bureaucratic interests, including
the desire to present themselves as protecting the community against
the threat of internal subversion, inspired them to exaggerate the
danger of radicalism.”89 Senator Joseph R. McCarthy, the figure who
epitomized the anti-Communism of the s, received substantial
assistance from Hoover, who secretly released information about sus-
pected Communists to McCarthy.90 Further, the FBI supplied a steady
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stream of names of individuals to be called before the House Un-
American Activities Committee (HUAC).91 As historian Richard Pow-
ers observes, “information derived from the [FBI’s] files was clearly
the lifeblood of the Washington anti-communist establishment.”92
The FBI also leaked information about suspected individuals to em-
ployers and the press.93 Public accusations of being a Communist car-
ried an immense stigma and often resulted in a severe public
backlash.94 Individuals exposed as Communists faced retaliation in
the private sector. Numerous journalists, professors, and entertainers
were fired from their jobs and blacklisted from future employment.95
In short, government entities have demonstrated substantial abili-
ties to gather and store personal information. Combined with the ex-
tensive data available about individuals in third party records, this
creates a recipe for similar or greater government abuses in the fu-
ture.
Changing Purposes and Uses. Information obtained by the government
for one purpose can readily be used for another. For example, sup-
pose the government is investigating whether a prominent critic of
the war against terrorism has in any way assisted terrorists or is en-
gaged in terrorism. In tracking an individual’s activities, the govern-
ment does not discover any criminal activity with regard to terrorism,
but discovers that a popular website for downloading music files has
been visited and that copyright laws have been violated. Such infor-
mation may ultimately be used to prosecute copyright violations as a
pretext for the government’s distaste for the individual’s political
views and beliefs. Further, dossiers maintained by law enforcement
organizations can be selectively leaked to attack critics.
Indeed, it is not far-fetched for government officials to amass data
for use in silencing or attacking enemies, critics, undesirables, or rad-
icals. For example, J. Edgar Hoover accumulated an extensive collec-
tion of files with detailed information about the private lives of
numerous prominent individuals, including presidents, members of
Congress, Supreme Court justices, celebrities, civil rights leaders, and
attorney generals.96 Hoover’s data often included sexual activities.97
Hoover used this information to blackmail people or to destroy their
reputations by leaking it. Often, however, he did not even have to
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make any explicit threats. Politicians—and even presidents—feared
that Hoover had damaging information about them and would avoid
criticizing Hoover or attempting to remove him as FBI director. In-
deed, on one of the tapes President Nixon recorded in the Oval Office,
he declared that he could not fire Hoover because Hoover knew too
much information about him.98
We live in a world of mixed and changing motives. Data that is ob-
tained for one purpose can be used for an entirely different purpose
as motives change. For example, for several years, the FBI extensively
wiretapped Martin Luther King, Jr.99 They wiretapped his home, his
office, and the hotel rooms that he stayed at when traveling.100 Based
on the wiretaps, the FBI learned of his extensive partying, extramari-
tal affairs, and other sexual activities. A high-level FBI official even
anonymously sent him a tape with highlights of the FBI’s recordings,
along with a letter that stated:
King, there is only one thing left for you to do. You know what it
is. You have just  days in which to do (this exact number has
been selected for a specific reason, it has definite practical signi-
ficant [sic]). You are done. There is but one way out for you. You
better take it before your filthy, abnormal fraudulent self is bared
to the nation.101
Hoover’s motive is disputed. One theory is that King was wire-
tapped because he was friendly with a person who had previously
been a member of the Communist Party.102 Another theory is that
Hoover despised King personally. Hoover’s longstanding hatred of
King is evidenced by his nasty public statements about King, such as
calling King “the most notorious liar” in the nation.103 This was proba-
bly due, in part, to King’s criticism of the FBI for inadequately ad-
dressing the violence against blacks in the South, Hoover’s
overreaction to any criticism of the FBI, and the FBI’s practice of con-
sistently targeting its critics.104 As David Garrow hypothesizes, the
original reason that the FBI began collecting information about King
was due to fears of Communist ties; however, this motivation
changed once these fears proved unfounded and several powerful in-
dividuals at the FBI expressed distaste for King’s sexual activities and
moral behavior.105
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Protecting Privacy with Architecture
The dangers discussed previously illustrate why privacy is integral to
freedom in the modern state. As I discussed in chapter , we should
move away from the invasion conception and seek to protect privacy
through architectural solutions that regulate power in our various re-
lationships. Protecting privacy through architecture differs from pro-
tecting it as an individual right. Viewing privacy as an individual right
against government information gathering conceives of the harm to
privacy as emanating from the invasion into the lives of particular
people. But many of the people asserting a right to privacy against
government information gathering are criminals or terrorists, people
we do not have a strong desire to protect. In modern Fourth Amend-
ment law, privacy protection is often initiated at the behest of specific
individuals, typically those accused of crimes. Often these individu-
als’ rights conflict with the need for effective law enforcement and the
protection of society. Why should one individual’s preference for pri-
vacy trump the social goals of security and safety? This question is
difficult to answer if privacy is understood as a right possessed by
particular people.
In contrast, architecture protects privacy differently and is based
on a different conception of privacy. Privacy is not merely a right pos-
sessed by individuals, but is a form of freedom built into the social
structure. It is thus an issue about the common good as much as it is
about individual rights. It is an issue about social architecture, about
the relationships that form the structure of our society.
One might dismiss the abuses of government information gather-
ing as caused by a few rogue officials. But according to David Garrow,
the FBI that targeted Martin Luther King, Jr. was not a “deviant insti-
tution in American society, but actually a most representative and
faithful one.”106 In other words, the FBI reflected the mindset of many
Americans, embodying all the flaws of that mindset. We like to blame
individuals, and certainly the particular abusers are worthy of admo-
nition, but we cannot overlook the fact that the causes of abuse often
run deeper than the corrupt official. Abuse is made possible by a bu-
reaucratic machinery that is readily susceptible to manipulation.
Thus, the problem lies in institutional structures and architectures of
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power. In the latter half of the twentieth century, and continuing to
the present, one of the aspects of this architecture has been the lack
of control over government information gathering.
What is the most effective architecture to structure the way that the
government can access personal information held by third parties? In
the next chapter, I discuss two architectures, that of the Fourth
Amendment, which the Court has concluded doesn’t apply to data
held by third parties, and that of the statutory regime which has
arisen in its place.
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The Fourth Amendment,
Records,  and Pr ivacy
The Architecture of the Fourth Amendment
The Purposes and Structure of the Fourth Amendment. For better or for
worse, we currently regulate law enforcement in the United States
with a constitutional regime, comprised primarily by the Fourth,
Fifth, and Sixth Amendments. A significant part of this regime applies
to government information gathering. The Fifth Amendment affords
individuals a privilege against being compelled to testify about in-
criminating information. The Fourth Amendment regulates the gov-
ernment’s power to obtain information through searches and
seizures. Specifically, the Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, pa-
pers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon prob-
able cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.1
Although the Fourth Amendment applies to government activity in
both the civil and criminal contexts,2 it is limited to activities that
constitute “searches” and “seizures.” Certain activities, such as seeing
things exposed openly to public view, are not searches.3 The Fourth
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Amendment only governs searches where an individual has “a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy.”4
If the Fourth Amendment applies, a search or seizure must be “rea-
sonable.” Although technically the two clauses of the Fourth Amend-
ment are separate, the Court has interpreted the requirement that a
search or seizure be reasonable as related to the warrant requirement.
To obtain a warrant, the police must demonstrate to a neutral judge
or magistrate that they have “probable cause,” which means they
must provide “reasonably trustworthy information” that the search
will reveal evidence of a crime.5 Generally, searches and seizures with-
out a warrant are per se unreasonable—which means that they are
deemed invalid.6 This has become known as the “per se warrant
rule.”7
The Court has made numerous exceptions to the per se warrant
rule.8 For example, the Court held in Terry v. Ohio that the police
could stop and frisk an individual without a warrant or probable
cause.9 Further, the Court has held that “special needs” in schools and
workplaces make the warrant and probable cause requirements im-
practicable.10 In the words of legal scholars Silas Wasserstrom and
Louis Michael Seidman, the per se warrant rule “is so riddled with ex-
ceptions, complexities, and contradictions that it has become a trap
for the unwary.”11
The Fourth Amendment is enforced primarily through the exclu-
sionary rule. Evidence obtained in violation of the Amendment must
be excluded from trial.12 Without the exclusionary rule, Justice
Holmes observed, the Fourth Amendment would be a mere “form of
words.”13 According to law professor Arnold Loewy: “The exclusionary
rule protects innocent people by eliminating the incentive to search
and seize unreasonably.”14 The exclusionary rule, however, has long
been a sore spot in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, engendering
extensive debate over its desirability and efficacy.15
Fourth Amendment Scope: Privacy. As applied by the Court, the Fourth
Amendment has focused on protecting against invasions of privacy,16
although some commentators contend this focus is misguided. Ac-
cording to legal scholar William Stuntz, criminal procedure is “firmly
anchored in a privacy value that had already proved inconsistent with
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the modern state.”17 For Stuntz, privacy vis-à-vis the government is
impracticable given the rise of the administrative state, with its exten-
sive health and welfare regulation. Stuntz asserts that robust Fourth
Amendment protection of privacy will prevent the government from
regulating industry, uncovering white-collar crime, and inspecting in-
dustrial facilities. The government must collect information to en-
force certain regulations, such as securities laws and worker safety
protections.18 “By focusing on privacy,” Stuntz argues, “Fourth
Amendment law has largely abandoned the due process cases’ con-
cern with coercion and violence.”19 “The problem,” argues Stuntz, “is
not information gathering but [police] violence.”20
Legal scholar Scott Sundby offers a different critique of the Fourth
Amendment’s focus on privacy. Although designed to expand Fourth
Amendment protection, privacy has “turned out to contain the seeds
for the later contraction of Fourth Amendment rights.”21 “The Fourth
Amendment as a privacy-focused doctrine has not fared well with the
changing times of an increasingly nonprivate world and a judicial re-
luctance to expand individual rights.”22
However, Sundby assumes that “privacy” means what the Court
says it means. Many current problems in Fourth Amendment ju-
risprudence stem from the Court’s failure to conceptualize privacy
adequately, both in method and substance. Methodologically, the
Court has attempted to adhere to a unified conception of privacy.
Conceptualizing privacy by attempting to isolate its essence or com-
mon denominator has inhibited the Court from conceptualizing pri-
vacy in a way that can adapt to changing technology and social
practices.23 Substantively, the Court originally conceptualized privacy
in physical terms as protecting tangible property or preventing tres-
passes. The Court then shifted to viewing privacy with the secrecy
paradigm. In each of these conceptual paradigms, the Court has
rigidly adhered to a single narrow conception and has lost sight of the
Fourth Amendment’s larger purposes.
In contrast, I contend that the Fourth Amendment provides for an
architecture, a structure of protection that safeguards a range of diff-
erent social practices of which privacy forms an integral dimension.
Those like Stuntz and Sundby who contend that the Fourth Amend-
ment should not concern itself with privacy fail to see the importance
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of privacy in the relationship between the government and the Peo-
ple. The private life is a critical point for the exercise of power. Privacy
shields aspects of our lives and social practices where people feel vul-
nerable, uneasy, and fragile, where social norms and judgment are
particularly oppressive and abrasive. It is also implicated when infor-
mation relates to our basic needs and desires: finances, employment,
entertainment, political activity, sexuality, and family. Indeed, the
great distopian novels of the twentieth century—George Orwell’s
1984, Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World, and Franz Kafka’s The Trial—
all illustrate how government exercises of power over the private life
stifle freedom and well-being.
Although Stuntz contends that the Fourth Amendment must for-
sake privacy because of the rise of the administrative state, this is the
very reason why protecting privacy is imperative. The administrative
state threatens to equip the government with excessive power that
could destroy the Framers’ careful design to ensure that the power of
the People remains the strongest.24 In particular, the extensive power
of modern bureaucracies over individuals depends in significant part
on the collection and use of personal information. While Stuntz is
correct that the Fourth Amendment should not be cabined exclu-
sively to protecting privacy and should address other values such as
coercion and violence, he errs in treating privacy and police coercion
as mutually exclusive.25
Robust Fourth Amendment protection need not be inconsistent
with the administrative state, as a significant amount of modern ad-
ministrative regulation concerns business and commercial activities
which lack Fourth Amendment rights equivalent to those guaranteed
to individuals.26 Stuntz retorts that for individuals to have a meaning-
ful protection of privacy, they must be provided with privacy within
institutions, which “is almost the same as giving the institution itself a
protectible privacy interest.”27 Beyond this, Stuntz contends, “a great
deal of government information gathering targets individuals,” such
as the information that is gathered in tax forms.28 However, one need
not adopt an all-or-nothing approach to Fourth Amendment privacy.
The Fourth Amendment does not categorically prohibit the govern-
ment from compelling certain disclosures by individuals or institu-
tions. If it did, then the tax system and much corporate regulation
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would be nearly impossible to administer. But the fact that the gov-
ernment can compel certain disclosures does not mean that it can
compel people to disclose the details of their sexual lives or require
them to send in their diaries along with their tax forms. The govern-
ment’s power to inspect factories for safety violations does not mean
that the government should be able to search every employee’s office,
locker, or bag. Therefore, although misconceptualizing privacy, the
Court has correctly made it a focal point of the Fourth Amendment.
Fourth Amendment Structure: Warrants. Before eroding it with dozens of
exceptions, the Court made the Fourth Amendment’s warrant re-
quirement one of the central mechanisms to ensure that the govern-
ment was responsibly exercising its powers of information collection.
Some critics, however, view warrants as relatively unimportant in the
Fourth Amendment scheme. According to constitutional law expert
Akhil Amar, the Fourth Amendment “does not require, presuppose, or
even prefer warrants—it limits them. Unless warrants meet certain
strict standards, they are per se unreasonable.”29 Amar contends that
the colonial revolutionaries viewed warrants with disdain because
judges were highly influenced by the Crown and warrants immunized
government officials from civil liability after conducting a search.30
Therefore, according to Amar, “[t]he core of the Fourth Amendment,
as we have seen, is neither a warrant nor probable cause, but reason-
ableness.”31
Amar is too dismissive of warrants. Merely looking to colonial
precedents is insufficient, because the Fourth Amendment did not
follow colonial precedents (since general searches were rampant) but
rejected them.32 My aim, however, is not to quarrel about original in-
tent. Even if Amar is right about the Framers’ intent, warrants are an
important device in our times since, as Scott Sundby observes, “the
Founders could not have foreseen the technological and regulatory
reach of government intrusions that exists today.”33
The warrant requirement embodies two important insights of the
Framers that particularly hold true today. First, the warrant require-
ment aims to prevent searches from turning into “fishing expedi-
tions.”34 Accordingly, the warrant clause circumscribes searches and
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seizures. As the Fourth Amendment states, a warrant must describe
with “particular[ity] . . . the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.”35
The Framers included the warrant clause because of their experi-
ence with writs of assistance and general warrants.36 A writ of assis-
tance was a document that allowed British customs officials to force
local officials and even private citizens to search and seize prohibited
goods.37 Writs of assistance didn’t need to specify a particular person
or place to be targeted; anyone could be searched under their author-
ity; and they resulted in “sweeping searches and seizures without any
evidentiary basis.”38 Like writs of assistance, general warrants had a
very broad scope, and they did not need to mention specific individu-
als to target or specific locations to be searched. They “resulted in
‘ransacking’ and seizure of the personal papers of political dissenters,
authors, and printers of seditious libel.”39 As Patrick Henry declared:
“They may, unless the general government be restrained by a bill of
rights, or some similar restrictions, go into your cellars and rooms,
and search, ransack, and measure, everything you eat, drink, and
wear. They ought to be restrained within proper bounds.”40
Second, warrants reflect James Madison’s vision of the appropriate
architecture for a society in which the power of the People remains
paramount. Writing about separation of powers in Federalist No. 51,
Madison observed:
But what is government itself but the greatest of all reflections on
human nature? If men were angels, no government would be
necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor in-
ternal controuls on government would be necessary. In framing
a government which is to be administered by men over men, the
great difficulty lies in this: You must first enable the government
to controul the governed; and in the next place, oblige it to con-
troul itself. A dependence on the people is no doubt the primary
controul on the government; but experience has taught mankind
the necessity of auxiliary precautions.41
The profound insight of Madison and the Framers was that by sep-
arating government powers between different entities and pitting
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them against each other, government could be controlled. As legal
scholar Raymond Ku aptly observes, the Framers adopted the Fourth
Amendment based on concerns about limiting executive power.42
Madison was acutely aware that the “parchment barriers” of the Con-
stitution would fail to check government encroachments of power,
and he explained how both the legislative and executive branches
could overstep their bounds.43 He arrived at an architectural solution:
Power should be diffused among different departments of govern-
ment, each afforded “the necessary constitutional means, and per-
sonal motives, to resist encroachments of the others.” Government
will be kept in check only if its parts consist of “opposite and rival in-
terests.”44 As historian Gordon Wood describes the Madisonian vision:
It was an imposing conception—a kinetic theory of politics—
such a crumbling of political and social interests, such an atom-
ization of authority, such a parceling of power, not only in the
governmental institutions but in the extended sphere of the soci-
ety itself, creating such a multiplicity and a scattering of designs
and passions, so many checks, that no combination of parts
could hold, no group of evil interests could long cohere. Yet out
of the clashing and checking of this diversity, Madison believed
the public good, the true perfection of the whole, would some-
how arise.45
The warrant requirement reflects Madison’s philosophy of govern-
ment power by inserting the judicial branch in the middle of the exec-
utive branch’s investigation process.46 Although warrants have been
criticized as ineffective because judges and magistrates often defer to
the police and prosecutor’s determination, criminal procedure expert
Christopher Slobogin aptly contends that warrants raise the “stan-
dard of care” of law enforcement officials by forcing them to “docu-
ment their requests for authorization.”47 According to Stuntz,
warrants make searching more expensive, because they require law
enforcement officials to “draft affidavits and wait around court-
houses.”48 Because officers must devote time to obtaining a warrant,
they are unlikely to use them unless they think it is likely that they will
find what they are looking for.49 As Justice Douglas has explained for
the Court:
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[T]he Fourth Amendment has interposed a magistrate between
the citizen and the police. This was done neither to shield crimi-
nals nor to make the home a safe haven for illegal activities. It
was done so that an objective mind might weigh the need to in-
vade that privacy in order to enforce the law. The right of privacy
was deemed too precious to entrust to the discretion of those
whose job is the detection of crime and the arrest of criminals.
Power is a heady thing; and history shows that the police acting
on their own cannot be trusted. And so the Constitution requires
a magistrate to pass on the desires of the police before they vio-
late the privacy of the home.50
Further, the requirement of prior approval prevents government
officials from “dreaming up post hoc rationalizations”51 and judges
from experiencing hindsight bias when evaluating the propriety of a
search after it has taken place.52
My purpose is not to defend the existing structure of the Fourth
Amendment as perfect. For the purposes of this discussion, it is suffi-
cient to agree () that the Fourth Amendment regime serves an impor-
tant function by establishing an architecture that aims to protect
privacy in addition to other values, and () that one of the central fea-
tures of this architecture requires neutral and external oversight of
the executive branch’s power to gather and use personal information.
Even if its efficacy is limited, the structure of the Fourth Amend-
ment is better than a void. Few commentators have suggested that
the Fourth Amendment be repealed or that its larger purposes in con-
trolling government power are inimical to a well-functioning society.
Outside the realm of the Fourth Amendment is a great wilderness, a
jungle of government discretion and uncontrolled power. Thus, the
issue of the applicability of the Fourth Amendment is an important
one, and to that issue I now turn.
The Shifting Paradigms of Fourth Amendment Privacy
Some notion of privacy has always been the trigger for Fourth
Amendment protection, at least since the late nineteenth century. In
, in Boyd v. United States,53 an early case delineating the meaning
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of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, the government attempted to
subpoena a person’s private papers for use in a civil forfeiture pro-
ceeding. The Court held that the subpoena violated the Fourth and
Fifth Amendments, since it invaded the individual’s “indefeasible
right of personal security, personal liberty and private property.”54
Commentators have characterized Boyd as protecting property
and as consistent with the exaltation of property and contract during
the Lochner era.55 The Lochner era was a period of Supreme Court ju-
risprudence lasting from about  through . The case that epit-
omized this era was Lochner v. New York, where the Court struck
down a law restricting the number of hours that bakery employees
could work to  a week. The Court concluded that the law infringed
upon the constitutional guarantee of liberty of contract.56 When the
Court also nullified many other progressive laws and New Deal
statutes for similar reasons, it was denounced for adhering too strictly
to an ideology of laissez faire and unbridled commercial activity.57
Although Boyd certainly furthers the ideology of the Lochner Court,
it should not merely be dismissed as the product of Lochner-like ac-
tivism. Boyd follows a conception of privacy that the Court consis-
tently adhered to in the late nineteenth century and the first half of
the twentieth century. Under this conception, the Court viewed inva-
sions of privacy as a type of physical incursion. For example, nine
years prior to Boyd, in , the Court held in Ex Parte Jackson that the
Fourth Amendment applied to the opening of letters sent through the
postal system: “The constitutional guaranty of the right of the people
to be secure in their papers against unreasonable searches and
seizures extends to their papers, thus closed against inspection,
wherever they may be.”58 Additionally, privacy also concerned physi-
cal bodily intrusions. In Union Pacific Railway Company v. Botsford,
an  case concerning privacy but not directly involving the Fourth
Amendment, the Court held that a court could not compel a female
plaintiff in a civil action to submit to a surgical examination:
The inviolability of the person is as much invaded by a compul-
sory stripping and exposure as by a blow. To compel any one,
and especially a woman, to lay bare the body, or to submit it to
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the touch of a stranger, without lawful authority, is an indignity,
an assault, and a trespass.59
Consistent with Boyd and Ex Parte Jackson, the Court readily rec-
ognized the injury caused by physical intrusions such as trespass-
ing into homes, rummaging through one’s things, seizing one’s
papers, opening and examining one’s letters, or physically touching
one’s body. Indeed, in , when Warren and Brandeis authored
their famous article The Right to Privacy, they observed that the law,
which had long recognized physical and tangible injuries, was just
beginning to recognize incorporeal ones.60 Warren and Brandeis ar-
gued that privacy was more than simply a physical intrusion, a view
increasingly recognized in the common law of torts in the early
twentieth century. However, in its Fourth Amendment jurispru-
dence, the Court held fast to its physical intrusion conception of
privacy.
The Court’s view that Fourth Amendment privacy constituted pro-
tection from physical intrusions came to a head in  in Olmstead v.
United States.61 There, the Court held that the tapping of a person’s
home telephone outside a person’s house did not run afoul of the
Fourth Amendment because it did not involve a trespass inside a per-
son’s home: “The Amendment does not forbid what was done here.
There was no searching. There was no seizure. The evidence was se-
cured by the use of the sense of hearing and that only. There was no
entry of the houses or offices of the defendants.”62 Olmstead relied
upon the Court’s physical intrusion conception of privacy. Since there
was no trespassing, opening, or rummaging, there was no invasion of
Fourth Amendment privacy.
Justice Louis Brandeis vigorously dissented, chastising the Court
for failing to adapt the Constitution to new problems. He observed:
“When the Fourth and Fifth Amendments were adopted, the form
that evil had theretofore taken had been necessarily simple.”63 The
government “could secure possession of [a person’s] papers and other
articles incident to his private life—a seizure effected, if need be, by
breaking and entry.”64 But technological developments, Brandeis ar-
gued, have created new threats to privacy:
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[T]ime works changes, brings into existence new conditions and
purposes. Subtler and more far-reaching means of invading pri-
vacy have become available to the government. Discovery and
invention have made it possible for the government, by means
far more effective than stretching upon the rack, to obtain dis-
closure in court of what is whispered in the closet.65
The Court, however, continued to follow the Olmstead conception
of privacy in subsequent cases. In Goldman v. United States, for exam-
ple, the police placed a device called a “detectaphone” on the wall
next to a person’s office, enabling them to eavesdrop on the conversa-
tions inside the office. The Court concluded that since there had been
no physical trespass into the office, the Fourth Amendment had not
been violated.66
In , nearly  years after Olmstead, the Court in Katz v. United
States finally abandoned the physical intrusion conception of privacy
and adopted the Fourth Amendment approach employed today. Katz
involved the electronic eavesdropping of a telephone conversation
made by a person in a phone booth. Explicitly overruling Olmstead
and Goldman, the Court declared: “What a person knowingly exposes
to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of
Fourth Amendment protection. But what he seeks to preserve as pri-
vate, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally
protected.”67
The Court’s approach to determining the applicability of the
Fourth Amendment emerged from Justice Harlan’s concurrence in
Katz. The “reasonable expectation of privacy test” looks to whether ()
a person exhibits an “actual or subjective expectation of privacy” and
() “the expectation [is] one that society is prepared to recognize as
‘reasonable.’”68
Brandeis’s dissent in Olmstead only partially won the day in Katz.
Instead of adopting a conception of privacy that was adaptable to
new technology, as the reasonable expectation of privacy test initially
promised to be, the Court rigidified its approach with a particular
conception of privacy—the secrecy paradigm. The Court based this
new conception on the language in Katz that privacy turned on what
a person exposed to the public. In this way, privacy was conceptual-
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ized as a form of secrecy, and people couldn’t have a reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy in information that was not kept secret.
The full implications of this new conception of privacy are dis-
cussed in the next section. Before turning to this issue, it is important
to observe the effects of the Court’s failure to reconceptualize privacy
in Olmstead. As a result of the nearly  years between Olmstead and
Katz, there was little control over the burgeoning use of electronic
surveillance, one of the most powerful technological law enforce-
ment tools developed during the twentieth century. The Fourth
Amendment stood by silently as this new technology proliferated.
At the time of Olmstead, many viewed wiretapping with great un-
ease. Justice Holmes called it a “dirty business.”69 Even J. Edgar
Hoover, who later became one of the greatest abusers of wiretapping,
testified in  that wiretapping was “unethical” and that he would
fire any FBI employee who engaged in it.70
In , just six years after Olmstead, Congress enacted § of the
Federal Communications Act, making wiretapping a federal crime.
However, § was practically impotent. It did not apply to wiretap-
ping by state police or private parties. Nor did it apply to bugging.
Further, it only precluded the disclosure of tapped communications
in court proceedings.71 Thus, the FBI could wiretap so long as it didn’t
try to use any of the results in court.72
Gradually, presidents gave the FBI increasing authority to wire-
tap.73 In World War II, the FBI gained authorization to engage in wire-
tapping to investigate national security threats. Later, the
authorization expanded to encompass domestic security. The fear of
communism during the s allowed the FBI to intensify its use of
electronic surveillance.74
Widespread abuses began to occur. Hoover’s misconduct was
egregious. He wiretapped critics of the FBI, enemies of his political
allies, and practically anybody whose political views he disliked. As
discussed earlier, he engaged in massive electronic surveillance of
Martin Luther King, Jr. Presidents also misused the FBI’s wiretap-
ping power for their own political purposes. President Nixon or-
dered extensive wiretapping, including surveillance of his own
speechwriter, William Safire.75 Presidents Kennedy and Johnson also
ordered electronic surveillances inappropriately.76 With regard to
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pre-Katz wiretapping by the states, an influential study led by Samuel
Dash concluded that  percent of state wiretapping lacked court au-
thorization and that state regulation of wiretapping had been largely
ineffective against abuses.77
Thus, for  years, the government’s power to engage in electronic
surveillance fell outside of the reach of the Fourth Amendment, and
the legislation that filled the void was ineffective. Today, history is
in the process of repeating itself. The Court has made a mistake
similar to Olmstead, and it is one with severe and far-reaching im-
plications.
The New Olmstead
Although we have moved from the Olmstead physical intrusion con-
ception of privacy to a new regime based upon expectations of pri-
vacy, there is a new Olmstead, one that is just as shortsighted and
rigid in approach. The Court’s new conception of privacy is the se-
crecy paradigm. If any information is exposed to the public or if law
enforcement officials can view something from any public vantage
point, then the Court has refused to recognize a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy.
For example, in Florida v. Riley, the Court held that a person did
not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his enclosed green-
house because a few roof panels were missing and the police were
able to fly over it with a helicopter.78 In California v. Greenwood, the
police searched plastic garbage bags that the defendant had left on
the curb to be collected by the trash collector. The Court held that
there was no reasonable expectation of privacy in the trash because
“[i]t is common knowledge that plastic bags left on or at the side of a
public street are readily accessible to animals, children, scavengers,
snoops, and other members of the public.”79 Trash is left at the curb
“for the express purpose of conveying it to a third party, the trash col-
lector, who might himself have sorted through [the] trash or permit-
ted others, such as the police, to do so.”80
Consistent with this conception of privacy, the Court held that
there is no reasonable expectation in privacy for information known
or exposed to third parties. In United States v. Miller, federal agents
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presented subpoenas to two banks to produce the defendant’s finan-
cial records. The defendant argued that the Fourth Amendment re-
quired a warrant, not a subpoena, but the Court concluded that the
Amendment didn’t apply. There is no reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy in the records, the Court reasoned, because the information is
“revealed to a third party.”81 Thus, “checks are not confidential com-
munications but negotiable instruments to be used in commercial
transactions. All of the documents obtained, including financial
statements and deposit slips, contain only information voluntarily
conveyed to the banks and exposed to their employees in the ordi-
nary course of business.”82
The Court used similar reasoning in Smith v. Maryland. Without a
warrant, the police asked a telephone company to use a pen register,
which is a device installed at the phone company to record the num-
bers dialed from the defendant’s home. The Court concluded that
since people “know that they must convey numerical information to
the phone company,” they cannot “harbor any general expectation
that the numbers they dial will remain secret.”83
Miller and Smith establish a general rule that if information is in
the hands of third parties, then an individual lacks a reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy in that information, which means that the Fourth
Amendment does not apply.84 Individuals thus probably do not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in communications and records
maintained by ISPs or computer network administrators.85 The third
party record doctrine stems from the secrecy paradigm. If informa-
tion is not completely secret, if it is exposed to others, then it loses its
status as private. Smith and Miller have been extensively criticized
throughout the past several decades. However, it is only recently that
we are beginning to see the profound implications of the third party
doctrine. Smith and Miller are the new Olmstead and Goldman. Gath-
ering information from third party records is an emerging law en-
forcement practice with as many potential dangers as the
wiretapping in Olmstead. “The progress of science in furnishing the
government with means of espionage is not likely to stop with wire-
tapping,” Justice Brandeis observed in his Olmstead dissent. “Ways
may some day be developed by which the government, without re-
moving papers from secret drawers, can reproduce them in court,
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and by which it will be enabled to expose to a jury the most intimate
occurrences of the home.”86
That day is here. The government’s harvesting of information from
the extensive dossiers being assembled with modern computer tech-
nology poses one of the most significant threats to privacy of our
times.87
The Emerging Statutory Regime and Its Limits
Throughout the twentieth century, when the Supreme Court held that
the Fourth Amendment was inapplicable to new practices or technol-
ogy, Congress often responded by passing statutes that afforded some
level of protection. Through a series of statutes, Congress has estab-
lished a regime regulating government access to third party records.
This regime erects a particular architecture significantly different
from that of the Fourth Amendment. Unfortunately, this regime is
woefully inadequate.
Procedural Requirements to Obtain Information. The most significant
deficiency is that a majority of the statutes permit government access
to third party records with only a court order or subpoena—a signifi-
cant departure from the Fourth Amendment, which generally re-
quires warrants supported by probable cause to be issued by a
neutral and detached judge. Unlike warrants, subpoenas do not re-
quire probable cause and can be issued without judicial approval.
Prosecutors, not neutral judicial officers, can issue subpoenas.88 Ac-
cording to Stuntz: “[W]hile searches typically require probable cause
or reasonable suspicion and sometimes require a warrant, subpoenas
require nothing, save that the subpoena not be unreasonably burden-
some to its target. Few burdens are deemed unreasonable.”89 Accord-
ing to legal scholar Ronald Degnan, subpoenas are not issued “with
great circumspection” and are often “handed out blank in batches
and filled in by lawyers.”90 As Stuntz contends, federal subpoena
power is “akin to a blank check.”91
Prosecutors can also use grand jury subpoenas to obtain third
party records.92 Grand jury subpoenas are “presumed to be reason-
able” and may only be quashed if “there is no reasonable possibility
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that the category of materials the Government seeks will produce in-
formation relevant to the general subject of the grand jury investiga-
tion.”93 As Stuntz observes, grand jury subpoenas “are much less
heavily regulated” than search warrants:
As long as the material asked for is relevant to the grand jury’s in-
vestigation and as long as compliance with the subpoena is not
too burdensome, the subpoena is enforced. No showing of prob-
able cause or reasonable suspicion is necessary, and courts
measure relevance and burden with a heavy thumb on the gov-
ernment’s side of the scales.94
Therefore, courts “quash or modify” subpoenas only “if compli-
ance would be unreasonable or oppressive.”95 Further, “judges decide
these motions by applying vague legal standards case by case.”96
Court orders under most of the statutes are not much more con-
strained than subpoenas. They typically require mere “relevance” to
an ongoing criminal investigation, a standard significantly lower and
looser than probable cause.
The problem with subpoenas and court orders is that they supply
the judiciary with greatly attenuated oversight powers. The role of the
judge in issuing or reviewing subpoenas is merely to determine
whether producing records is overly burdensome. With this focus,
financial hardship in producing information would give courts more
pause when reviewing subpoenas than would threats to privacy. The
role of the judiciary in court orders is also quite restricted. Instead of
requiring probable cause, court orders require the government to
demonstrate that records are “relevant” to a criminal investigation, a
much weaker standard. In short, judicial involvement with subpoe-
nas and court orders amounts to little more than a rubber stamp of
judicial legitimacy.
Wiretapping and Bugging. When the Court held in Olmstead that the
Fourth Amendment did not apply to wiretapping, Congress re-
sponded six years later by enacting § of the Federal Communica-
tions Act of . As discussed earlier, § was far too narrow and
limited. In , a year after the Court in Katz declared that the Fourth
Amendment applied to wiretapping, Congress enacted Title III of the
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Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act,97 which greatly strength-
ened the law of wiretapping, extending its reach to state officials and
private parties. In , Congress amended Title III with the Elec-
tronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA). The ECPA restructured
Title III into three parts, known as the “Wiretap Act,” which governs
the interception of communications; the “Stored Communications
Act,” which covers access to stored communications and records; and
the “Pen Register Act,” which regulates pen registers and trap and
trace devices.98
The Wiretap Act covers wiretapping and bugging. It applies when a
communication is intercepted during transmission. The Act has strict
requirements for obtaining a court order to engage in electronic sur-
veillance.99 In certain respects, the Wiretap Act’s requirements are
stricter than those for a Fourth Amendment search warrant.100 It also
requires that the surveillance “minimize the interception of commu-
nications” not related to the investigation. The Act is enforced with an
exclusionary rule.101
However, the interception of electronic communications not in-
volving the human voice (such as email) is not protected with an ex-
clusionary rule. Although the Wiretap Act has substantial protections,
it covers ground already protected by the Fourth Amendment. In ar-
eas not protected by the Fourth Amendment, the architecture of the
statutory regime is much weaker and more porous.
Stored Communications. Communications service providers frequently
store their customers’ communications. ISPs temporarily store email
until it is downloaded by the recipient. Many ISPs enable users to
keep copies of previously read email on the ISP’s server, as well as
copies of their sent emails. Since a third party maintains the informa-
tion, the Fourth Amendment may not apply.102
The Stored Communications Act provides some protection, but
unfortunately it is quite confusing and its protection is limited. Elec-
tronic storage is defined as “any temporary, intermediate storage of a
wire or electronic communication incidental to the electronic trans-
mission thereof,” and “any storage of such communication by an
electronic communication service for purposes of backup protec-
tion.”103 This definition clearly covers email that is waiting on the ISP’s
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server to be downloaded. But what about previously read email that
remains on the ISP’s server? According to the Department of Justice’s
(DOJ) interpretation of the Act, the email is no longer in temporary
storage, and is therefore “simply a remotely stored file.”104 The Act per-
mits law enforcement officials to access it merely by issuing a sub-
poena to the ISP.105 And in contrast to the Wiretap Act, the Stored
Communications Act does not have an exclusionary rule.
Communications Service Records. The Stored Communications Act also
regulates government access to a customer’s communications service
records, which consist of the customer’s name, address, phone num-
bers, payment information, and services used.106 One of the most im-
portant pieces of information in ISP records is the customer’s
identity. An ISP may have information linking a customer’s screen
name to her real name. Thus, an ISP often holds the key to one’s abil-
ity to communicate anonymously on the Internet. The government
often wants to obtain this information to identify a particular
speaker. To access customer records, the government must obtain a
court order, which requires “specific and articulable facts showing
that there are reasonable grounds to believe that . . . the records or
other information sought, are relevant and material to an ongoing
criminal investigation.”107 Further, since the Act lacks an exclusionary
rule, information obtained in violation of the law can still be intro-
duced in court.108
Pen Registers, Email Headers, and Websurfing. The Pen Register Act at-
tempts to fill the void left by Smith v. Maryland by requiring a court
order to use a pen register or trap and trace device.109 Whereas a pen
register records the phone numbers a person dials from her home, a
trap and trace device creates a list of the telephone numbers of in-
coming calls. The USA-PATRIOT Act, passed in  shortly after the
September th attacks, expanded the scope of the Pen Register Act.
The definition of a pen register now extends beyond phone num-
bers to also encompass addressing information on emails and IP
addresses. An IP address is the unique address assigned to a particu-
lar computer connected to the Internet. All computers connected to
the Internet have one. Consequently, a list of IP addresses accessed
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reveals the various websites that a person has visited. Because web-
sites are often distinctively tailored to particular topics and interests,
a comprehensive list of them can reveal a lot about a person’s life. The
court order to obtain this information, however, only requires the
government to demonstrate that “the information likely to be ob-
tained . . . is relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation.”110 Courts
cannot look beyond the certification nor inquire into the truthfulness
of the facts in the application. Once the government official makes
the proper certification, the court must issue the order.111 As one court
has observed, the “judicial role in approving use of trap and trace de-
vices is ministerial in nature.”112 Finally, there is no exclusionary rule
for Pen Register Act violations.
Financial Records. Two years after United States v. Miller, Congress
filled the void with the Right to Financial Privacy Act (RFPA) of ,
which requires the government to obtain a warrant or subpoena to
access records from banks or other financial institutions.113 However,
the subpoena merely requires a “reason to believe that the records
sought are relevant to a legitimate law enforcement inquiry.”114 When
subpoena authority is not available to the government, the govern-
ment need only submit a formal written request for the informa-
tion.115
In addition to banks, credit reporting agencies have detailed
records for nearly every adult American consumer. Under the Fair
Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) of , a consumer reporting agency
“may furnish identifying information respecting any consumer, lim-
ited to his name, address, former addresses, places of employment, or
former places of employment, to a governmental agency.”116 Thus, the
government can simply request this information without any court
involvement. And the government can obtain more information with
a court order or grand jury subpoena.117 Since the FCRA focuses on
credit reporting agencies, it doesn’t prohibit the recipients of credit
reports from disclosing them to the government.
Although the RFPA and FCRA protect financial information main-
tained by banks and credit reporting agencies, the government can
obtain financial information from employers, landlords, merchants,
creditors, and database companies, among others. Therefore, finan-
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cial records are protected based only on which entities possess them.
Thus, the statutory regime merely provides partial protection of
financial data.
Electronic Media Entertainment Records. The statutory regime protects
records pertaining to certain forms of electronic media entertain-
ment. Under the Cable Communications Policy Act (Cable Act) of
,118 a government official must obtain a court order in order to ob-
tain cable records. The government must offer “clear and convincing
evidence that the subject of the information is reasonably suspected
of engaging in criminal activity and that the information sought
would be material evidence in the case.”119 People can “appear and
contest” the court order.120 This standard is more stringent than the
Fourth Amendment’s probable cause and warrant requirements.
However, there is no exclusionary rule under the Cable Act.
In addition to cable records, the statutory regime also protects
videotape rental records. The Video Privacy Protection Act (VPPA) of
 states that a videotape service provider may disclose customer
records to law enforcement officials “pursuant to a warrant . . . , an
equivalent State warrant, a grand jury subpoena, or a court order.”121
Unlike the Cable Act, the level of protection under the VPPA is much
less stringent.
Although the statutory regime protects the records of certain forms
of electronic media entertainment, it fails to protect the records of
many others. For example, records from music stores, electronics
merchants, and Internet media entities are afforded no protection.
Medical Records. Our medical records are maintained by third parties.
Could the third party doctrine extend to medical records? On the one
hand, given the considerable privacy protection endowed upon the
patient-physician relationship, the third party doctrine may stop at
the hospital door.122 On the other hand, the doctrine applies to
records of financial institutions, which also have a tradition of main-
taining the confidentiality of their customers’ information.123 Unless
the patient-physician relationship is distinguished from banks, the
third party doctrine logically could apply to medical records. How-
ever, the Supreme Court has yet to push the doctrine this far.
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The federal health privacy rules under the Health Insurance Porta-
bility and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of  apparently view medical
records as falling under the third party doctrine. The rules permit law
enforcement officials to access medical records with a mere sub-
poena.124 Health information may also be disclosed “in response to a
law enforcement official’s request for such information for the pur-
pose of identifying or locating a suspect, fugitive, material witness, or
missing person.”125
Moreover, not all health records are covered by HIPAA. Only
records maintained by health plans, health care clearinghouses, and
health care providers are covered.126 Although doctors, hospitals,
pharmacists, health insurers, and HMOs are covered, not all third
parties possessing our medical information fall under HIPAA. For ex-
ample, the sale of nonprescription drugs and the rendering of med-
ical advice by many Internet health websites are not covered by
HIPAA.127 Therefore, while certain health records are protected, others
are not.
Holes in the Regime. Federal statutes provide some coverage of the
void left by the inapplicability of the Fourth Amendment to records
held by third parties. Although the statutes apply to communication
records, financial records, entertainment records, and health records,
these are only protected when in the hands of particular third parties.
Thus, the statutory regime does not protect records based on the type
of information contained in the records, but protects them based on
the particular types of third parties that possess them.
Additionally, there are gaping holes in the statutory regime of pro-
tection, with classes of records not protected at all. Such records in-
clude those of merchants, both online and offline. Records held by
bookstores, department stores, restaurants, clubs, gyms, employers,
and other companies are not protected. Additionally, all the personal
information amassed in profiles by database companies is not cov-
ered. Records maintained by Internet retailers and websites are often
not considered “communications” under the ECPA; the government
can access these records and the ECPA doesn’t apply. Thus, the statu-
tory regime is limited in its scope and has glaring omissions and gaps.
Further, the statutes are often complicated and confusing, and their
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protection turns on technical distinctions that can leave wide fields of
information virtually unprotected.
Therefore, the current statutory regime is inadequate. As warrants
supported by probable cause are replaced by subpoenas and court
orders supported by “articulable facts” that are “relevant” to an inves-
tigation, the role of the judge in the process is diminished to nothing
more than a decorative seal of approval. And since there are numer-
ous holes in the regime, there are many circumstances when neither
court orders nor subpoenas are required. The government can simply
ask for the information. An individual’s privacy is protected only by
the vague and toothless privacy policies of the companies holding
their information.
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Reconstruct ing 
the Architecture
Today, much of our personal information is finding its way into the
hands of third parties. Moreover, given the Court’s current conception
of privacy under the Fourth Amendment, the architecture that regu-
lates many of the government’s information gathering practices is in-
creasingly that of a confusing and gap-riddled statutory regime.
One solution to fill the void is for the Court to reverse Smith v.
Maryland and United States v. Miller. Although Fourth Amendment
architecture is significantly more protective than that of the statutory
regime, the problem of how to regulate government access to third
party records is not adequately addressed by Fourth Amendment ar-
chitecture alone. As discussed earlier, the principal remedy for Fourth
Amendment violations is the exclusionary rule, which prevents the
government from introducing improperly obtained data during a
criminal prosecution. However, many information acquisition abuses
often occur in the absence of prosecutions. Therefore, the exclusion-
ary rule alone is not sufficiently protective.
A better architecture to regulate government information gather-
ing from third parties should be constructed. In particular, such an
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architecture should prevent the types of problems associated with
government information gathering discussed earlier in chapter . An
architecture should strive for three goals: minimization, particular-
ization, and control.
First, government information gathering should be minimized.
Sweeping investigations and vast stores of personal data in the hands
of government entities present significant opportunities for the prob-
lematic uses discussed earlier.
Second, efforts at amassing data should be particularized to
specific individuals suspected of criminal involvement. Particulariza-
tion requires law enforcement officials to exercise care in selecting
the individuals who should be investigated, and it prevents dragnet
investigations that primarily involve innocent people. One of the
most important aspects of keeping the government under control is
to prevent its investigatory powers from being turned loose on the
population at large.
Third, government information gathering and use must be con-
trolled. There must be some meaningful form of supervision over the
government’s information gathering activity to ensure that it remains
minimized and particularized. The government’s use of information
must be controlled to prevent abuses and security lapses.
The aims of the architecture, however, are not the most difficult is-
sue. Substantively, the architecture needs a scope. Which information
gathering activities should be regulated? Procedurally, the architec-
ture needs a mechanism for carrying out its aims. What type of struc-
tural controls should an architecture adopt?
Scope: System of Records
An architecture begins with substance. It must provide guidance
about which information gathering activities it governs. What is the
appropriate scope of an architecture that regulates government infor-
mation gathering? In particular, should the architecture cover all in-
stances where the government gathers personal data from third
parties? Restricting all information collection from third parties
would prevent law enforcement officials from eliciting initial infor-
mation essential to develop sufficient evidence to establish probable
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cause. In the early stages of an investigation, the police frequently talk
to victims, witnesses, friends, and neighbors. The police often find
out about a crime when people voluntarily report suspicious activity.
These examples all involve third parties who possess information
about the person being investigated. If the architecture encompasses
all third parties, then it might unduly constrain police investigations.
Consequently, a line must be drawn to distinguish the instances
where third parties can voluntarily supply information to the govern-
ment and where the government will be prohibited from accessing
information. Although we may want to prevent Amazon.com from di-
vulging to the government the log of books a person bought, we may
not want to prohibit a person’s neighbor or a stranger from telling the
police which books she happened to observe the person reading.
Where should we draw the line? One way is to focus on the type of
data involved, distinguishing between “private” and “nonprivate” in-
formation. The architecture would protect all personal information
that is private. But how is privacy to be defined?1 Following the se-
crecy paradigm, the Court has defined privacy as total secrecy. But
this definition obviously doesn’t work since it would exclude informa-
tion held by third parties.
Another way to define private information is to focus on “intimate”
information. A number of commentators, such as philosophers Julie
Inness and Tom Gerety, have contended that intimacy is the essential
characteristic of privacy.2 But what constitutes “intimate” informa-
tion? Without an adequate definition, “intimate” becomes nothing
more than a synonym for “private.” Some commentators, such as In-
ness, define “intimacy” as involving loving and caring relationships.3
However, much private information, such as financial and health
data, doesn’t pertain to these types of relationships.
The more fundamental problem with focusing on whether infor-
mation is private is that privacy is contextual and historically contin-
gent. Easy distinctions such as intimate versus nonintimate and
secret versus nonsecret fail to account for the complex nature of what
is considered private. Privacy is a dimension of social practices, activ-
ities, customs, and norms that are shaped by history and culture. The
matters that are considered private and public have changed
throughout history. Privacy is not an inherent property of particular
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forms of information, since even the most sensitive and revealing in-
formation is not private under all circumstances. Even if ordinarily a
person’s sex life or medical history is private, it wouldn’t be private if
that person were a public figure who routinely discussed these mat-
ters openly in public. Certainly, public disclosure does not eliminate
the privacy of information; indeed, even information that is exposed
to others may retain its private character. Nevertheless, privacy de-
pends upon degrees of accessibility of information, and under cer-
tain circumstances, even highly sensitive information may not be
private.
Additionally, focusing on the type of information does not solve
the problem of distinguishing between the neighbor’s telling the po-
lice what books he sees a person reading and Amazon.com’s provid-
ing the police with a complete inventory of the books the person has
purchased. By attempting to draw a line based upon the type of infor-
mation, these two instances would be treated similarly. Another ex-
ample more radically illustrates the problem. Many would deem
information about a person’s genitals to be private information.
Should the police be required to obtain a warrant before talking to a
victim of a sexual assault about an assailant’s genitals? This would be
absurd. On the other hand, many would express serious objections if
the police, without probable cause, could simply compel information
from the person’s doctor.
Another way a line could be drawn is based upon people’s expecta-
tions. Such an approach would draw from the Court’s notion of “rea-
sonable expectations of privacy.” The problem with this approach,
however, is that an empirical evaluation of expectations alone could
gradually lead to the diminishment of privacy as more and more peo-
ple come to expect that the records held by third parties can be read-
ily obtained by the government.4
If a line cannot be drawn based upon the type of information in-
volved or people’s expectations of privacy, then how should the line
be drawn? The answer must focus on relationships. Privacy is not in-
dependent of the relationships in which it is a part. Individuals read-
ily share information in certain private relationships, such as the
family. In particular relationships people undertake certain risks, in-
cluding the risk of betrayal by one with whom confidences are shared.
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The fact that there are expectations and risks, however, does not
mean that they must be the exclusive focus of our inquiry.
The issue is not the conceivable risk of betrayal, but rather which
risks people ought to assume and which risks people should be in-
sured against. This determination has a normative dimension. When
a patient discloses an ailment to a doctor, arguably the patient as-
sumes the risk that the doctor will disclose the information to the
public. However, there are several protections against this risk. Pa-
tient-physician confidentiality is protected by ethical rules, which if
violated could result in the loss of the doctor’s license to practice
medicine.5 Confidentiality is also protected with an evidentiary privi-
lege.6 Courts have created tort law causes of action against physicians
who disclose personal information.7 Finally, states have passed laws
that protect against the disclosure of medical information.8 Thus, in
numerous ways, the law structures the patient-physician relationship
to protect against the risk of disclosure. Similarly, the law of evidence
has recognized the importance of protecting the privacy of commu-
nications between attorney and client, priest and penitent, husband
and wife, and psychotherapist and patient.9 Our expectations in these
relationships are the product of both existing norms and the norm-
shaping power of the law. As Christopher Slobogin notes, “in a real
sense, we only assume those risks of unregulated government intru-
sion that the courts tell us we have to assume.”10
Therefore, the scope of the architecture should be shaped by con-
siderations regarding social relationships. The architecture’s scope
should encompass all instances when third parties share personal in-
formation contained within a “system of records.” This term is taken
from the Privacy Act, which defines a “system of records” as “a group
of any records . . . from which information is retrieved by the name of
the individual or by some identifying number, symbol, or other iden-
tifying particular assigned to the individual.”11 A “system of records” is
used to distinguish between collecting information by speaking with
specific individuals versus obtaining it through the vast stores of
records held by companies.
Focusing on systems of records targets at least two sets of relation-
ships that must be regulated: our relationships with the government
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and our relationships with the companies, employers, and other enti-
ties that possess personal information.
In relationships with the government, the focus should be on what
society wants the government to be able to know rather than whether
certain matters are public or private based on the extent of their ex-
posure to others. The Court’s conception of privacy assumes that the
government stands in the same shoes as everybody else, which is
clearly not the case. If we allow a loved one to read our diary, do we
also want the government to be able to read it? As Anthony Amster-
dam has observed: “For the tenement dweller, the difference between
observation by neighbors and visitors who ordinarily use the com-
mon hallways and observation by policemen who come into hallways
to ‘check up’ or ‘look around’ is the difference between all the privacy
that his condition allows and none.”12
Indeed, the existence of Fourth Amendment protection indicates
that the government stands in a different position than ordinary citi-
zens or private-sector organizations. The possibility of aggregation
and the rise of digital dossiers argue in favor of regulating the govern-
ment’s access to information.
The focus should be on the goals of the architecture rather than on
technical distinctions over whether information is intimate enough
or secret enough. These questions should not derail attention from
the important issue of whether government information gathering
activities present sufficient actual and potential dangers to warrant
protection. The problems discussed earlier regarding information
flows from the private sector to the government stem from the exten-
siveness of the personal information that businesses are reaping to-
day. Focusing on “systems of records” targets the type of information
flow that raises concern. Because the problem of modern govern-
ment information gathering is caused by the increasing dossiers
maintained in private-sector record systems, the architecture targets
those third parties that store data in record systems.
Our relationships with the entities that maintain record systems
about us differ from other social relationships. Though it is possible
for the government to obtain personal data by interviewing friends
and others, the information in records is more permanent in nature
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and is readily aggregated. Record systems are particularly dangerous
because of how easily data can be gathered, combined, stored, and
analyzed.
Further, entities that maintain systems of records collect data in a
power dynamic where information disclosure is often not consen-
sual. A person can take considerable steps to prevent a stranger from
collecting data without consent. For example, a person who is
overzealous in gathering information can be subject to laws prohibit-
ing stalking or harassment.
Relationships to employers and landlords, however, are different
than those with our friends, neighbors, and even strangers. Currently,
employers and landlords have a substantial amount of power to ex-
tort personal information. They often stand in an unequal position to
that of the individual employees or tenants. The nature of the rela-
tionship with employers and landlords provides them with a signifi-
cantly greater amount of power and control. If people aren’t willing to
supply the information, then they may not be hired or approved as a
tenant.
Relationships with merchants and communications providers
might not be as directly coercive as those with the entities that govern
our livelihoods and dwellings. Because these relationships are more
impersonal, should it be left up to the market to decide this issue?
Some might argue that if consumers demanded that companies pro-
tect their information from the government, then the market would
reflect these demands.
Thus far, however, the market has not been responsive to this issue.
As discussed earlier, privacy policies are often vague about informa-
tion flows to the government. Individuals are usually unaware of the
extent to which information about them is collected. People have
difficulty bargaining over privacy, and the market fails to afford suffi-
cient incentives to rectify this problem.13 Further, many companies
have never established a relationship with the people whose data
they have collected—and thus, there isn’t even the opportunity to
bargain.
Even if people are informed, they have little choice but to hand
over information to third parties. Life in the Information Age depends
upon sharing information with a host of third party companies. The
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Supreme Court in Smith and Miller has suggested that if people want
to protect privacy, they should not share their information with third
parties. However, refraining from doing so may result in people living
as Information Age hermits, without credit cards, banks, Internet
service, phones, and television. The market does not seem to offer a
wide array of choices for people about the amount of privacy they
would like to protect. As discussed in chapter , there is little hope
that the market alone will achieve the appropriate level of protection.
Therefore, the scope of the architecture must be defined broadly to
encompass any third party that maintains a “system of records.” This
definition of scope is not perfect, and there may be hard cases that
call for exceptions. However, this rule would provide clear guidance
to law enforcement officials when gathering information from third
parties. Clarity is a virtue. Unlike the existing statutory architecture,
which is complicated and often full of notable gaps, this architecture
has clear and simple boundaries.
Structure: Mechanisms of Oversight
Many different procedural mechanisms are available to control gov-
ernment information gathering, and they fall on a spectrum from no
control to complete restriction. In the middle of the spectrum are
mechanisms of oversight—where the government can access infor-
mation only if it can make certain showings before a neutral and ex-
ternal party. This middle course will work the best.
No Control. On the “no control” end of the spectrum, businesses may
voluntarily disclose personal information to the government. If it so
desired, Amazon.com could connect its computers to the FBI’s. If a
private-sector entity does not volunteer information, then the gov-
ernment can compel its production with a mere subpoena. The entity
need not contest the subpoena or provide notice to the person to
whom the information pertains. Whether the entity does so would be
left up to market forces—to contracts between the entity and the con-
sumer or privacy policies. The problem with “no control” is that it
does nothing to solve the problems caused by government informa-
tion gathering.
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Mechanisms of Restriction. On the other end of the spectrum are archi-
tectural mechanisms of restriction—prohibitions on government col-
lection and use of information. These mechanisms are embodied in
the architecture of the Fifth Amendment.14 The Fifth Amendment pro-
vides that “[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be
a witness against himself.”15 The Fifth Amendment’s privilege against
self-incrimination prevents the government from compelling individ-
uals to testify against themselves, and completely bars use of the infor-
mation obtained in violation of the right at trial. In contrast, under
current Fourth Amendment architecture, evidence is admissible at
trial so long as the government obtains it with a valid search warrant.
At one point in its history, the Fourth Amendment used to rely
heavily on mechanisms of restriction. Early cases, such as Boyd v.
United States,16 and Gouled v. United States,17 held that the govern-
ment could seize a person’s private papers only if they were instru-
mentalities of a crime—in other words, only if they were actually used
to commit the crime. If they were merely evidence of a crime, how-
ever, the government couldn’t obtain them—even with a warrant.
This rule became known as the “mere evidence” rule. The Court later
overturned it.18
Perhaps the mere evidence rule should be resurrected and applied
to third party records. This would effectively bar the government from
obtaining the records. The problem with this solution is that it would
cripple modern criminal investigation. As William Stuntz observes:
“Government regulation require[s] lots of information, and Boyd
came dangerously close to giving regulated actors a blanket entitle-
ment to nondisclosure. It is hard to see how modern health, safety,
environmental, or economic regulation would be possible in such a
regime.”19 Because Boyd rested in part on the Fifth Amendment, it
completely prevented the government from obtaining and using the
papers against the defendant no matter what procedure the govern-
ment had used to obtain them. This approach is far too restrictive
when it comes to most personal information maintained in third
party records.
Mechanisms of Oversight. In the middle of the spectrum are mecha-
nisms of oversight. An architecture containing this type of mecha-
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nism is preferable to regulate government access of records held by
third parties maintaining “systems of records.” Mechanisms of over-
sight allow the government to gather information, but the govern-
ment must first justify its need to do so by presenting facts and
evidence before a neutral detached judge or magistrate. Oversight is
embodied in the Fourth Amendment’s per se warrant rule. The war-
rant requirement achieves the aims of minimization, particulariza-
tion, and control. Collection is minimized by the requirement that
the government justify that its information gathering is legitimate
and necessary. The warrant ensures particularization with its require-
ment that there be probable cause that a particular person be en-
gaged in criminal activity or that particular place contains evidence
of a crime. Finally, the warrant achieves control (at least over the col-
lection efforts) by having a neutral and detached party authorize the
collection.
In many cases, warrants are the best regulatory device for govern-
ment information gathering. Often, at the point during an investiga-
tion when certain information from third parties becomes important
to obtain, there is already enough evidence to support a warrant. In
both Smith and Miller there was probably sufficient evidence for the
police to secure warrants. Therefore, the requirement of a warrant
prevents cases of illegitimate abuses—such as large-scale informa-
tion sweeps and investigations without particularized suspicion—
without unduly interfering with legitimate law enforcement
activities. Further, third party records have few of the dangers that
make warrants inefficient. For example, because third parties main-
tain the records, there are fewer opportunities for a suspect to hide or
destroy documents during the time law enforcement officials obtain
a warrant.
However, as discussed previously, merely applying the Fourth
Amendment to government access to third party records proves inad-
equate. The exclusionary rule only provides a remedy at trial, and
many of the abuses associated with government information gather-
ing extend far beyond criminal trials. Therefore, I recommend a fu-
sion between warrants and subpoenas.
Despite being far more permissive for government information col-
lection purposes, subpoenas have certain protections not available
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with search warrants. Unlike warrants, they can be challenged prior
to the seizure of the documents. The subpoenaed party can refuse to
comply and make a motion to quash before a judge. Further, subpoe-
nas permit the target to produce the documents rather than have
government agents rummage through a person’s home or belong-
ings.20 The advantages of subpoenas over search warrants are best il-
lustrated in Zurcher v. The Stanford Daily,21 where the police searched
a newspaper’s offices for evidence relating to a criminal suspect. The
newspaper was not involved in the alleged crime; it merely possessed
evidence. The Court upheld the search because the police obtained a
valid warrant. Dissenting justices contended that there were First
Amendment concerns with searches of newspaper offices because
they would disrupt journalistic activities and result in “the possibility
of disclosure of information received from confidential sources, or of
the identity of the sources themselves.”22 Congress responded to
Zurcher by passing the Privacy Protection Act of , which restricts
the use of search warrants for offices of newspapers and other media
entities for evidence of crimes of other parties.23 In effect, the Act re-
quires the use of subpoenas in addition to warrants to obtain such ev-
idence.
The benefits of subpoenas, however, often do not apply when they
are issued on the third parties to produce an individual’s records. The
third party does not need to notify the individual or may not have any
incentive to challenge the subpoena in court. Further, as discussed
earlier, subpoenas have many weaknesses compared to warrants,
such as a lack of requiring particularized suspicion and little protec-
tion by way of oversight by the judiciary.
Therefore, the Fourth Amendment architecture should be resur-
rected statutorily, by creating a requirement that the government ob-
tain a special court order—a fusion between a warrant and a
subpoena. From warrants, the standard of probable cause should be
used. This threshold would require government officials to go before
a judge with specific facts and evidence that a particular person is in-
volved in criminal activity. For example, a probable cause standard
would prevent government officials from scouring through databases
to locate all people who bought books about bomb making or drug
manufacturing. Such a search is akin to the types of general searches
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that the Framers wanted to forbid. From subpoenas, advance notice
should be provided to the person whose records are involved, and
that person should be able to challenge the order in court. This statu-
tory regime would incorporate the exclusionary rule, a minimum
statutory damages provision, and a framework for disciplining
offending law enforcement officials.
Moreover, third parties maintaining personal information in a
“system of records” should be restricted from voluntarily disclosing
an individual’s personal information to the government except under
special circumstances. Exceptions might include allowing disclosure
to prevent an imminent threat of harm to another. Another exception
would allow the individual to whom the records pertain to authorize
the government to obtain them from the third party. For example, if a
victim of computer hacking wanted to permit the government to ac-
cess the victim’s own ISP records, the victim could authorize the gov-
ernment to do so.
Regulating Post-Collection Use of Data
Another problem that must be addressed is the way personal infor-
mation is used once it has been collected. As Stuntz astutely observes:
“Fourth Amendment law regulates the government’s efforts to un-
cover information, but it says nothing about what the government
may do with the information it uncovers. Yet as the Clinton investiga-
tion shows, often the greater privacy intrusion is not the initial disclo-
sure but the leaks that follow.”24 Legal scholar Carol Steiker notes:
“Unlike other countries in North America and Western Europe, the
United States [has] never developed a national plan to organize a ‘sys-
tem’ of policing or to provide for centralized control over police au-
thority.”25 Once information is collected, the Fourth Amendment’s
architecture of oversight no longer applies. This is problematic, as
many of the abuses of information by the government occur after the
information has been collected.
The Privacy Act of  provides some limited regulation of records
maintained by law enforcement entities. But as discussed earlier in
chapter , the Act contains many exceptions and loopholes that
have limited its effectiveness. Government entities often can share
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information widely with each other.26 Additionally, the Act applies
only to the federal government.
The Privacy Act is an important first step in reining in the vast
stores of data that government entities collect. There remains, how-
ever, much room for the Privacy Act to be improved and strength-
ened. One possible safeguard is to mandate the destruction of data
after a certain period of time or, mandate the transfer of data to the
judicial branch after a certain period of time for access only under
special circumstances. Another way is to adopt a meaningful purpose
specification restriction. This means that, with certain reasonable ex-
ceptions, information collected from third party records may only be
used for the particular purpose for which it is collected.
Developing an Architecture
The government’s increasing access to our digital dossiers is one of
the most significant threats to privacy of our times, and it is inade-
quately regulated. The Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has
been mired in the difficulties of conceptualizing privacy, thus pre-
venting the application of the Fourth Amendment. A statutory regime
has arisen to fill the void, but it is severely flawed. A new architecture
must be constructed, one that effectively regulates the government’s
collection and use of third party records. The process toward develop-
ing an appropriate architecture should begin by regulating both the
government’s acquisition of personal data and its downstream uses of
it. As for acquiring personal information stored in a system of records,
the government should be required to obtain a special court order
that combines the benefits of subpoenas and warrants. As for down-
stream uses, specific limits must be established for how long the gov-
ernment can keep personal information and for what the government
can do with it. The task of developing an architecture is not easy in a
rapidly changing society that is adjusting to the new dimensions of
the Information Age. This proposed solution is thus a beginning of
the process.
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Conclus ion
The problems arising from the emergence of digital dossiers are pro-
foundly important. They affect the power of individuals, institutions,
and the government; and they pervade numerous relationships that
form the framework of modern society. The way we respond to these
problems will significantly shape the type of society we are construct-
ing. Digital dossiers will affect our freedom and power; they will
define the very texture and tenor of our lives.
Ideally, technology empowers us, gives us greater control over our
lives, and makes us more secure. But digital technologies of data
gathering and use are having the opposite effect. Increasingly, com-
panies and the government are using computers to make important
decisions about us based on our dossiers, and we are frequently not
able to participate in the process.
As discussed throughout this book, the law of information privacy
has not yet effectively grappled with these problems. Certainly, infor-
mation privacy law has had positive effects. It would be far too simple
to conclude that the law has failed. But the law has not been suffi-
ciently successful, and the problems have grown much more trou-
bling during the law’s watch.
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One response to these developments is a cynical one. Some com-
mentators argue that things have already progressed too far for law
to grapple with the problems of digital dossiers. Scott McNealy, CEO
of Sun Microsystems, famously quips: “You already have zero pri-
vacy. Get over it.”1 Amitai Etzioni observes that “as long as Americans
wish to enjoy the convenience of using credit cards and checks (as
opposed to paying cash) and of ordering merchandise over the phone
and the Internet (rather than shopping in person), they will leave
data trails that are difficult to erase or conceal.”2 “To be realistic,”
Etzioni states, “the probability of returning the genie to the bottle
is nil.”3
Too often, discussions of privacy parade a horde of horribles, rais-
ing fears of new technologies developing too fast for the law to han-
dle. We are left with a sense of hopelessness—technology will
continue to erode privacy and there is little we can do to stop it. To the
contrary, I believe that there is much cause for optimism. We are still
in the early days of the Information Age, and we still have the ability
to shape the networks of information flow.
In fact, technology isn’t the primary culprit—many of the privacy
problems I discussed are caused in large part because of the law. The
law plays a profound role not just in solving the problems of digital
dossiers, but in manufacturing them as well. The law is not merely re-
active to new technologies that threaten privacy, but is also a shaping
force behind these technologies as well as the amount of privacy we
experience today. We often see privacy as naturally occurring and
threatened by rapidly developing technology. Law must intervene to
protect privacy. However, law creates and constructs the world we live
in. This is particularly true with privacy. To a significant degree, pri-
vacy is legally constructed. Law already shapes our ability to hide in-
formation and it shapes information accessibility. Law makes certain
information publicly available; it keeps places (such as the home) pri-
vate by enforcing trespass and property laws. Law also shapes our ex-
pectations of privacy in many contexts.4
The law also influences much of the loss of privacy. Many privacy
problems are the product of legal decisions that have been made over
the past century as we have shaped our modern information econ-
omy. Once we understand the full extent of the legal construction of
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privacy, we will realize that privacy is not passively slipping away but
is being actively eliminated by the way we are constructing the infor-
mation economy through the law.
In the nineteenth century, Americans faced many significant pri-
vacy problems. For example, since colonial times, the privacy of the
mail was a vexing problem. Sealing letters was difficult.5 Benjamin
Franklin, who was in charge of the colonial mails, required his em-
ployees to swear an oath not to open mail.6 Nevertheless, significant
concerns persisted about postal clerks reading people’s letters.
Thomas Jefferson, Alexander Hamilton, and George Washington fre-
quently complained about the lack of privacy in their letters, and they
would sometimes write in code.7 As Thomas Jefferson wrote: “[T]he
infidelities of the post office and the circumstances of the times are
against my writing fully and freely.”8
These problems persisted in the nineteenth century. As Ralph
Waldo Emerson declared, it was unlikely that “a bit of paper, contain-
ing our most secret thoughts, and protected only by a seal, should
travel safely from one end of the world to the other, without anyone
whose hands it had passed through having meddled with it.”9 The law
responded to these problems. Congress passed several strict laws
protecting the privacy of the mail.10 And in , in Ex Parte Jackson,
the Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment prohibited gov-
ernment officials from opening letters without a warrant.11
In the nineteenth century, one might have simply concluded that
people shouldn’t expect privacy in their letters, and that they should
“get over it.” But privacy isn’t just found but constructed. It is the
product of a vision for a future society. By erecting a legal structure to
protect the privacy of letters, our society shaped the practices of let-
ter-writing and using the postal system. It occurred because of the
desire to make privacy an integral part of these practices rather than
to preserve the status quo.
Similar examples abound in the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries. When the increasing amount of information collected by
the U.S. census sparked a public outcry, Congress took action by
passing powerful laws to safeguard the confidentiality of census in-
formation.12 After Warren and Brandeis’s  article, The Right to Pri-
vacy,13 raised concern over new technologies in photography and an
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increasingly sensationalistic press, courts and legislatures responded
by creating many new privacy laws.
Today, we face new technological challenges. Many of the prob-
lems we currently encounter are created by the profound growth in
the creation and use of digital dossiers. Part of the difficulty we are
experiencing in dealing with these problems is that they are not as
easy to capture in a soundbite, and they often do not quickly materi-
alize as concrete injuries. When a scandalous secret is disclosed or a
hidden video camera is installed in one’s bedroom, we can easily rec-
ognize and describe the privacy harms. The troubles caused by digi-
tal dossiers are of a different sort. These harms are complex and
abstract, which is why I invoked the metaphor of Kafka’s The Trial,
since Kafka was so adept at depicting these types of harms. Today,
like the all-encompassing Court system that assembled a dossier
about Joseph K., large organizations we know little about are produc-
ing digital dossiers about us. The dossiers capture a kind of digital
person—a personality translated into digitized form, composed of
records, data fragments, and bits of information. Our digital dossiers
remain woefully insecure, at risk of being polluted by identity thieves
or riddled with careless errors. And all the while, we are like Joseph
K.—powerless, uncertain, and uneasy—constantly kept on the out-
side while important decisions about us are being made based on
our dossiers.
I have argued that we need to rethink traditional notions of pri-
vacy in order to solve these problems. Protecting privacy in the Infor-
mation Age is a question of social design. It is about designing an
architecture for the information networks that are increasingly con-
stitutive of modern society. The law must restructure our relation-
ships with the entities collecting and using our personal information.
These relationships are not naturally occurring—it is the law that has
defined our relationships to various businesses and institutions, and
it is thus the law that is at least partly responsible for our powerless-
ness and vulnerability. Changing our relationships with bureaucra-
cies can’t be achieved through isolated lawsuits. We need a regulatory
system, akin to the ones we have in place regulating our food, envi-
ronment, and financial institutions.
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The law actively contributes to the creation of our dossiers by com-
pelling people to give up personal data, placing it in public records,
and then allowing it to be amassed by database companies. The solu-
tion is for the law to place greater controls on its public records by
limiting the degree to which personal information in these records
can be accessed and used.
The increasing government access and use of our digital dossiers is
also the product of legal decisions made during the past century. The
Supreme Court has interpreted the Fourth Amendment in a short-
sighted way, and the use of dossiers threatens a profound end-run
around Fourth Amendment protections. The law that fills the void
fails to adequately control the government’s tapping into our digital
dossiers. The solution is to create a legal structure for keeping govern-
ment access to our digital dossiers in check. The government should
be required to obtain a special court order when it wants to access
personal data that is maintained in a business’s record systems.
All of these solutions are not absolutist ones. I am not advocating
that businesses be forbidden from collecting personal data or that
public records be made inaccessible or that the government be pro-
hibited from obtaining personal information. These absolutist solu-
tions are not practical in an information society. In this respect, those
that say the genie can’t be stuffed back into the bottle are correct. We
will not suddenly turn into Luddites and throw away our credit cards,
stop surfing the Internet, and return to using paper records. We are in
an Information Age, and there is no turning back. But this does not
mean that privacy is destined for extinction. We can have the benefits
of an information-driven world without sacrificing privacy. The solu-
tions I propose do not stop the flow of data. Companies can still
gather information; public records can be made widely available; and
the government can obtain personal information. But when compa-
nies collect our data, the law should impose weighty responsibilities
and should allow people to have greater participation in how the data
is used. When public records are made available, the law should do so
along with demanding restrictions on access and use. When the gov-
ernment wants to obtain personal data, the law should mandate that
it demonstrate before a neutral judicial official that it has a factual
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basis that the search will reveal evidence of a particular person’s crim-
inal activity.
The law can protect privacy. This does not require that the law be-
come involved in areas in which it currently has been absent—the law
is already involved. The choices we make in shaping the law are of
critical importance. The law is currently making choices, and it is at-
tempting to balance privacy against countervailing interests such as
efficiency, transparency, free speech, and safety. As I have demon-
strated throughout this book, however, our understandings of privacy
must be significantly rethought. Once privacy is reconceptualized, we
can find ways to accommodate both privacy and its opposing inter-
ests. With an understanding of privacy appropriate for the problems
we now face, the law will be better able to build privacy into our bur-
geoning information society.
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; “angel” vs. “demon” customers, ;
black-and-white view of, , ; bu-
reaucracy, , ; in census data, –;
compensation for, ; curtailing collec-
tion of, ; disclosure of, , ; dis-
crepancies in, –; explanatory
details, n; forced disclosure of,
; future uses of, ; in government
bureaucracies, ; government func-
tioning, ; as identifier, ; illumina-
tion of government functioning, ,
, ; inaccuracies in, ; incremen-
tal release of, –; on the Internet, ;
market-based solutions to privacy
problems, ; national database of, ;
need for federal agency to regulate col-
lection and use of personal informa-
tion, –; opportunity to assert
privacy interest, ; participation in
uses of, –, , , , , ;
personal control of, , –, ; po-
tential for abusing, ; in private sec-
tor, n; private sector handling of,
, ; processing of, ; prohibitions
on disseminating, ; property rights
to, –, , n; In re Guess.com,
Inc., ; relinquishment of full title to,
, ; responsibility for, ; sales of,
–; security practices, , ; trade
in, ; use restriction laws, , –;
value of, –. See also contractual de-
fault rules for ownership of personal
information
Personal Responsibility and Work Oppor-
tunity Reconciliation Act (), 
Philadelphia Police Department (PPD),

Phone numbers, , , , 
Photographs, , , –
Physical incursion conception of invasion
of privacy, –
Poindexter, John, , 
Police: coercion and violence by, , ;
interviewing by, ; the most efficient,
; national police, ; objectivity of,
n; Philadelphia Police Depart-
ment (PPD), ; professionalization of,
; public disclosure of payroll
records, ; warrants, n
Political contributions, –
Portrait of a Lady (James), 
Posner, Richard, , 
Pound, Roscoe, , n
Power: Big Brother, ; bureaucracy,
–, ; of businesses, ; effective-
ness of individual remedies, , ,
; of government, ; inequalities in
information transfers, ; information
and, ; in Kafka’s Trial, –, ;
knowledge and, ; social relationships,
; system of records, . See also bar-
gaining power
Powerlessness: architectures of vulnera-
bility, ; bureaucracy, , ; computer
databases, , –; digital dossiers,
; government information collec-
tion, ; harms created by, ; in-
equalities in knowledge, ;
information collection, ; Kafka
metaphor for invasion of privacy, ;
privacy and, –, 
Powers, Richard, 
PPD (Philadelphia Police Department),

Princeton University, 
Privacy: accessibility of information, ,
; active elimination of, ; Big
Brother and, , ; bodily intrusions,
–; Cohen on, ; collection/use
of personal information, , ; com-
puterization, ; constitutive privacy,
–; construction of, –; con-
textual nature, –; control of use of
information, , ; death of, , ,
; definition of, ; desire for, , ;
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disclosure of personal information, ;
financial records, , –; First
Amendment, –, –; Fourth
Amendment, –, –, –;
freedom of association, ; “going
price” of, ; importance to people, ;
incorporeal injuries, ; Information
Age hermits, ; infringements of, ;
institutional interests in, ; intimacy
and, ; lack of, ; loss of, –;
McNealy on, ; natural occurrence
of, ; police coercion and violence,
, ; powerlessness and, –, ;
preferences, , –; as a property
right, –, n; protections pro-
vided by, ; in public, ; reasonable
expectation of, , –; risk and,
–; Rosen on, ; Schwartz on, ,
–; secrecy paradigm, , –, ;
social and legal structure, –; social
relationships, –; state protec-
tions, ; stated concerns compared to
behavior, –, , –; Supreme
Court’s conceptualization of, –,
–, , ; term not in U.S. Con-
stitution, ; threats to, , , –,
, , , , –; trans-
parency, –, –; use restric-
tion laws, ; ways of understanding,
; in well-functioning markets, ;
Westin on, ; zero privacy, . See also
architecture conception of privacy; in-
vasion conception of privacy; right to
privacy
Privacy Act (): amendments proposed
by author, ; Andrews v. Veterans Ad-
ministration, –; applicability, ;
Freedom of Information Act, ; limi-
tations, , –, , –; provi-
sions, ; “routine use” exception, ,
, ; sharing of records between
government agencies, –; Social
Security numbers, ; system of
records, 
Privacy law: historical context, ; per-
sonal relationships with business and
government, ; right of access to
public records, ; Right to Privacy
(Warren and Brandeis), –, –,
–, –. See also information
privacy law
Privacy policies: Amazon.com’s, –;
Bennet on, ; changes in, ; contracts
compared to, –; difficulties with,
; EBay’s, ; enforcement mecha-
nisms, ; feasibility of personal cus-
tomization, ; Federal Trade Commis-
sion (FTC), , n; incentives for
adopting, ; lack of interest in, ;
Lessig on, ; model statement, ; as
replacement for Fourth Amendment,
; similarities among, ; Smith on,
; “trustmark” for, ; violations of,
–, 
Privacy preferences, , –
Privacy Protection Act (), 
Privacy protections: architecture concep-
tion of privacy, –; Boyd v. United
States, –, ; competition in the
marketplace, ; credit reporting agen-
cies, ; European Union vs. U.S., ,
–; Fair Information Practices,
–; Fourth Amendment, ,
–; inequalities in knowledge,
–; in invasion conception of pri-
vacy, , ; isolated infractions, ,
, ; law and, , ; markets and,
, , ; minimum floor for, –,
; nondisclosure, ; OECD guide-
lines, , ; paper records, ; par-
ticipation in uses of personal
information, , ; personal rela-
tionships with business and govern-
ment, ; Privacy Protection Act
(), ; private sector handling of
personal information, , ; property
rights, , n; public records, ;
records not protected at all, –;
requirements for viable protection, ;
social design, ; social structure, ;
state laws compared to federal laws,
; through architecture, ; type of
information vs. third party possessing
it, 
Private-sector databases, –; Big
Brother, ; ChoicePoint’s, –; gov-
ernment data protection boards,
n; government purchase of data
from, –; government requests for
data from, , ; as “Little Brothers,”
, n; mass marketing, ; public
records, , , ; as salable assets,
; targeted/database marketing, –
Probable cause: architecture for govern-
ing government information collec-
tion, ; Fourth Amendment, , ;
government information collection,
; relevance vs., ; warrants, 
Profiling, –, –, , –, n
Property law, 
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Property rights: alienability of property,
; bargaining power, ; consent, ;
in defective markets, ; initial entitle-
ments, ; to personal information,
–, , n; privacy as one, –,
n; privacy protections, ,
n; Westin on, 
Property tax assessment records, 
Prosser, William, 
Protective orders, –
Psychographic information, –
Psychotherapy patients, 
Public disclosure: abortion doctors, ;
accessibility of information, ; An-
drews v. Veterans Administration,
–; black-and-white view, , ;
Briscoe v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, ;
computer databases, ; Cox Broad-
casting Corp. v. Cohn, , ; defined,
; disclosure of information by physi-
cians, ; Forsher v. Bugliosi, ; juve-
nile offenders’ names, –; Melvin
v. Reid, ; motives of requesters of
public records, ; NAACP v. Alabama,
; names and addresses, ; Paul P. v.
Verniero, ; police payroll records,
; prohibitions on compelling,
–; protective orders, –; rape
victim’s name, –; redaction be-
fore, –; Restatement of, ; “rou-
tine use” exception in Privacy Act
(), , ; Russell v. Gregoire, ;
sanctioning disclosure of public infor-
mation, ; Scheetz v. Morning Call,
Inc., ; Social Security numbers, ,
; specifying purpose for, –;
teacher salaries, ; Walls v. City of Pe-
tersburg, 
Public office, 
Public records, –; access to (see pub-
lic records, access to); arrest records,
–, , ; bankruptcy records,
–, n; birth records, ; Cali-
fornia, ; Colorado, ; commercial
use of, ; common law, –; com-
pilations of, , , n; confiden-
tiality, ; conviction records, , ;
data in, –, ; digitalization of,
–; disclosure of, –; divorce
records, ; Dunhill v. Director, District
of Columbia Department of Trans-
portation, ; family court proceed-
ings, ; Florida, ; Georgia, ;
government power, ; information
brokers, ; on the Internet, , ;
Kentucky, ; laws governing, –;
limits on disclosure, –; Louisiana,
; Massachusetts, , n;
Megan’s Laws, , , n; motives
of requesters of, ; motor vehicle
records, ; Nixon v. Warner Commu-
nications, Inc., , n; number of
federal government databases, ;
Ohio, ; Pennsylvania, ; political
contributions, –; Privacy Act
(), , –; privacy problem
caused by, ; privacy protections, ;
private-sector databases, , , ;
property tax assessment records, ;
protective orders, –; public dis-
closure, –; public-sector data-
bases, –; redaction before
disclosure, –; Reno v. Condon, ;
restricting contents of, ; sales of data
from, ; secrecy paradigm, ; secu-
rity, ; sex offender records, , ;
state records, , –; “street lists,”
; threats to privacy, ; trends
affecting, ; true information in,
–; use restriction laws, –,
–; vital records, ; voting
records, , ; worker’s compensa-
tion records, . See also court records;
freedom of information laws (FOIAs);
government
Public records, access to, –; busi-
nesses, ; commercial speech, ;
conditional access, –; court
records, –; Cox Broadcasting
Corp. v. Cohn, , ; criminal trials,
; First Amendment, –; Florida
Star v. B.J.F., –; Globe Newspaper
Co. v. Superior Court, ; illumination
of government functioning, , ,
; judicial records, n; juvenile
offenders’ names, –; Los Angeles
Police Department v. United Reporting
Publishing Co., ; membership lists,
; NAACP v. Alabama, ; pre-access
vs. post-access restrictions, –;
public domain, –, ; public records
law, –; Publicker Industries, Inc. v.
Cohen, –; purpose for, –; re-
strictions on, –, , –, ;
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,
; technology, ; vulnerability, 
Publicker Industries, Inc. v. Cohen, –
R. L. Polk & Co., 
Rape victims, , –
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RDC (Regulatory DataCorp), 
RealNetworks, Inc., 
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